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This dissertation leverages a phenomenon of racial reclassification in Brazil to shed new 
light on the processes of identity politicization. Conventional wisdom tells us that the 
history of race mixture, fluid racial boundaries, and stigmatized blackness lead 
Brazilians to capitalize on racial fluidity and change their racial identifications—to 
reclassify—toward whiteness. In more recent years, however, Brazilians have 
demonstrated a marked and newfound tendency to reclassify towards blackness. I argue 
that this sudden reversal is the unintended consequence of expanded access to secondary 
and university education in recent decades, which has led many to develop a racialized 
political consciousness, what I refer to as political identity. State-led efforts to better 
include lower-class sectors of the citizenry through educational expansion have 
increased formerly marginal and newly mobile citizens’ exposure to information, social 
networks, and the labor market, while also endowing them with greater internal efficacy. 
Greater exposure and efficacy, in turn, have led many to challenge commonsense racial 
hierarchies and the national myth of racial unity as they have come face-to-face with 
racialized inequalities in their quests for upward mobility. Reclassification toward 
blackness, then, is an articulation of these newfound and racialized political identities. 
 This theory is informed and developed through in-depth interviews with 
reclassifiers collected during more than 15 months of field research in two Brazilian 
 cities. These insights are empirically and systematically tested with longitudinal cohort 
analysis of annual household data from the census bureau. Additionally, drawing on 
original survey experiments and an original panel dataset of public university students, 
I test and find inconsistent support for a rival instrumental hypothesis based on the 
implementation of race-targeted affirmative action, as well as the hypothesis that racial 
identification has been shaped by the state’s changing discourse toward race and the 
national myth of racial unity. Finally, analyzing an originally designed survey, I explore 
the consequences of these racialized political identities for political engagement and the 
exercise of citizenship. 
 Ultimately, this dissertation contributes a novel account of identity politicization 
at the individual level and emphasizes the interaction between social structure and 
citizenship institutions in these processes. 
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 Merely by describing yourself as black you have started on a road towards 
emancipation, you have committed yourself to a fight against all forces that seek to 
use your blackness as a stamp that marks you out as a subservient being. 
—Steve Biko, “The Definition of Black Consciousness” 
 
 
 
A casa-grande surta quando a senzala aprende a ler. 
The masters lose their minds when the slaves learn to read. 
—Brazilian aphorism 
 
 
 
Voice is political action par excellence. 
—Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
That’s when I was like “I’m black,” you know? 
 
These are the words of Jorge, a university student in his mid-30s living in Recife, a 
coastal city in northeastern Brazil. On a sunny and breezy morning in 2017, Jorge 
invited me to his parents’ home in a middle-class neighborhood in the center of the city, 
where he recounted for me the details of his personal transformation. Jorge, like many 
others I came to meet in Brazil, is classified as white on his birth certificate—the work 
of his parents, he reports. Today, however, he self-identifies as black. Reflecting on his 
experience growing up in the middle class in Recife, Jorge says that at the time he never 
thought much about race or his racial identity, per se, but that today he sees many of his 
past experiences as deeply racialized. This changed for Jorge at university, where he 
enrolled in a sociology course on black feminism. There, he gained exposure to new 
information and perspectives, and he found himself relating to the personal anecdotes 
and examples of racism suffered and shared by his classmates. It was this experience, 
Jorge tells me, that led him to “discover [him]self” as black.  
 Tiago, an economics student in his mid-20s who also studied at a university in 
Recife, tells a similar story. Like Jorge, Tiago tells me that he is classified as white on 
his birth certificate, that today he identifies as black, and that while growing up he never 
gave much thought to his racial identity. When I ask Tiago what, then, prompted such 
a stark shift in his racial identification, he tells me that one day he was hanging out with 
friends from university who brought him to an event organized by the black movement. 
There, Tiago heard the anecdotes and stories of personal struggle and everyday racism 
that the activists were sharing. He tells me that these stories resonated with him in ways 
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he was not expecting because he had not realized he endured racism—that is, because 
he did not consider himself black. But upon hearing about experiences so similar to his 
own, Tiago asked himself, “how had I not realized this before?” He tells me, “I looked 
back and said ‘jeez, that all happened to me because I was black. Because I am black.’ 
It was really just like that. It was a discovery.” 
 The personal and racial trajectories of Jorge and Tiago are as unremarkable as 
they are remarkable in Brazil. They are unremarkable because their stories are functions 
of the fluidity and ambiguity of racial boundaries that have long earned Brazil special 
status as the world’s foremost “racial democracy,” a racially united nation born from 
the mixture of European, African, and indigenous peoples. Without rigid racial 
boundaries such as those found in the United States or South Africa, such boundary-
crossing was not only acceptable, but commonplace. Yet it is the very history of 
boundary-crossing in Brazil that also makes these trajectories remarkable. For while 
Brazil is known—and lauded by some—for its particular form of raceless nationalism, 
below the surface of the country’s national myth have long lain rampant racism, deep 
inequalities, and the everyday practice of whitening, in which Brazilians would 
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Figure 1.1 Brazil’s Racial Composition, 1992-2014. Source: Brazilian census bureau (IBGE), census 
and annual household surveys (PNAD).   
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capitalize on the fluidity of racial boundaries to change their racial identifications—to 
reclassify—and place themselves in lighter racial categories, when possible. 
 Not so since the early 2000s. In more recent years, many Brazilians like Jorge 
and Tiago have demonstrated a marked and newfound tendency to reclassify not toward 
whiteness, but instead toward blackness. Figure 1 shows the racial composition of Brazil 
from 1992 to 2014, as determined by the Brazilian census bureau. Between the 2000 
and 2010 censuses, the Brazilian population unexpectedly turned from majority to 
minority-white—a sudden structural shift that, as we will see, is left unexplained by 
demographic trends or changes in census enumeration practices. Instead, what has 
become clear is that Brazilians are increasingly assuming the stigmatized labels of 
blackness. 
 This dissertation analyzes these patterns of racial reclassification as a 
springboard for shedding new light on the processes of identity change and 
politicization. Specifically, this project aims to understand why Brazilians are choosing 
to reclassify toward blackness, that is, social categories that are associated with stigma 
and that are often the target of discrimination. In seeking to account for these patterns, 
it also aims to explain why this could happen so suddenly; why ostensibly at the 
beginning of the 2000s; and why increasingly over time. In so doing, this project 
provides a novel theoretical account of the individual-level processes of political 
identity formation. Those familiar with Brazil will be quick to attribute such change to 
new material incentives created by the implementation of race-targeted affirmative 
action policies. As we will see in the chapters that follow, however, this parsimonious 
explanation finds inconsistent empirical support and struggles to account for long-term 
identity change in this context of racial fluidity and stigmatized blackness. Instead, I 
develop and test the argument that these patterns are best understood as the unintended 
consequence of recent efforts at educational expansion, which has altered many 
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Brazilians’ racial self-understandings, led them to cross previously recognized racial 
boundaries, and imbued newfound racial identities with political meaning. 
The Brazilian case is particularly well positioned to offer insights into the 
processes of political identity formation. To the extent that Brazil has appeared in the 
literature on ethnic and racial politics, scholars have noted the weak politicization of 
racial differences (Bueno and Dunning 2017; Hanchard 1994; also see Yashar 2005). 
Indeed, Brazil is typically analyzed as a “negative” case demanding explanation or one 
that offers crucial variation on the (in)dependent variable (Lieberman 2003, 2009; Marx 
1998; Nobles 2000). Scholars agree that race has been politically relevant only insofar 
as elites have largely disarticulated racial differences by constructing a racially inclusive 
nation that whitewashes Brazil’s history as the single largest and longest-running 
participant in the slave trade, as well as slavery’s persistent role in shaping present-day 
inequalities (Andrews 1991, 2004; Loveman 2014; Schwarcz 1993; Skidmore 1974; 
Stepan 1991). Thus with little prior expectation for racial categories to crystallize as 
political identities, I aim to leverage Brazil’s “exceptionalism” (Pepinsky 2017) in this 
regard as a rare opportunity to study political identity formation where such identity 
change is not only possible, but possible to empirically and systematically detect. 
 
The Argument 
  I argue that this sudden reversal in patterns of reclassification is the unintended 
consequence of expanded access to secondary and university education in recent 
decades, which has led many newly mobile citizens to develop a racialized political 
consciousness—what I refer to as political identity. Beginning in the 1990s, state-led 
efforts to incorporate marginal sectors of the citizenry through social policy expansion 
granted the lower classes—many of whom are racially ambiguous and susceptible to 
ideologies of white superiority—unprecedented access to the benefits of social 
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citizenship. Expanded access to education, in particular, increased marginal citizens’ 
exposure to new information, social networks, and labor market experiences, and 
increased their sense of internal political efficacy. This increased exposure and efficacy, 
in turn, have led many of these formerly marginal and newly mobile citizens to confront 
and challenge Brazil’s national myth of racial unity and commonsense racial hierarchies 
as they have come face-to-face with racialized inequalities in their quests for upward 
mobility. Reclassification toward blackness, then, can be understood as an articulation 
of these newfound and racialized political identities – the development of which is due 
in part to Brazil’s structural conditions of extreme inequality and racial stratification, as 
well as access to the benefits of social citizenship. 
 In historical perspective, what sets this recent era of social incorporation apart, 
and what explains the sudden timing of these patterns, is state-level changes in the 
coverage and nature of social benefits allocated to citizens by the state. In decades past, 
literacy requirements excluded large segments of the poor from the franchise, and social 
benefits were accessible only by formal labor sectors, and were allocated in service of 
the state’s goals of modernization and development (Collier and Collier 2002; Fischer 
2008; Loveman 2014). As the third wave of democratization reached Brazil by the 
1980s, a new and progressive constitution not only codified universal rights of social 
citizenship for all Brazilians, but lifted literacy requirements for political citizenship 
(Garay 2016). In this altered political arena, left- and right-of-center governments, 
suddenly competing for the political support of the masses, had great incentive to reform 
and fund social policy institutions to improve access to and the quality of social benefits. 
Specifically, reforms in basic education included increased spending at all levels, altered 
spending formulas, and restructured incentives and resource delivery to circumvent 
political patronage and clientelism. At the university level, reforms included the 
expansion of and creation of new and free public universities, race- and means-targeted 
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affirmative action programs, and greater ease of access via reforms to the entrance 
exam, new scholarship programs, and federally funded financial aid. The result has been 
remarkable improvements in quality and access to secondary and university education 
at all levels of Brazil’s income structure. The ultimate consequence of educational 
expansion for many citizens, I argue, however, has been the new kinds of personal 
experiences that upward mobility entails and that can shape racial subjectivity and 
political consciousness. 
 In broader theoretical terms, this dissertation establishes that individuals might 
claim and articulate identities that are associated with stigma and discrimination, rather 
than distance themselves from them, when these self-understandings constitute a 
political identity. By political identity, I mean those categories of social membership 
that shape individuals’ perceptions and understandings of power relationships, broadly 
defined. Thus whereas previously individuals self-whitened in response to the myriad 
incentives for whiteness that permeated society, recent generations of lower class and 
upwardly mobile citizens (who are darker-skinned, on average, but who have options in 
terms of their racial self-identifications) are increasingly coming to understand their 
relative positions in society in racial terms. For many of these individuals, the 
development of racialized political identities is not determined simply by one’s physical 
appearance, nor by one’s objective location in the social structure. Instead, it rests on 
one’s subjective judgments and interpretations of power asymmetries between groups, 
interpretations which are influenced by their access to a key benefit of social citizenship. 
By (in)directly altering personal experiences through exposure and empowering them 
with greater internal efficacy, greater education has encouraged citizens to question 
commonsense social hierarchies, demand equality of opportunity, and articulate 
identities and pursue interests in diverse political arenas.  
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On the one hand, then, reclassification and political identity formation are 
consequences of the expansion of social citizenship. On the other, they are indicative of 
a new era of democratic politics in which formerly marginal citizens have been 
empowered to exercise, and thereby deepen, democratic citizenship itself. 
 
Contributions 
A Novel Account of Identity Politicization 
 This dissertation contributes to theoretical debates on when, why, and how 
identities become politicized. Near-consensus has emerged in the comparative politics 
literature on the central role of incentives and institutions in shaping these outcomes. 
David Laitin (1986), for example, argues that colonial institutions can carry long-term 
legacies for shaping the commonsense of which identities structure local politics, and 
that individuals’ identity choices reflect prospective calculations of material payoffs 
(Laitin 1998). In more recent scholarship, Posner (2005) and Huber (2017) argue that 
identities and cleavages are mobilized electorally from above in elites’ attempts to 
maximize their own payoffs. Voters, in turn, similarly support such electoral strategies, 
which promise a more favorable distribution of state resources (Chandra 2004). 
By contrast, the argument I develop and substantiate in the chapters that follow 
emphasizes that identities can become politicized in the absence of mobilization from 
above, and in the absence of clear material incentives to do so. In my analyses I probe 
extensively for evidence to support the notion that reclassification toward blackness is 
the product of recent affirmative action policies incentivizing blackness, but this 
hypothesis falls short. Not only does it struggle to account for long-term identity change, 
but Brazilians appear to have begun reclassifying toward blackness in advance of major 
affirmative action policies, and even do so after they qualify for such benefits. 
Moreover, this crude instrumentalist hypothesis struggles to account for the fact that 
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claiming and articulating black identities would run counter to one’s material interests—
that is, they are articulating identities at the potential risk of inviting greater racialized 
discrimination. 
In light of this, my account shifts attention away from institutions that shape 
incentives and toward institutions of social citizenship, which can empower citizens to 
assume these identities and articulate them in various political arenas. I argue that 
citizenship can matter in these processes partly because “[e]ducation is a necessary 
prerequisite,” in T.H. Marshall’s words,  of “the right to defend and assert all one’s 
rights on terms of equality with others” (Marshall 1950, 10–11, 26). Insofar as education 
encourages the articulation of identity-based interests and grievances, then access to 
social citizenship, and the exercise of civil and political citizenship, is central to these 
processes. But citizenship institutions matter, too, I argue, because these rights are not 
uniformly accessible to all sectors of society. As we will see, the punctuated extension 
of (social) citizenship rights to de facto excluded sectors of the citizenry can produce 
sudden and unexpected political consequences. This analysis thus highlights the ways 
in which social structure and citizenship institutions can interact to create conditions 
under which political identities come into formation: structural conditions of extreme 
inequality and color-based stratification may legitimate identity-based claims and 
grievances; but it is when the individuals suffering from these inequalities are also 
endowed with the tools and capacities of citizenship that they are most likely to develop 
political identities on these bases and articulate these identities in the political arena. 
 
An Empirical Analysis of the “Identity-to-Politics Link” 
 This dissertation also contributes to a broader research agenda in the 
interdisciplinary study of identity politics that has urged studying identity politicization 
as a set of processes. In particular, this analysis takes up recent calls to study more 
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precisely how social categories come to inspire group consciousness and how members 
of these categories cohere politically, what political scientists typically consider 
political “cleavages” (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Rogers Brubaker and colleagues have 
provided some of the most pointed critiques of this literature, above all for abusing the 
logic of constructivism and for conflating categories and groups (Brubaker 2004; 
Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Instead, scholars should seek to better understand “the 
ways in which self-understandings may harden, congeal, and crystallize” (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000, 1).   
Taeku Lee (2008) echoes these calls and suggests that scholars focus greater 
attention on the “identity-to-politics link,” the set of processes that lead from social 
categories, to group consciousness, to political coherence and mobilization. Despite 
widespread recognition of these gaps in the literature, we possess relatively few 
empirical studies of the processes of identity politicization. This dissertation is thus an 
advancement in our theoretical and empirical understanding. In particular, it contributes 
to this agenda by leveraging these patterns of racial reclassification not simply as a 
fascinating case of identity change that merits explanation, but also as a rare opportunity 
to study the ways in which social categories come to inspire political consciousness at 
the individual level. Chapter 2 elaborates these conceptual and theoretical 
considerations in greater detail and situates the individual-level processes of political 
identity formation within the broader identity-to-politics link. 
 
An Update on Racial Consciousness in Brazil 
 In addition to contributing to the literatures on identity politicization, this study 
contributes to the comparative study of racial politics. In particular, this study serves to 
document these stark patterns of reclassification as an update to the conventional 
wisdom on patterns of racial identification in Brazil. A long line of research in 
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anthropology and sociology, in particular, have established the nature of Brazilian racial 
subjectivity and racial hierarchies. Of particular relevance is the idea that “money 
whitens:” whiteness, in other words, is associated with upper-class status, and blackness 
lower-class status (Cardoso and Ianni 1960; Degler 1971; Harris 1952; N. do V. Silva 
1994; Wagley 1965). Many of the foremost analyses establishing these patterns 
systematically (Bailey 2009; N. do V. Silva 1994; E. E. Telles 2004; E. E. Telles and 
Lim 1998) and ethnographically/interpretively (Hanchard 1994; Hordge-Freeman 2015; 
Sheriff 2001; Twine 1998) were conducted with data from single survey rounds or with 
limited temporal scope. Moreover, almost all of these oft-referenced studies rely on data 
collected before these more recent patterns of reclassification became apparent. 
 Methodologically, recent years have seen great advances in the survey methods 
used to understand patterns of racial identification (E. E. Telles 2014; E. E. Telles and 
Paschel 2014), but this study is the first to place these patterns in longitudinal 
perspective and to provide a theoretically developed, historically situated, and 
systematically tested account of longitudinal variation in patterns of racial 
identification. In particular, one of the key findings of my analysis in this regard is that 
upward mobility does not inevitably lead to whitening, as prior research would suggest. 
Instead, individuals’ socioeconomic backgrounds interact with their personal 
experiences of upward mobility to shape their racial subjectivity and political 
consciousness. I argue that this recent era signals a certain degree of social and political 
flux in the Brazilian case that not only renews attention to the subjective and constructed 
nature of racial boundaries, but that also ought to encourage scholars to think twice 
before taking for-granted Brazil’s infamous status as the perennial paradox in the 
comparative study of racial politics. 
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Implications for the Exercise of Citizenship 
 Finally, this study considers not only the causes and mechanisms of political 
identity formation, but it also explores the consequences of this change for political 
engagement. In particular, this study makes use of an originally designed survey 
instrument that incorporates modern survey methods for measuring and analyzing racial 
identification (E. E. Telles 2014), as well as the operationalization of an original index 
to directly measure political consciousness as distinct from racial identification. This 
survey employs these new empirical tools to test more precisely and directly the 
hypothesized causal mechanisms, and the consequences of political identity formation 
for various forms of civic participation and engagement, social movement participation, 
political interest, and internal and external political efficacy. Ultimately, these novel 
data show that politically conscious members are also more politically engaged. 
 By exploring these consequences, this study casts these patterns of political 
identity formation as a kind of policy feedback effect. Specifically, the analysis 
documents the relationship between educational expansion, political identity formation, 
and political engagement, and shows how the expansion of social citizenship benefits 
can not only shape political identities, but that these political identities in turn can shape 
how citizens exercise their civic and political citizenship rights. Since the third wave of 
democratization swept Latin America in the 1980s, states have struggled to guarantee 
full rights of democratic citizenship for all of their citizens, leading scholars to bemoan 
the state of “low-intensity citizenship” in the region (O’Donnell 1993). I suggest that 
these patterns and their consequences for political engagement paint a somewhat 
optimistic picture for the state of citizenship in the region. For not only have states begun 
to actively pursue policies addressing the region’s stark inequalities, but these policies 
have also increased the likelihood the citizens will articulate identities in the political 
arena that coincide with the structural disadvantage they face in society, and thereby 
 12 
 
demand further redress for the inequalities that have so weakened democratic 
citizenship.  
 
Chapter Overview 
 The chapters that follow provide a theoretical and empirical account of the 
processes of identity formation and politicization. Chapter 2 elaborates the argument 
introduced here. I emphasize the contribution to the literature on ethnic and identity 
politics by focusing on the consequences of expansionary social policy for 
understanding the adoption of stigmatized identities and the mechanisms of 
consciousness formation. I also discuss competing hypotheses drawn from conventional 
wisdom that identity-driven political behavior is shaped by material incentives, or that 
discursive and symbolic shifts at the level of the Brazilian state can explain these recent 
patterns of reclassification. Finally, I situate this novel theoretical account in the 
literature by distinguishing the individual-level account from processes of cleavage 
politicization that predominate in the literature, typically through top-down strategic 
mobilization or bottom-up movement mobilization.  
 Chapter 3 presents historical background and context for these recent patterns of 
reclassification, as well as for the extension and accessibility of social citizenship 
benefits in Brazil. I focus in this chapter on the recent era of social inclusion and social 
policy expansion, commonly thought of as the “second incorporation” following the 
incorporation of urban working classes under populist leader Getúlio Vargas in the mid-
twentieth century. I emphasize that the recent era extended educational access to citizens 
occupying informal social and economic sectors of society.  
 Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present empirical analyses of the causal propositions 
elaborated in Chapter 2, as well as the consequences of political identity for political 
engagement and the exercise of citizenship. Chapter 4 presents analysis of in-depth 
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interview data collected with reclassifiers and stable identifiers, and seeks to elaborate 
the causal pathways that link education with reclassification and political consciousness. 
This chapter leverages the richness of qualitative data to gain insights into the personal 
experiences and processes that lead individuals to develop political consciousness. In 
particular, the chapter focuses on the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy and 
illustrates how education alters individuals’ personal experiences, which lead them to 
challenge commonsense racial boundaries, the national myth of racial democracy, and 
their understandings of power more broadly in Brazilian society.  
Chapter 5 presents a series of systematic and quantitative tests of the observable 
implications of the argument, as well as tests of the rival hypotheses. This chapter draws 
on a longitudinal analysis of birth cohorts constructed from annual household surveys 
from the Brazilian census bureau; original survey experiments testing rival hypotheses; 
and an original panel analysis of Brazilian university students, constructed from an 
originally constructed database drawn from protected data held by the Brazilian 
Ministry of Education. This series of quantitative tests provides support for the political 
identity hypothesis—showing that better educated individuals, in particular those from 
lower class backgrounds, are the most likely to adopt nonwhite identities over time—
and finds little evidence in favor the rival hypotheses as sufficient explanations for the 
apparent patterns of reclassification. 
Chapter 6 draws on original survey data to link political consciousness to these 
patterns of reclassification, and to explore the consequences of this consciousness for 
forms of political engagement, showing that individuals with higher levels of racial 
consciousness are not only more likely to claim and articulate black identities, but they 
are more active, engaged, participatory, and efficacious than their less-conscious 
counterparts. 
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The final, concluding chapter reflects back upon the theoretical issues this 
dissertation engages and situates these findings within the ethnic and identity politics 
literature and the broader literature on comparative race. Finally, I conclude by 
discussing the implications of these findings for our understanding of citizenship in 
contemporary democratic politics. 
 
Notes on Terminology 
 Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying the racial terminology employed 
throughout this dissertation. Those familiar with Brazil and other countries in Latin 
America know that racial terminology cannot be employed with the same taken for-
granted clarity or precision as in other contexts (Harris et al. 1993; N. do V. Silva 1996; 
E. E. Telles 2004). This is increasingly the case since recent patterns of reclassification 
have only diversified the logics of racial subjectivity. Because my study focuses on 
patterns of reclassification using the official census categories, I often refer to the racial 
categories white (branco), brown or mixed-race (pardo), and black (preto). In addition 
to these official categories, two additional words are commonly used in Brazil with 
some degree of ambiguity. The first is the infamous moreno, which translates to English 
roughly as “dark,” and which studies have shown can be used in place of any other racial 
category (N. do V. Silva 1996; E. E. Telles 2004). For many, the prevalence and use of 
the word moreno to describe oneself in racial terms is evidence of the Brazilian idea of 
race mixture and unity; others understand it as a euphemism to avoid associating oneself 
with blackness (Hanchard 1994; Hordge-Freeman 2015; Twine 1998). In addition, an 
increasingly common form of identification is the word negro, promoted by the black 
movement, which is commonly understood to mean Afro-descendant. The Brazilian 
census bureau (IBGE) occasionally employs this category in its analyses of census data 
by collapsing black and brown categories together. While the black movement promotes 
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the use of the word negro to promote racial unity (Nobles 2000; Paschel 2016), studies 
have shown that not all individuals who identify as mixed-race would consider 
themselves negro (Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz 2013; Loveman, Muniz, and Bailey 
2012).  
 Throughout this dissertation, when I use white, brown, or black to refer to racial 
classifications, I refer specifically to the official census categories. Rather than the word 
negro, I use the term nonwhite to refer to black and brown classified individuals 
together, excluding indigenous and Asian classified individuals (who also appear on the 
census). When translating from Portuguese, I often translate both preto and negro to 
English as black, though if this translation (or the translation of other euphemisms) 
obscures some context or connotation, I also note the Portuguese usage parenthetically.  
Finally, throughout this dissertation I employ various terms to make references to 
individuals’ identities and identifications. First, I distinguish between identity, the 
individual’s sincere self-understanding, and identification, which entails affiliation or 
classification of some kind. Thus one might identify as preto on the census, even if one 
understands herself to be negra. Moreover, one’s identity may not be influenced at all 
by one’s “race,” even if they are aware of how they self-classify in racial terms. As I 
elaborate in Chapter 2, I further distinguish between identity and its subtype political 
identity. Whereas one’s identity may be informed by a wide array of attributes or social 
membership, when I reserve the term political identity for those self-understandings that 
shape individuals’ understandings of power. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RACIAL RECLASSIFICATION AS POLITICAL IDENTITY FORMATION 
 
This dissertation aims to explain shifting patterns of racial identification in Brazil, 
namely the newfound tendency among Brazilians to capitalize on the fluidity of racial 
boundaries to reclassify toward blackness. In accounting for this ostensibly sudden 
reversal in the tendency to reclassify toward whiteness, it also aims to provide a 
theoretical account of the processes through which social categories come to constitute 
individuals’ political consciousness, and how and why individuals choose to articulate 
these identities in the political arena. Unlike prior scholarship which has cast Brazil as 
an exception in the comparative study of racial politics, this dissertation leverages 
Brazil’s exceptionalism and this empirical puzzle to provide a new and coherent account 
of the causes of political consciousness, the mechanisms of its formation, and its 
consequences for democratic citizenship. 
I argue that reclassification toward blackness has been driven by the formation 
of racialized political identities, spurred by expanded access to formal education in 
recent decades. Education has increased formerly marginal and newly mobile citizens 
exposure to racialized inequalities and their internal political efficacy. As a result, these 
upwardly mobile citizens have come to challenge Brazil’s national myth of racial unity 
and commonsense racial hierarchies as they come face-to-face with racialized 
inequalities in their struggles for upward mobility. Racial reclassification, then, is an 
articulation of this new and racialized political consciousness, the development of which 
is due in part to structural conditions of extreme inequality and racial stratification, as 
well as access to the benefits of social citizenship. 
In addition to elaborating on and discussing this argument, the rival hypotheses, 
and other alternative explanations, this chapter also establishes and motivates the 
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empirical puzzle at the heart of this analysis. I lay to rest simple explanations based on 
demography or enumeration practices and emphasize that conventional wisdom would 
expect reclassification toward whiteness, not blackness. Central to understanding these 
patterns, I argue, is the notion of “political identity.” I begin with a definition of this 
concept. 
 
Conceptualizing Political Identity 
 “Political identity” is a commonly employed but rarely defined concept in 
political science scholarship. This has led to a proliferation of differing and at times 
contradictory (if seemingly commonsensical) usages in the literature, typically as 
partisanship, citizenship, or simply as applications of social identity.1 When I employ 
the term, however, I am referring to categories of social membership that inspire group 
consciousness and that shape individuals’ understandings of power relationships, 
broadly defined.2 More specifically, this conceptualization can be unpacked into three 
components: 
1. Political identities are assumed at the individual, rather than group level. A 
particular social membership may not constitute a political identity for all 
members of a group/category. Instead, the relevant question is whether a 
particular membership or group attachment indeed constitutes a political identity 
for any one member.  
2. Political identities entail group consciousness, that is, they entail more than a 
simple awareness of one’s membership in a category or the act of categorization; 
they entail affirmed identification with the group and other members. 
                                                 
1 For a fuller treatment of this conceptualization and of other usages, see De Micheli (2018). 
2 This conceptualization is inspired by Cramer’s (2016) conceptualization of rural consciousness. Also 
see Jung (2000) for a similar conceptualization. 
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3. What makes this consciousness political is that it shapes the way individuals 
interpret and make sense of power relationships between groups. This 
component broadens the typical view of group consciousness,3 which focuses 
more narrowly on stratification beliefs and relative deprivation. 
In addition to avoiding the analytical pitfalls of “groupism” (Brubaker 2004), 
the focus on the individual in this conceptualization also provides an analytical 
flexibility that helps to situate the individual-level process of the formation of political 
consciousness within the broader processes through which social categories are 
translated into group-level politics, what Taeku Lee (2008) calls the “identity-to-politics 
link.” Lee is particularly concerned with understanding how, given the individual’s 
repertoire of identities, any one category might become politicized and group members 
might cohere politically to mobilize or engage in politics collectively.4 This 
conceptualization of political identity not only provides theoretical leverage in the 
present analysis, but can also serve this broader research agenda by situating the 
phenomenon whereby social categories crystallize politically for individuals within the 
broader set of processes through which group politics emerges. 
Finally, it is worth taking a moment to distinguish this conceptualization from 
the related concepts of social identity and political cleavages. First, whereas social 
identity entails identification, or “knowledge of [one’s] membership in a social group” 
(Tajfel 1981, 255),5 political identity implies consciousness, “a set of political beliefs 
and action orientations arising out of this awareness of similarity” (Gurin, Miller, and 
Gurin 1980, 30). Thus social identity theory hypothesizes that identity shapes behavior 
simply through the act of identification, where as a consciousness-based perspective 
                                                 
3 For classic conceptualizations, see Gurin, Miller, and Gurin (1980) and Miller et al. (1981). 
4 Also see Brubaker and Cooper (2000, 5) on confusing “categories of analysis” and “categories of 
practice.” 
5 This is can also be understood as categorization, in Turner et al.’s (1987) terms. 
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might expect within-group heterogeneity. Second, the focus on micro-level identities 
distinguishes political identities from political cleavages, which might be viewed as the 
macro-level manifestation of micro-level political identities. In other words, whereas 
political cleavages entail a shared collective identity (Bartolini and Mair 1990, chap. 9), 
political identity refers only to the attributes of any one individual’s identity.6 It is thus 
the level of analysis that distinguishes these two concepts: if a social membership 
inspires political identities for enough group members, then one might say that these 
identities have cohered politically and scaled up to form a cleavage. 
 
The Puzzle of Racial Reclassification 
Census Enumeration and Demographic Trends 
The formation of racialized political identities, I will argue, is central to 
understanding racial reclassification. But this cannot be taken for granted without 
assessing simple explanations for these patterns. To be sure, such apparent and swift 
change might be an artifact of census enumeration practices or intergroup differences in 
                                                 
6 One might say that political cleavages imply micro-level political identities, but that political identities 
do not imply political cleavages. In this sense, political identities and the group memberships they are 
based on can be thought of not as objectively and empirically identifiable, but as cognitive entities: “not 
things in the world but ways of seeing the world” (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004, 47). 
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demographic trends. Indeed, in the Brazilian context, where racial boundaries are fluid 
and weakly institutionalized (Lieberman 2009), ostensible shifts in racial composition 
may simply be the product of changing classification schemes employed to measure 
“race.” Several studies have in fact shown that estimates of Brazil’s racial composition 
are sensitive to the classification scheme employed (Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz 2013; 
Loveman, Muniz, and Bailey 2012; Monk 2016), as well as to whether respondents are 
classified by themselves or enumerators (N. do V. Silva 1994; E. E. Telles 2004; E. E. 
Telles and Lim 1998). These concerns can be allayed by the simple fact that over the 
period in question, the classification scheme employed by the census bureau has 
remained unchanged, and the bureau has consistently relied on respondents’ self-
declarations for classification (IBGE 2003, 2016). These shifts, therefore, cannot be 
dismissed as artifacts of enumeration practices.7 
 Shifts in racial composition are also due in part to intergroup differences in 
demographic trends, though longitudinal patterns also fail to account for the observed 
shifts.8 Since 1991, international migration has accounted for less than 1 percent of 
Brazil’s resident population, and this figure has been on the decline.9 Mortality statistics 
show that the mortality rates of nonwhite Brazilians are generally similar to or greatly 
exceed those of whites. Fertility statistics, on the other hand, offer prima facie evidence 
in favor of a demographic explanation: statistics suggest that generally nonwhite women 
have more children than white women; but a longitudinal view shows that the racial gap 
in fertility has been steadily declining, suggesting that, relative to whites, the growth of 
nonwhites ought be slowing over time. 
                                                 
7 See Appendix A for more on census practices. 
8 See tables and figures in Appendix A for more on demographic trends. 
9 For the historical role of immigration in altering Brazil’s racial composition, see Skidmore (1974) and 
Levy (1974).  
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 To see this more clearly, consider Figure 2.2, which presents a simple analysis 
of birth cohorts between the 2000 and 2010 censuses. Each cluster of bars represents a 
birth cohort (based on decade of birth), and each bar shows the percentage change in 
the size of each racial group between the 2000 and 2010 censuses within each birth 
cohort. By excluding from these figures anyone born after the 2000 census, this simple 
analysis controls for any inter-group differences in fertility rates. If there were 
reclassification occurring, we would expect to see negative growth rates for all 
categories, as with time cohort members can only exit through death. First, and notably, 
there are sizable and negative rates for self-identified whites in all cohorts. The decline 
in the white population is not reducible to exceedingly high mortality rates among 
elderly whites. Instead, the size of the white group appears to be declining at similar 
rates regardless of age – a finding that does not comport with mortality statistics, which 
show that the elderly die at much greater rates (Appendix Table A3). Second, there are 
positive and large growth rates among self-identified blacks and browns, with the largest 
growth rates among younger cohorts and blacks, the most stigmatized racial group in 
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Brazil. These patterns suggest that a considerable amount of reclassification took place 
between the 2000 and 2010 censuses. 
 Table 1 presents estimates from a cohort component analysis, a demographic 
method of computing projections for the 2010 population based on demographic trends 
observed in the 2000 census, and comparing these estimates to the statistics observed in 
the real census.10 This more rigorous analysis bears out the same pattern as the simple 
cohort analysis above, showing the white population to be smaller and black and brown 
populations larger than expected. Specifically, this analysis estimates that roughly 10 
percent of self-identified browns and 31 percent of self-identified blacks are comprised 
of reclassifiers. What these simple analyses make clear, then, is that the apparent 
patterns of reclassification cannot be dismissed as artifacts of census practices or 
demographic trends.  
 
The Status Quo: Stigma, “Social Race,” and Whitening 
 This puzzle is further sharpened by the fact that reclassification itself is not a 
new phenomenon in Brazil or Latin America (Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade 2004; 
Loveman and Muniz 2007; Wood and Carvalho 1994).11 High rates of miscegenation 
and the absence of racial group membership rules have produced a fluid system of 
classification in which Brazilians self-identify according to flexible phenotypic criteria 
rather than rigid descent rules (A. S. A. Guimarães 1999; Harris 1964b; Nogueira 1998; 
                                                 
10 This table is reproduced from Miranda’s (2015) cohort component analysis. Also see Soares (2008) for 
documentation of reclassification patterns. 
11 For analogous patterns in the United States, see Waters (2002) and Davenport (2018). 
 2000  2010 (aged 10+) Change due to % Change due to 
Category Enumerated  Projected Enumerated Reclassification Reclassification 
White 92.0  88.1 77.8 -10.3 -12 
Brown 65.8  62.6 68.8 6.2 10 
Black 10.6  9.9 13.0 3.1 31 
Table 2.1 Estimates of Inter-Census Racial Reclassification, 2000-10. Source: Miranda (2015). 
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E. E. Telles 2004; Wade 1997). Brazilians possess rich lexicons to describe racial (or 
“color”) differences, including terms that deviate from census categories (Harris 1970; 
Harris et al. 1993; N. do V. Silva 1996; E. E. Telles 2004). Moreover, the subjective 
understanding of race is intertwined with notions of class, what scholars refer to as 
“social race” (Degler 1971; Harris 1964a; Wagley 1965). As sociologist Nelson do 
Valle Silva describes, “given some phenotypic combination, the higher the 
socioeconomic position of the individual at the moment of classification, she will be 
classified that much closer to white” (N. do V. Silva 1994, 70). This complexity and 
ambiguity, therefore, allows individuals to place themselves in categories different from 
those ascribed to them, as well as to reclassify themselves over time. 
 But to the extent that reclassification occurred in the past, it has traditionally 
reflected a practice known as “whitening.” Conventional wisdom holds, and microlevel 
analyses have shown, that Brazilians have historically capitalized on racial fluidity to 
reclassify themselves in lighter racial categories (Azevedo 1955; Osorio 2004; Pierson 
1942; N. do V. Silva 1994; E. E. Telles 2004; E. E. Telles and Lim 1998). This trend 
has also borne out at the macro level: demographic studies of the period between 1950 
and 1990 reveal that significant proportions of black identifiers reclassified as mixed-
race during a period of middle-class growth, in keeping with the social race hypothesis 
(Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade 2004; Lovell 1999; Wood and Carvalho 1994). 
Anthropology and sociology, moreover, are replete with examples documenting the 
phenomenon, from the common adage that “money whitens” to the assertion that 
whitening “is a ‘universal’ aspiration. Blacks, dark mulattoes, and many light 
mulattoes—all want to whiten” (Cardoso and Ianni 1960, 183). 
 Empirically oriented scholars problematize the ambiguity of racial identification 
to different degrees. Some see it as measurement error, complicating efforts to measure 
“race” and its related outcomes (Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz 2013; A. Guimarães 
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2001; Loveman, Muniz, and Bailey 2012; E. E. Telles and Lim 1998), whereas others 
see attempts to simplify racial classification as inherently problematic (Harris et al. 
1993). Yet another interpretation is illuminated in Marvin Harris’s ethnography 
conducted in rural Brazil: 
The Negro in Minas Velhas attempts to ‘pass’ not by posing as white but by posing as 
anything but a Negro—as a dark moreno, or chulo, or caboclo, etc. If these categories 
do not suffice he is liable to invent new ones. For example, a Negro storekeeper named 
Antonio who is well-educated by local standards, fairly prosperous and active 
politically, never refers to himself as preto [black], though physically he has every 
reason to do so. He prefers rather the original—and euphemistic—term roxinho (a little 
purple) and alludes to his son as ‘that slightly purple fellow over there’. Each individual 
twists as well as he can away from complete identification with the lowest echelon of 
the social order. The Negro has the opportunity of saying first, ‘My hair is not that 
kinky’, or ‘My lips are not that big’, or ‘My colour is not that black’; and second, ‘I 
may look like that picture but I am not as poor, or as illiterate, as he probably is. 
Therefore, I am not like him’. (Harris 1952, 60) 
This passage captures how declarations of racial identification, including euphemisms 
and census categories, may not reflect one’s sincere self-conception, but rather a 
strategy of avoiding the stigma associated with blackness (Burdick 1998b; Sheriff 
2001).12 Racially ambiguous Brazilians can thus try to minimize stigma by “whitening,” 
inevitably participating in the reproduction of racial hierarchies by implying with their 
behavior that whiteness is preferred. 
This interpretation is not a consensus view, but the idea that racial identification 
reflects a stigma-minimizing strategy finds broad support. Carl Degler (1971), for 
example, famously describes this as the “mulatto escape-hatch;” Hanchard (1994) and 
Twine (1998) describe the ways in which Brazilians participate in the reproduction of 
racial hierarchies by failing to confront racism; Sheriff (2001) documents in her 
ethnography that Brazilians often avoid describing friends and neighbors as black as a 
form of “politeness;”13 and Hordge-Freeman (2015) documents how families socialize 
                                                 
12 In her ethnography of race and racism in a low-income community in Rio de Janeiro, Sheriff (2001, 
31) describes a “yearning to escape all that is negatively associated with blackness.” 
13 Also see Nogueira (1998). 
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Brazilians to internalize racial hierarchies. “Afro-Brazilians,” she writes, “engage in 
racial bargains, compromises that are often made ambivalently, in which [they] may 
comply with racial hierarchies in exchange for perceived payoffs that may be political, 
economic, psychological, or even affective” (Hordge-Freeman 2015, 6). Moreover, not 
only have scholars documented rampant discrimination against the darker-skinned for 
decades,14 but recent analyses reveal that Brazilian parents are more likely to invest in 
education for their lighter-skinned children (Rangel 2015), and that Brazilians earn 
higher wages when their employers perceive them as lighter-skinned (Cornwell, Rivera, 
and Schmutte 2014). Thus racial hierarchies are reproduced not only through 
discriminatory policies or macro-structural forces, but also by ostensibly nonwhite 
Brazilians themselves who seek to approximate whiteness for perceived payoffs in 
varied forms. 
How these myriad incentives shaped patterns of racial identification are clear in 
Table 2.2, which cross-tabulates respondents’ self-classifications in the official census 
categories with how they were classified by survey interviewers. The likelihood of 
category mismatch increases monotonically as one moves from white to black; among 
those classified as brown, mismatched respondents are twice as likely to opt for a lighter, 
rather than darker category; and nearly 10 percent of those classified as black self-
                                                 
14 For seminal analyses, see Hasenbalg (1979) and Telles (2004). Also see Silva (1985, 2000), Andrews 
(1991, 2014), Lovell (1999, 2006), Lovell and Wood (1998), Monk (2016) and Telles (2014). 
  Self-Classification   
  White Brown Black Total (%) N 
Respondent as 
classified by 
interviewer 
White 87.34 12.45 0.21 100  474 
Brown 23.62 64.47 11.91 100 470 
Black 9.76 31.71 58.94 100  123 
 Total (N) 537 401 129 - 1,067 
Table 2.2 Comparing Self-Classification with Ascribed Classification. Source: Pesquisa Social 
Brasileira, 2002. χ2 (df = 4) = 681.91, p < .001. 
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classify as white, compared to almost none of those classified as white self-classifying 
as black.15  
It is clear that whitening was the dominant trend. But it is also clear that racially 
ambiguous Brazilians have options, that is, they can choose “exit” or “voice” 
(Hirschman 1970). An individual can exit by self-whitening, thereby complying with 
racial hierarchies to “defend his welfare or to improve his position” (Hirschman 1970, 
15); or the individual can exercise voice, “political action par excellence” (Hirschman 
1970, 16), by choosing blackness and defying commonsense logics that valorize 
whiteness. Conventional wisdom in social identity theory, too, would predict exit from 
those social categories that do not contribute positively to the individual’s concept of 
self (Tajfel 1981). Without this “positive group distinctiveness,” individuals ought to 
tend toward leaving the group, when possible (Tajfel 1974, 69). Recent patterns of 
reclassification toward blackness, then, present a puzzle that conventional wisdom did 
not anticipate and cannot explain: in this context of racial fluidity and stigmatized 
blackness, individuals are seemingly pursuing voice over exit. 
 
The Political Identity Hypothesis: Exposure, Efficacy, and Consciousness 
 The ostensibly sudden reversal in patterns of reclassification, I argue, is the 
unintended consequence of expanded access to secondary and university education in 
recent decades, which has led many newly mobile citizens to develop racialized political 
identities. Beginning in the 1990s, state-led efforts to incorporate marginal sectors of 
the citizenry through social policy expansion granted lower class sectors—many of 
whom are racially ambiguous and susceptible to ideologies of white superiority—
unprecedented access to the benefits of social citizenship. Expanded access to 
                                                 
15 For detailed discussion of classification mismatch, see Telles 2004, chap. 4. Also, Silva 1994; Bailey 
2009; Telles and Lim 1998. 
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education, in particular, increased marginal citizens’ exposure to new information, 
social networks, and labor market experiences, and increased their sense of internal 
political efficacy. Increased exposure and efficacy, in turn, have led many of these 
formerly marginal and newly mobile citizens to confront and challenge Brazil’s national 
myth of racial unity and commonsense racial hierarchies as they have come face-to-face 
with racialized inequalities in their quests for upward mobility. Reclassification toward 
blackness, then, can be understood as an articulation of these newfound and racialized 
political identities, which have altered individuals’ subjective understandings of race, 
imbued their racial self-understandings with political meaning, and led them to cross 
previously recognized racial boundaries. 
 
Macro-Level Mechanism: State-Led Educational Expansion 
That such dramatic shifts in Brazil’s racial composition could unfold so 
suddenly is a testament to the state’s efforts to expand access to the benefits of social 
citizenship in recent decades. The Brazilian state played an important, if indirect and 
unintentional, role in inducing these patterns of reclassification through unprecedented 
efforts to include “outsider” citizens through social policy expansion. As Candelaria 
Garay (2016) argues, the lifting of literacy requirements in Brazil’s 1988 constitution, 
along with the codification of universal social rights, increased political competition for 
poor voters who were previously excluded from the franchise. With remarkable 
continuity across right- and left-leaning governments (Garay 2016; Melo 2008), 
politicians suddenly had great incentive to reform and create a host of public policies 
and programs that unleashed an impressive wave of upward mobility for these lower 
class sectors. In the educational domain alone, the state greatly increased investments 
and sought to improve educational access and quality (INEP 2016b; World Bank 2002). 
In the 1990s, reforms included a new national education plan, mandated state-
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government spending floors, federal funds for under-resourced municipalities, new 
resource allocation formulas incentivizing student enrollments, and new delivery 
channels to circumvent political bargaining between local and state governments (Melo 
2017). In the 2000s, education spending reached OECD levels, and the state created 
new public universities, expanded university slots, created federal scholarship and 
financial aid programs, centralized the university entrance exam, and sought to 
explicitly make higher education more inclusive through means- and race-targeted 
affirmative action policies (Heringer 2015; Heringer and Ferreira 2009; Melo 2017; L. 
T. Soares 2013). 
The consequence of this era of state-led social policy expansion is unmistakable: 
it is estimated that more than 9 million households (33 million individuals) were lifted 
out poverty since the 1990s, creating a so-called “new middle class” (Klein, Mitchell, 
and Junge 2018; Neri 2011). Of course, educational reform and expansion alone are not 
responsible for this wave of upward mobility. But I argue that greater access to 
education, in particular, is what has led to altered racial self-understandings, political 
consciousness, and, ultimately, reclassification toward blackness at the individual level, 
in particular among lower-class sectors, for whom this educational access is 
unprecedented. 
 
Micro-Level Mechanisms: Exposure and Efficacy 
 The idea that education increases political participation and engagement has 
featured as a central finding in decades of political science scholarship (Lerner 1958; 
Lipset 1959, 1960; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1987; Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady 1995). Yet unlike studies that link education and political behavior or 
attitudes towards democracy, I emphasize that education can also play a role in 
reshaping the nature of racial identities by increasing individuals’ exposure and efficacy. 
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Specifically I argue that education increases individuals’ exposure to new information, 
social movements and networks, and experiences in the labor market, all of which shape 
individuals’ personal experiences and their interpretations of those experiences. At the 
same time, education endows individuals with a greater sense of internal political 
efficacy, that is, a greater sense one’s own political competence, or self-esteem. 
Exposure alters the experiences and interpretations that shape one’s racial self-
understanding, and internal efficacy empowers individuals to confront the stigma 
traditionally associated with blackness. Whereas in the past individuals may have found 
themselves complying with commonsense racial hierarchies and whitening, better-
educated and upwardly Brazilians (who are of lower class backgrounds and darker-
skinned, on average) are increasingly articulating these political identities and crossing 
previously adhered-to racial boundaries based on new and political understandings of 
race. 
The argument that education and upward mobility can shape political identities 
and racial understandings builds on foundational studies of racial consciousness in the 
United States. Following the civil rights movement, scholars found that upward mobility 
did not weaken racial consciousness among African Americans, as was expected 
(Frazier 1957), but rather deepened it. Indeed, it was the growth of the black middle 
class that gave rise to Dawson’s (1995) seminal theory of the black utility heuristic, or 
racial “linked fate.” Similarly, Hochschild (1995) finds that middle-class blacks are 
more pessimistic than their lower-class counterparts about the reality of the American 
dream, despite having supposedly fulfilled its promises (also see Tate [1994]). These 
studies share the insight that the nature of racial identities and consciousness are 
profoundly shaped by class experiences. 
Black Americans are, of course, emblematic of group consciousness (Shingles 
1981; Verba and Nie 1972). But while conventional wisdom emphasizes that “money 
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whitens” in Brazil, more recent scholarship has begun to uncover correlations that lend 
support to this argument. In his seminal text on racial identity and inequality in Brazil, 
Edward Telles (2004, 98-99) finds that higher levels of educated are correlated with 
black self-identification, even if not always in the official census category of preto. In 
another study, Bailey and Telles (2006) find that better-educated Brazilians are most 
likely to adopt the black label negro, rather than a mixed-race label.16 In their analyses 
of oversamples of Afro-Brazilians, Mitchell-Walthour and Darity (2014) and Mitchell-
Walthour (2018) similarly provide evidence that black identification (as negro or preto) 
is associated with greater education. Finally, drawing on a novel survey instrument that 
includes measures of skin tone and hair texture,17 Telles and Paschel (2014) similarly 
find that education correlates with black identification.  
There are relatively few longitudinal analyses of racial identification in Brazil,18 
though those that exist also lend credence to a reversal in the relationship between 
education and racial reclassification. Schwartzman (2007) and Marteleto (2012) study 
how parents classify their children, and find that better-educated parents were more 
likely to classify their children as white in the 1980s and 1990s, but that this tendency 
reversed itself by the 2000s. Similarly, in a rare panel study of racial identification, 
Francis-tan and Tannuri-Pianto (2015) find that students at one federal university were 
more likely to adopt black identities following matriculation, in particular students 
admitted via affirmative action policies. 
Thus despite the conventional wisdom that “money whitens,” recent studies 
provide considerable support for the idea that upward mobility via education can also 
                                                 
16 Also see Bailey (2009) and Telles (2004). 
17 Telles (2004) has shown that these two physical attributes are most often cited as what constitutes 
individuals’ understandings of racial classifications in Brazil. 
18 Exceptions include macro-level studies, which do not cover the relevant time period (Carvalho, Wood, 
and Andrade 2004; Wood and Carvalho 1994), and one that does (Miranda 2015). Vitor Miranda’s (2014) 
doctoral dissertation and Soares (2008) include micro-level analyses, though without theoretical 
explanation for the identified patterns of reclassification. 
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lead individuals to self-darken or reclassify toward blackness. This discussion, however, 
highlights two gaps in this literature. First is the relative scarcity of longitudinal analyses 
of individuals’ self-identifications that help us understand how/why patterns of 
reclassification appear to have shifted over time.19 Second is the absence of fully 
developed and systematically tested theoretical explanations to link education to black 
identification or reclassification, despite the mounting evidence to substantiate this 
relationship. This study aims to fill these gaps by specifying and documenting how 
education can shape racial identification through the mechanisms of exposure and 
efficacy. 
 
Exposure 
First, with education comes exposure to information, which can contribute to 
racial consciousness by raising awareness of racialized inequalities, the importance of 
race in history, and by introducing individuals to alternative perspectives and 
discourses. In her study of black public opinion in the United States, Tate suggests that 
greater racial consciousness among better-educated blacks is due to their greater 
awareness of racialized inequalities (Tate 1994, 28). In the Brazilian case, critical 
ethnographies and interpretive studies argue that the country’s national myth 
whitewashes and conceals the country’s past history of slavery and inhibits 
interpretations of discrimination and inequalities as racialized (Hanchard 1994; Twine 
1998).20 More broadly, education is associated with political knowledge and awareness 
                                                 
19 Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2012, 2013) and Francis-Tan and Tannuri-Pianto (2015) are notable and 
illuminating exceptions, though these rigorous panel analyses are limited in temporal scope and focus on 
students at one federal university. 
20 In her ethnographic study of a favela in Rio de Janeiro, Sheriff (2001) argues against the idea that 
individuals accept the myth of racial democracy wholesale, documenting beliefs of understandings of 
racism and a general view that Brazil is less racially ambiguous than it is often described. Bailey (2009) 
similarly explores views regarding racial democracy representative survey data and finds little support 
for these arguments.  
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(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Verba and Nie 1972; 
Verba, Nie, and Kim 1987).21 Revised modernization theories also posit that education 
and information are mechanisms by which individuals develop “emancipative values,” 
greater autonomy, and self-expression, which promote democratic values and support 
for gender equality (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2003). Thus by 
increasing access to information, education can put individuals in touch with untold 
truths in Brazilian history and make them more aware of present-day racial 
inequalities.22  
 Second, attending schools and universities broadens social networks by putting 
individuals in contact with other students from more or less different backgrounds. In 
his seminal analysis of the civil rights movement, McAdam (1982) describes movement 
mobilization as a process of “cognitive liberation.”23 Other scholars of social 
movements similarly see social movement participation and mobilization as sites where 
collective identities are forged (Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Klandermans 1992). 
Hanchard (1994) suggests that the black movement in Brazil has by and large been 
unsuccessful at raising consciousness among the Brazilian masses, but Paschel’s (2016) 
updated analysis documents the movement’s great success at effecting discursive 
change within the Brazilian state. In any case, for students whose lives have by and large 
remained in local (and even peripheral neighborhoods), attending a high quality school 
in a distant neighborhood or frequenting a university campus inserts one into new 
spaces, composed potentially of students of different socioeconomic backgrounds (and 
                                                 
21 Most famously, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) argue that education is the primary factor that separates 
the politically knowledgeable from the unknowledgeable. According to these authors, education provides 
cognitive skills, facts of the social and political world, opportunities to learn, and generates interest in 
politics. Their understanding of “political knowledge” is more narrow than my understanding of 
information, but the broader point is that education likely increases exposure to all kinds of information.  
22 For an analysis of how access to information reshapes racial identities among Afro-Latinxs in the 
United States, see Hordge-Freeman and Veras’s (2019) forthcoming study. 
23 Also see Lee (2002) on how social movements can change public opinion and attitudes in a broader 
publics. 
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skin colors) from one’s own (Artes and Ricoldi 2015; Kruks-Wisner 2018).24 Moreover, 
university campuses in particular are common sites of organization for student groups, 
civic associations, and social movement and civil society networks. Ziad Munson’s 
(2010) fascinating study of the making of pro-life activists in the United States reveals 
that individuals often join movements not because of pre-formed political or ideological 
beliefs, but through their social contacts; after developing movement ties, individuals 
are then more likely to absorb and articulate the worldviews and opinions espoused by 
social movements. Thus insofar as greater education expands one’s social networks and 
increases social contact, then education will likely introduce individuals to civic and 
associational spaces then provide new and alternative political worldviews.25 
 Finally, education is likely to change one’s set of personal experiences by 
altering one’s insertion into the labor market. Indeed, many in Brazil (and beyond) 
pursue education simply as a pathway of upward mobility and in the hopes of landing 
better paying jobs. Thus education can put individuals on new pathways in which they 
are competing for higher status jobs and a) landing those jobs and potentially be thrust 
into elite, heavily white environments, or b) they may not land well paying jobs or may 
be disappointed in the labor market more generally. Studies of labor market 
discrimination in Brazil have long demonstrated that darker-skinned Brazilians suffer 
the greatest wage penalties in high-status jobs (Campante, Crespo, and Leite 2004; 
Lovell 1999; Lovell and Wood 1998; S. S. D. Soares 2000). As one ascends socially, 
moreover, it becomes increasingly difficult to attribute perceived discrimination of any 
                                                 
24 Kruks-Wisner (2018) is not concerned with education or universities, per se, but describes processes 
where spatial and social mobility increase exposure to the “haves,” which can make one aware of one’s 
own status as a “have-not.” This parallels the experience of arriving to a university as a lower-class student 
coming in contact with upper-class students. 
25 John Burdick (1998a, 2005) also argues that religious groups and organizations are important sites for 
black empowerment in Brazil. Moreover, Collier and Handlin (2009) suggest that in recent decades in 
Latin America civic arenas of political participation are becoming increasingly diverse, and that 
likelihood of participation in these arenas increases with social class/status. 
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kind to social class or status (Souza 1983, 77). Indeed, in interviews with black 
professionals in Rio de Janeiro, Silva and Reis (2011) find that incidents of perceived 
racial discrimination generate the greatest sense of injustice.26 Thus for racially 
ambiguous individuals who come from lower-class backgrounds, greater education may 
not bring economic success and lead to disenchantment; but even those who experience 
economic success may also be subject to greater racialized discrimination in the 
workplace. In either case, the result can be a generated sense of racialized grievance. 
Education, the promised pathway of upward mobility, therefore, can have the effect of 
racializing one’s worldview by altering one’s expectations and experiences in the labor 
market. 
 
Efficacy 
 If exposure increases interpretations of one’s personal experiences as racialized, 
then efficacy also enables confrontation of those racial hierarchies and the social forces 
that allow the perpetuation of racism. Education fosters this by increasing individuals’ 
internal political efficacy—an individual’s evaluation of her own self-competence.  A 
number of previous studies have identified correlations between education and internal 
efficacy (Shingles 1981; Verba and Nie 1972). In their classic comparative study of 
civic participation, for example, Almond and Verba (1963) argue that education endows 
individuals with their own sense of “subjective competence;” In their study of 
democratic citizenship in the United States, Nie and colleagues (1996) find that 
education improves cognitive proficiency and political sophistication; and in an analysis 
of political behavior in Latin America, Borowski et al. (2011) similarly find that 
education is by far the strongest predictor of citizens’ sense of their political 
competence. Notably, Bleck finds in her study of Mali that the expansion of education 
                                                 
26 Also see Lamont et al. (2016). 
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led to “empowered democratic agents” who were “knowledgeable about the political 
system, the range of potential political choice, and the avenues for expression in 
democratic institutions” (Bleck 2015, 6). Specifically, Bleck finds that higher educated 
and French-literate Malians have a greater sense of internal efficacy, which in turn 
increases their ability to engage in the difficult task of navigating the country’s “flawed 
political system” (Bleck 2015, 100). Scholars have predominantly focused on the effects 
of efficacy on political engagement and participation, but the basic idea is that 
efficacious citizens are more likely to recognize and confront racism and discrimination 
when they encounter it because they are less susceptible to the internalization of racial 
hierarchies (Hordge-Freeman 2015; Twine 1998). In other words, education empowers 
citizens to exercise voice and to challenge racial hierarchies, rather than comply with 
them.  
 
Summary and Observable Implications 
 The thrust of the argument advanced here, then, is that greater access to 
education plays an important role in shaping the personal experiences that inform racial 
self-understandings and identifications in this context. This argument accords with other 
studies in the comparative race literature, which similarly emphasize experiences with 
racism as a determinant of racial consciousness (Caldwell 2007; Hanchard 1994; 
Mitchell-Walthour 2018; Sheriff 2001). Unlike previous studies, however, I link these 
experiences to the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy, which themselves are tied to 
education. In this sense, I offer a more developed and theoretical account of the 
processes of political identity formation. To be sure, the processes sketched here are 
complex, heterogeneous, and unfold over varying lengths of time across individuals. 
Nonetheless, the key observable implication of the political identity hypothesis is that 
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better educated citizens, in particular those with lower-class backgrounds, ought to be 
the most likely to reclassify toward blackness.   
 
Alternative Hypotheses: Affirmative Action as Incentive and Discourse 
The Instrumental Hypothesis: Affirmative Action as Incentive 
Skeptics will quickly point out that over this period Brazil began experimenting 
with race-targeted affirmative action, an institutional change that generated material 
incentives for blackness. In 2001, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso broke with the 
state’s decades-long posture of colorblindness when he explicitly endorsed affirmative 
action for Afro-descendants (Htun 2004; Paschel 2016). Federal legislation was not 
passed until 2012, though states began implementing racial quotas in state universities 
as early as 2001.27 These policies targeted the absence of nonwhites and the lower 
classes in free public universities, which had remained the near-exclusive domain of 
white elites (Artes and Ricoldi 2015). University quotas remain the dominant form of 
affirmative action policy in Brazil, though in reality the majority of these policies are 
means-tested, and most policies target race only in conjunction with socioeconomic 
criteria (L. F. Schwartzman and Paiva 2014). 
Nonetheless, affirmative action policies comport with dominant explanations in 
political science that attribute identity change and salience to material incentives 
generated by social structure or institutions (Chandra 2004; Huber 2017; Laitin 1986, 
1998; Posner 2005). Indeed, “institutions that structure incentives” is one prototype of 
identity change outlined by Chandra (2012). In this view, the (high or low) salience of 
identities is the product of means-ends calculations by voters and elites alike in contexts 
                                                 
27 Rio de Janeiro was the first state to implement university quotas for Afro-descendants (though not 
exclusively), first in select universities in 2001 (law 3.708/2001), then in all state universities in 2003 
(law 4.151/2003). 
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of resource scarcity.28 Affirmative action has featured explicitly in this literature. Nagel 
(1986), for examples, argues that affirmative action incentivized Native American 
identification in the United States, and Chandra argues that in India these policies 
created incentives for ethnic groups to mobilize and demand inclusion as policy targets 
(Chandra 2005).29 
Instrumental explanations are attractive for their parsimony, though they 
struggle to explain the enduring identity change evident in the census. First, census 
respondents do not stand to gain benefits from their responses to census interviewers, 
which are anonymous by law. Additionally, the adoption of affirmative action has not 
eliminated the status quo incentives for whiteness that are reproduced through informal 
institutional racism. Fluid boundaries and reliance on racial self-declaration allow savvy 
opportunists who wish to take advantage of these policies to manipulate their declared 
race when and where necessary while otherwise pursuing the benefits of whiteness. 
Moreover, the misuse of affirmative action carries real risks. Implementing these 
policies in a context of such ambiguity has led to serious discussions of where to draw 
“the color line” (Bailey 2008; Fry and Maggie 2004; L. F. Schwartzman 2008). Some 
universities have created councils to determine the eligibility of those applicants 
tentatively admitted via racial quotas (T. Oliveira 2016; Sperb 2017; Unesp 2017). But 
even in universities without such councils, students deemed guilty of fraud can be 
expelled (e.g., Martins 2018). 
There is empirical support for these misgivings. In panel studies of university 
students before and after the implementation of quotas, Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 
(2012, 2013) find evidence that applicants manipulate their identifications for 
admission, but that students are likely to revert to lighter identification after 
                                                 
28 See Yashar (2005) for an incentive-driven, but not materialist, argument. 
29 See French (2009) for an institutionalist and social constructionist view on how laws and institutions 
can reshape cultural identities. 
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matriculation.30 These studies also reveal that darker-skinned students in particular are 
more likely to reclassify toward blackness after matriculation, and that they were likely 
to adopt the label negro within five years of completing university, suggesting 
motivations beyond instrumentality (Francis-Tan and Tannuri-Pianto 2015).31 
Despite these misgivings, the instrumental hypothesis nonetheless merits 
consideration. Indeed, in analyses of a survey experiment that primes individuals to 
think about affirmative action, Bailey (2008, 2009) finds evidence that this increases 
the likelihood Brazilians identify as negro in their open-ended responses, though the 
proportions remains small and differences were not subject to statistical test. Of course, 
the instrumental and political identity hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; 
individuals may behave similarly for different reasons. The empirical analysis will 
attempt to adjudicate between these hypotheses as plausible explanations for shifting 
patterns of identification in the context of the census, rather than instrumental behavior 
writ large. 
 
The Recognition Hypothesis: Affirmative Action as Racial Discourse 
 A final alternative hypothesis is that affirmative action is emblematic of a new 
era of racial discourse in Brazil that shapes individuals’ worldviews and racial 
understandings, potentially leading them to embrace blackness. In this view, “race is 
not something that language simply describes, it is something that is created through 
language and institutional practices” (Nobles 2000, 12). In particular scholars have paid 
close attention to censuses as state institutions that play key roles in the shaping of 
                                                 
30 Senkevics (2017) also finds that repeat-enrollers in the university entrance exam alter their 
identifications. The dominant trend is toward blackness, but a sizable proportion also whitens as well. 
31 Also see Schwartzman and Silva (2012) on administrators’ goals of racial consciousness-raising 
through affirmative action policies and ambiguities in students’ interpretations of these policies. 
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“political realities” and “ways of thinking and seeing” (Nobles 2004, 66).32 In the 
Brazilian case, scholars argue that the official ethno-racial classification scheme has 
served to uphold the myth of racial democracy by shaping racial subjectivity and 
commonsense (Hanchard 1994; Loveman 2014; Nobles 2000).  
Though scholars pay particular attention to the census, the state can also shape 
discourse more directly through explicit policies. In her updated account of black 
movements in Latin America, Tianna Paschel (2016) argues that black movement 
activism applied considerable pressure to the Brazilian state, which resulted in a 
significant shift in the state’s posture toward the racial question. The most striking 
change came during the center-right presidency of Cardoso, who was not only 
sympathetic to issues of racial inequality and discrimination, but also responsible for 
the state’s endorsement of such policies. This recognition of racial difference and the 
endorsement of public policies to combat racial inequalities marked the Brazilian state’s 
shift from colorblind to color-conscious.  
 Considering the weight given to discourse in shaping racial subjectivity and 
commonsense, then, one alternative explanation for patterns of reclassification is that 
the growing tendency to self-identify as nonwhite is the product of this discursive 
change. As the state has come to recognize racial differences within its population and 
sought to counter stigma and discrimination through race-targeted public policies, then 
individuals might have adopted new “ways of thinking and seeing” (Nobles 2004, 66) 
that make nonwhite identification less costly (i.e., less stigmatized) or simply more 
common. Like the political identity hypothesis, this alternative argument suggests that 
                                                 
32 According to James Scott, census-taking is one strategy states employ to make their populations 
“legible,” but “the builders of the modern nation-state do not merely describe, observe, and map; they 
strive to shape a people” (Scott 1998, 81). Censuses, moreover, are increasingly catching the attention of 
social scientists, who see official censuses as important institutions that shape not only identities 
(Hochschild and Powell 2008; Kertzer and Arel 2004; Prewitt 2013), but also citizenship (Nobles 2000, 
2004), nation-making (Loveman 2014), state performance (Scott 1998), and violent conflict (Lieberman 
and Singh 2017). 
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such a process would unfold over time, and, as it were, simultaneous to the social policy 
expansion I argue lies behind the patterns of racial reclassification. Unlike the political 
identity hypothesis, however, the recognition hypothesis does not predict heterogeneous 
effects according to level of education, which is the key difference in the observable 
implications of these two hypotheses. In the empirical analyses, I disentangle these 
hypotheses: first by leveraging educational heterogeneity in longitudinal analyses; and 
second by employing survey experiments to isolate the causal effect of discourse on 
racial identification. 
 
Additional Explanations 
 The empirical analysis of this dissertation will focus the three preceding 
hypotheses, but the broader literature on ethnic and identity politics nonetheless 
provides additional conventional wisdom on the question of identity change and 
politicization. Before concluding this chapter, I briefly discuss these alternative 
explanations and lay them to rest as plausible explanations for the observed patterns. 
 
Elites and Politicization from Above 
 First, a prominent line of research in identity politics, and in particular ethnic 
politics, attributes the politicization of identities to political elites. Particularly in 
contexts where elites seek political office to gain access to patronage or state resources, 
scholars argue that elites politicize those identities that allow them to win office and 
maximize their material payoffs. Posner, for example, argues elites politicize those 
cleavages they are most likely to win them elections, either because they are large 
relative to the political arena (Posner 2004) or because electoral rules shift incentives to 
form minimum-winning coalitions (Huber 2017; Posner 2005). Similarly, Chandra 
(2004) argues that in patronage democracies like India, where voters and elites are likely 
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to improve their lot mainly their access state resources, individuals see ethnic identities 
as particularly useful because they are reliable and exclusive channels to material 
payoffs for voters and politicians alike. In these and other accounts, the logic of identity 
politicization is that political elites play an important role in politicizing identities by 
actively mobilizing those differences that will win them office. 
 These accounts, however, fall short in Brazil. Indeed, to the extent that social 
differences have entered into the calculations of rent-maximizing elites, they have 
sought to disarticulate social differences, often through clientelism (Hagopian 1996). 
Likely for this reason, scholars have by and large remarked on the few social correlates 
for electoral behavior or the party system in Brazil (Mainwaring 1999; D. Samuels 2006; 
D. J. Samuels and Zucco 2018). Second, while it may seem that ambitious politicians 
would want to politicize race in order to win over votes, there is reason to believe that 
doing so is a losing electoral strategy. In fact, in his controlled comparison of mayoral 
races in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Oliveira (2007) finds that nonwhite politicians 
who campaign explicitly on race lose, while those who campaign using implicit racial 
cues and explicitly politicize class-based issues win.33 In a study of the campaign 
strategies of Afro-Brazilian officeholders, Mitchell (2009) finds that these politicians 
are acutely aware of racial issues when they are on the campaign trail, but they are 
careful not to campaign explicitly on racial platforms, because doing so is likely to 
mobilize the feelings of racialized stigma and potentially demobilizing voters. Thus 
while conventional wisdom in the ethnic politics literature see elites and agents of 
identity politicization, there has been recent pattern of top-down mobilization of race 
and there is little strategic utility in doing so.  
 
  
                                                 
33 Also see Madrid (2012) on the electoral strategy of “ethno-populism” in Latin America, in which 
ethnic appeals are successful only when combined with class-based appeals. 
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Social Movements and Politicization from Below 
 A second alternative explanation attributes the development of political 
consciousness and reclassification to social movements and mobilization. Indeed, social 
movements have been shown to foster identity formation and politicization. Notably, in 
his seminal study of the civil rights movements, Doug McAdam (1982) describes 
mobilizing efforts and movement participation as a form of “cognitive liberation,” or a 
change in consciousness in which the political system loses legitimacy, people begin to 
demand change, and they develop a sense of political efficacy.34 And while social 
movement scholars promote the views that collective identities are both causes 
(Friedman and McAdam 1992; Klandermans 2002) and consequences (Escobar and 
Alvarez 1992) of mobilization, plenty of scholarship has argued that, collective 
identities aside, social movement participation itself can play a role in developing 
political consciousness (Klandermans 1992; Roberts 1998; Stokes 1995).35 
 To be sure, Brazil’s Unified Black Movement (o movimento negro unificado) 
has existed for nearly a century in Brazil, and despite being driven underground during 
the military dictatorship, re-emerged in the 1970s and has been actively working to 
organize and build racial consciousness. Yet the black movement has, by and large, been 
seen as ineffective at mobilizing the masses (Burdick 1998b, 2005; Hanchard 1994). 
Tianna Paschel’s (2016) study of the black movement has shown that, despite these 
difficulties, the movement has been remarkably successful in recent years in shaping 
state discourse and racial policies, in particular affirmative action. But movement 
success in influencing elites cannot be equated with success in other political domains. 
As we will see, many of those who have reclassified are active militants of the black 
                                                 
34 Also see Lee (2002) on movements’ influence on public opinion. 
35 Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992, 54) write that class interests are often ill defined, 
heterogeneous and contradictory, and any class-based mobilization must engage in a process of 
redefinition of “class interests.” 
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movement, and there is no doubt that race-based activism is on the rise in a variety of 
diverse “interest arenas” (Caldwell 2007; Collier and Handlin 2009; Perry 2013; Smith 
2016). But it is unclear whether movement participation itself has served as an 
independent (or direct) cause of reclassification. As I elaborated above, I argue instead 
that it is only channel through which the effect of education operates.  
 
Cleavage Structure 
 Finally, structural theories of identity politics attribute the political salience of 
identities or cleavages to cleavage structure, or the degree to which various group 
allegiances coincide or cut across one another. In his classic study of ethnic conflict, 
Horowitz (1985) argues that conflict between groups is more likely when groups are 
organized in some form of hierarchy (also see Dunning and Harrison 2010; Rogowski 
1990). Similarly, Cederman et al. (2013) argue that civil war onset becomes more likely 
when political and economic inequalities map onto group divisions. Even outside of the 
study of violence, prominent structural theories, have seen identity or cleavage 
politicization simply as expressions of social structure (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) or as 
a function of a group’s size relative to the political arena (Posner 2004).  
 Structural theories, however, suffer from two major shortcomings. First, to the 
extent that social structure alone matters for understanding the politicization of identities 
or cleavages, then Brazil ought to have seen the politicization of both race and class 
long ago, given the country’s deep inequalities and racial stratification. Instead, racial 
and class cleavages have historically been weakly politicized in Latin America 
(Horowitz 1985; Yashar 2005) and in  Brazil in particular (Hanchard 1994; Lieberman 
2003, 2009; Mainwaring 1999; Marx 1998; D. Samuels 2006). Moreover, that 
reclassification has occurred alongside a period of unprecedented upward mobility for 
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the lower classes does not comport with the idea that structural grievances alone lead to 
politicization (leaving aside the implicit presumptions of stable group boundaries).  
 
Looking Forward 
 The remainder of this dissertation subjects these hypotheses to empirical testing. 
Chapter 4 illustrates the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy with analysis of in-depth 
interview data collected in two Brazilian cities. Chapter 5 test the political identity, 
instrumental, and recognition hypotheses. Chapter 6 analyzes the consequences of this 
political identity formation for political engagement and the exercise of citizenship. 
Before turning to these analyses, the following chapter historically situates the recent 
era of social inclusion and racial recognition and maps educational expansion. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RACE, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP, AND THE BRAZILIAN STATE 
 
In 1911, doctor and biomedical scientist João Batista de Lacerda, then-head of the 
prestigious National Museum of Natural History in Rio de Janeiro, traveled to London 
where he served as the Brazilian delegate to the First Universal Races Congress. 
Scholars and delegates from around the world, including W.E.B. DuBois and Franz 
Boas, gathered at the University of London to discuss issues of anti-racism in an effort 
to improve relations “between the so-called ‘white’ and the so-called ‘colored’ peoples” 
(quoted in Weatherly 1911, 316). Later in the twentieth century, Brazil would eventually 
be seen as exemplary on this question, having avoided both institutionalized racial 
oppression and the atrocities of genocide.  
Yet at the time of the Congress, Brazil had not yet held such exemplary status. 
Much to the contrary, the prevalence of race mixture in the country earned Brazil the 
derogatory title “the laboratory of the races” (Schwarcz 2011). In an era that would 
come to be defined by scientific racism, many anthropologists and medical scientists 
believed that miscegenation between “the races” produced degenerate and inferior 
offspring. Brazilian elites, too, feared that such degeneracy would doom Brazil’s 
prospects for becoming a modern and developed nation (Loveman 2014; Skidmore 
1974). Given this backdrop, the Congress was an opportunity for Brazilian elites to try 
to rescue their nation from a fate of backwardness in the eyes of the international 
community. In his paper titled “On the mestiço in Brazil,” Lacerda sought to appeal to 
an alternative, Lamarckian genetic logic (Stepan 1991) in an attempt to cast the future 
of the Brazilian nation in optimistic light: 
Sexual selection always continues toward perfection by subjugating atavism and 
purging the descendants of mestiços of all the trace characteristics of the negro. Thanks 
to this process of ethnic reduction, it is logical to suppose that in one century’s time 
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mestiços will disappear from Brazil, a fact that will coincide with the parallel extinction 
of the negro race among us. (quoted in Schwarcz 2011, 239) 
Miscegenation would not, Lacerda insisted, breed degeneracy. Rather, it would 
inevitably produce a “so-called white” population. 
 By the mid-twentieth century, the tune of Brazilian nationalism had changed. 
Brazil was no longer preoccupied with the “degenerate mestiço.” Instead, it preferred 
not to deal with the question of race at all. As political regimes oscillated between 
democracy and authoritarianism during the twentieth century, Brazilian leaders and 
elites, sharing goals of development and modernization, relied on Brazil’s myth of racial 
unity to aid in this national agenda, just as they had Lamarckian genetics. So long as 
miscegenation was believed to breed degeneracy, elites perpetuated notions that Brazil 
was becoming whiter; and so long as the Brazilian state believed that a homogenous 
national community aided industrialization and modernization from above, the state 
promoted ideas of racial unity that avoided political fissures that might undermine such 
goals. Eventually, international norms would favor multiculturalism and respect for 
diversity as markings of a modern democratic state, and the myth of racial unity would 
be replaced by explicit recognition of past wrongs. In this era, the state would not seek 
to eliminate “negros” nor gloss over their existence, but rather would work to include 
them as full members of the citizenry through expansionary and race-targeted social 
policy. 
This chapter briefly traces the evolution in the Brazilian state’s (un)official 
posture toward the racial question over the course the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. Alongside these shifts, it also traces the evolution of education and social 
policy to show that different sectors of society benefited from social policy expansion 
differently over these periods. By mapping these two trajectories, this chapter places the 
more recent era of social inclusion and racial recognition in broader historical context. 
 47 
 
It also aims to highlight the ways in which the state’s stance toward the racial question 
and to whom the state granted social policy benefits were both functions of the state’s 
goals of modernization and development at various points in time. Replacing racial 
democracy with recognition, and informal with inclusive citizenship, created the 
conditions under which reclassification toward blackness could occur as it did. These 
conditions, however, were as much a product of the historical and developmental 
trajectories pursued by the Brazilian state as they were the political will and incentives 
shaping contemporary politics. 
 
Scientific Racism, Raceless Nationalism, and Affirmative Action: Three Eras of 
Racial State Policy 
Scientific Racism in Post-Abolition Brazil, 1888-1940s 
 Current historical research estimates that approximately 40 percent of enslaved 
Africans arrived to what is present-day Brazil, making the country the single-largest 
destination of the slave trade (Andrews 2004). Following the peaceful abolition of 
slavery in 1888 (the last country in the Americas to do so), Brazil was left with a large 
slave-descendant population. The scarcity of European descendants posed a dilemma to 
elites at the time, who were heavily influenced by the prevailing ideas of the eugenics 
movement (Dávila 2003; Schwarcz 1993; Stepan 1991). In this era of scientific racism, 
which separated the human population into a finite set of mutually exclusive “races,” 
elites were particularly concerned with the implication of Brazil’s racial composition 
for the country’s national destiny, mainly its ability to develop into a modern and 
civilized nation, as described in the introduction to this chapter. 
 The response on the part of elites and the state was to “whiten” the population. 
This was to be accomplished in part through race mixture, following the genetic logics 
articulated by Lacerda (Schwarcz 2011; Stepan 1991), as well as through European 
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immigration (Skidmore 1974). Though they believed, or hoped, that nonwhites could 
be absorbed into the white population with little trace of African descent, elites sought 
to speed up this process by increasing the numbers of Europeans to lighten the nation’s 
genetic stock. Immigration policy in the early twentieth century sought, explicitly and 
implicitly, to encourage immigration from western Europe and to limit immigration 
from countries that could not more quickly advance this goal. Immigration policy as 
early as 1891 sought to restrict immigration by country of origin with this purpose 
(Skidmore 1974, 197). Indeed, even as the dominance of scientific racism began to 
wane, Brazilian elites continued to promote immigration to Brazil from Europe. 
Notably, during his dictatorial rule, Getúlio Vargas issued a decree shortly before his 
ouster in 1945 stipulating that immigrants should be admitted to Brazil in keeping with 
“the necessity to preserve and develop, in the ethnic composition of the population, the 
more desirable characteristics of its European ancestry” (quoted in Skidmore 1993, 
199). 
 Thus early years of Brazil’s first republic and its experiments with populist 
dictatorship represented a state posture on the racial question heavily influenced by 
scientific racism and European beliefs that only white nations could develop and 
prosper. Insofar as the state concerned itself with “the social question” of poverty and 
poor living conditions of the country’s large nonwhite population, it saw race as an 
independent cause of “degeneracy” and thus aimed to deal with the racial question by 
promoting policies that would absorb nonwhites into the desirable white population. 
With the demise of scientific racism in international epistemic communities, however, 
the state’s posture on the racial question would shift, carrying different consequences 
for the political and social realities of Afro-descendants in Brazil. 
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Racial Democracy, 1940s-1990s 
Starting in the 1920s and finally by the end of the second world war, scientific 
racism had lost international legitimacy. Ideas on the innate inequality of “races” were 
replaced by environmentalist theories that saw all individuals as innately equal and that 
recast “degeneracy” as products of social and economic forces—as acquired 
behaviors—rather than as fixed and inherited traits (Dávila 2003; Loveman 2014). 
Preferences for whiteness, however, would not disappear with the demise of scientific 
racism. Proclamations and decrees as explicit as Vargas’s may not have been issued in 
the following decades, but as Skidmore (1974) notes, these immigration policies 
remained largely intact long after his rule since no other policies were issued to replace 
them. Indeed, the period following Vargas and the era of race science can be 
characterized as a period of “racial silence” (Fischer, Grinberg, and Mattos 2018). 
Whereas in prior decades the state made explicit its desire for whiteness as part and 
parcel of its goals of development, this would be replaced by an embrace of the myth of 
racial democracy, which downplayed racial differences and put forth an image of Brazil 
rooted in racial unity. As Loveman (2014) documents, this shift in racial state policy 
tracks with a shift in international norms of modern statehood, which came to be rooted 
in homogenous national communities. The logic was simple: sameness was more 
conducive than difference to developing a modern and efficient state and nation. 
Brazil was well positioned to abide by these new international norms. Renowned 
sociologist Gilberto Freyre, himself a student of Franz Boas at Columbia University, 
had only years prior published his seminal revision of Brazilian history Casa-Grande e 
senzala (Freyre 1933)—translated to English as The Masters and the Slaves—in which 
he not only argues that Brazil’s race relations were harmonious (a legacy from the 
humane treatment of slaves in colonial Brazil), but that the Brazilian population was 
best understood as constituted through race mixture between European settlers, enslaved 
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Africans, and indigenous populations—a process of miscegenation facilitated by the 
Portuguese propensity for race mixture with the Moors. In Freyre’s words: “Every 
Brazilian, even the light-skinned fair-haired one, carries about with him on his soul…the 
shadow, or at least the birthmark, of the aborigine or the Negro” (Freyre 1986, 278). By 
the 1970s and 1980s, racial democracy would be denounced as a myth by academic 
researchers in Brazil and beyond, and it would be attacked by social movements and 
activists for whitewashing Brazil’s history of slavery, rampant discrimination, and deep 
and persistent inequalities (Andrews 1991; Hanchard 1994; Hasenbalg 1979; 
Nascimento 2016; Silva 1985). But before these denunciations, racial democracy served 
a vital function to the Brazilian state and nation, both providing a constitutive myth and 
enabling the state to conform to international expectations of how best to modernize and 
develop (Loveman 2014). 
This was particularly true as democratic institutions were replaced with 
dictatorial ones. It would be a stretch to say that the racial question was of utmost 
concern to the military regime that came to power in 1964. Yet the emergence and 
prevalence of the racial democracy myth also provided the military regime with an out: 
racial democracy made it possible to dismiss race from discussion altogether because 
stark racial differences, per se, did not exist in Brazil. Indeed, in the 1970 census, the 
first conducted under the military regime, questions regarding racial (or color) 
identification were removed from the census (Loveman 2014; Nobles 2000). Such a 
decision suggests the regime’s lack of interest in the racial question. Additionally, the 
military regime engaged in overt acts of suppression and censorship, targeting the black 
movement and other civil society groups (Hanchard 1994; Nobles 2000), providing 
more direct evidence of the regime’s interest in dismissing any political activities that 
might undermine their goals of delivering stable economic growth and performance. 
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Racialized Democracy, 1990s-present 
 By 1985, the military regime had agreed to restore political power to civilians, 
and in 1988 a new constitution was ratified that lifted literacy requirements on political 
citizenship rights, greatly extending the franchise to the poorest segments of the 
population. Academics, social movement activists, and international organizations had 
also waged major campaigns against Brazilian racial democracy (Bailey 2009; 
Hanchard 1994; E. E. Telles 2004). Important, too, was that national myths that united 
and homogenized populations were no longer seen as effective ways of progressing 
toward modernization. Instead, recognition of ethnoracial—among other—differences, 
inequalities, and social forces of discrimination were seen as the efforts of a modern 
state to fulfill the promises of democratic citizenship for all of those in whose name the 
state claimed to legitimately govern (Loveman 2014). 
 In this context, the Brazilian state shifted from colorblind to color-conscious. As 
Htun (2004) and Paschel (2016) show, the alignment of these international norms with 
a domestic political context of democracy incentivized the state and made it more 
responsive to political actors. Indeed, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, himself a 
former professor of sociology at the University of São Paulo and scholar of race 
relations in Brazil (Cardoso and Ianni 1960), marked a departure from the past in his 
inaugural address in 1995: “We will enthusiastically ensure equal rights for the equal: 
for women, who are the majority of our people and whom the country owes respect and 
opportunities for education and work; for racial minorities and near-minorities – for 
blacks, principally – who hope equality is more than just a word, but a portrait of reality” 
(Cardoso 1995). Thus from his first day in office Cardoso represented a symbolic break 
with the Brazilian state’s past posture toward race: Brazilian elites no longer perpetuated 
ideas of race mixture that sought to eliminate blackness, or to whitewash it as “mixed”—
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Cardoso instead recognized racial groups as distinct and as deserving of equality and 
respect. 
 Yet though Cardoso’s inaugural address signaled his willingness to engage with 
activists, the 1990s would bring little else in the way of symbolic or other change with 
regard to the race question. But by the early 2000s, activists began to use Brazil’s 
participation in the UN Conference on Race and Racism, held in Durban in 2001, to 
apply additional pressure to Cardoso to reckon with Brazil’s past. Cardoso complied, 
and in December of that year he gave a speech in which he formally endorsed race-
targeted affirmative action policies, saying “The Brazilian state recognizes the painful 
consequences that slavery caused in Brazil and will continue to aspire to repair them 
through public policies that promote equality of opportunity…affirmative policies in 
favor of Afro-descendants” (Cardoso 2001). Cardoso’s statement shocked both citizens 
and scholars, few of whom expected such an unequivocal endorsement for what was 
surely to be a controversial set of policies in this former racial democracy. 
 Nonetheless, Cardoso’s endorsement of affirmative action and its subsequent 
implementation in the form of means and race-targeted quotas for university in state and 
federal universities has thus come to symbolize Brazil’s new era of racialized 
democracy. To be sure, Brazil remains one of the most unequal and racially stratified 
societies in the world, but by the early twenty-first century, Brazil had evolved in ways 
that position the country in sharp contrast to its past.  
 
The Evolution of Social Policy 
The Vargas Era: O Estado Novo and the First Incorporation 
Alongside the evolution of the state’s posture toward race was the extension of 
social benefits over the course of the twentieth century and the punctuated incorporation 
of sectors of the Brazilian population as citizens. After the Brazilian monarchy was 
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deposed and the first republic established in 1889, the early stages of Brazil’s first 
republic coincided with early industrialization, the growth of cities, and the rise of mass 
politics (Conniff 1981). Populist leader Getúlio Vargas is widely credited with the 
creation of many social policy institutions, some of which have persisted to the present 
day. Vargas, who seized power in 1930 and who remained in power until his ouster in 
1945 (before returning in 1951), is known today as “The Father of the Poor” for his 
construction o Estado Novo, or the New State. Somewhat paradoxically, the Estado 
Novo constitution of 1937 centralized power and the apparatuses of the state in Vargas’s 
hands, previously decentralized in Brazil’s federal system. This centralization of power 
reestablished Vargas as a dictator, but this also enabled him to play a strong role in the 
creation and extension of social rights. 
Vargas is perhaps best known for the labor code established during the Estado 
Novo and which largely remained in place until the 1990s. This code allocated many 
rights and benefits for urban labor, including a minimum wage, eight-hour work day, 
pensions and social security, and paid holidays (Conniff 1981). These benefits, 
however, were reserved for members of state-recognized unions. Moreover, this labor 
code was enforced through a corporatist system that reserved the power to sanction 
unions and withhold benefits from unrecognized unions. Though Vargas would 
eventually make electoral appeals to workers and form alliances with leftist workers and 
communist parties, his engagement with labor was largely driven by this desire to 
control the potential threat to his power that urban labor posed (Collier and Collier 
2002). Thus unlike the labor-mobilizing populism of Argentina’s Perón (Roberts 2014), 
for example, Vargas’ incorporation of the citizenry was highly selective and designed 
to suit his political interest in controlling the growing sectors of urban labor (Collier and 
Collier 2002).  
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 This labor code represents one of the greatest social advances of the era, but 
Vargas gave attention to other policy domains as well. As for education, Vargas set 
agendas and established agencies that continued to exist for much of the twentieth 
century. It was under Vargas, for example, that the federal government created a 
Ministry of Education and articulated the first national education plan (Dávila 2003). 
Prior to the Vargas era, education was reserved for the children of elites, and it was 
under Vargas that education was extended, primarily to urban labor, with the goal of 
fostering nationalism and the vocational training necessary for an industrializing 
economy (Silva 1980). At the time this certainly marked an advance in accessibility to 
public education, but census data reveals that access remained restricted and highly 
uneven (Dávila 2003; Fischer 2008). Nonetheless, the initial creation of federal 
education policy was simply a first step in creating a public education system as a right 
of citizenship.  
 Yet education policy in the Vargas era was more than a tool of industrialization. 
It was also heavily influenced by the ideas of eugenic nationalism that permeated much 
elite thinking and fears in this era (Dávila 2003; Loveman 2014; Skidmore 1974). While 
scientific racism had begun to lose its international legitimacy by mid-century, at the 
time when Brazil was establishing some of its first education policies and institutions, 
elites saw education as a tool for whitening the population not through Lamarckian 
genetics (Schwarcz 2011; Stepan 1991) or immigration (Skidmore 1974), but through 
educational socialization. As historian Jerry Dávila writes in his analysis of Vargas-era 
education policy,  
by the second decade of the twentieth century these elites began to seek escape from 
the determinist trap that tied Brazil to perpetual backwardness because of its large 
nonwhite population. Instead, they embraced a notion that degeneracy was an 
acquired—and therefore remediable—condition. Blackness still held all of its 
pejorative connotations, but individuals could escape the social category of blackness 
through improvement of their health, level of education and culture, or their social 
class. (Dávila 2003, 6) 
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Though access to education remained highly restricted in this period, those who were 
fortunate enough to gain access were being socialized into the logics of whitening, that 
is, learning that hygiene, education, and upper-class status are constitutive of whiteness. 
 Ultimately, the Vargas era represented a significant advance in the extension of 
rights and benefits to Brazilian citizens, even if these benefits predominantly targeted 
urban labor. Of course, the highly unequal allocation/accessibility of these rights and 
benefits created highly segmented societies that would lead to informality/illegality and 
weakened citizenship (Fischer 2008; Holston 2008). Yet it was also precisely in the 
highly segmented nature of citizenship, and the punctuated way in which citizenship 
rights and benefits would be extended, that would leave open the possibility for 
educational and other reforms that would create the conditions for reclassification 
towards blackness down the road. 
 
The Democratic Interregnum and the Military Regime, 1946-1985 
 Such reforms, however, would only come decades later. After Vargas was 
ousted in 1945 a new democratic constitution was established in 1946, which 
established education as a right of all Brazilians. The country’s first comprehensive 
national education plan, the LDB (Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da educacão nacional), 
would be first passed in 1961, establishing formulas for resource allocation, spending 
floors, and mandating school attendance at four years of age. These reforms appear 
progressive on paper, but schools were few and far between, those that existed were 
under-resourced, teachers were under-educated and poorly paid, and widespread 
poverty meant few families complied with mandates to send their children to school (de 
Mello and Hoppe 2005). This is clear in census data, which shows that the 
overwhelming share of the population failed to complete primary school. In this era, 
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access to high school and university remained the exclusive domain of a privileged elite 
(Castro 1989). 
  In 1964, democracy gave way to military dictatorship, which did little to 
improve national education policy, even though the military regime hung its own 
fortunes on its ability to deliver economic growth and modernization. As a result of the 
regime’s preoccupation with eradicating leftist threats of communism and socialism, 
many of the architects of the 1961 LDB were sent into exile, and freedom of expression 
in education and innovative programs aimed at adult literacy were terminated. Aside 
from these more politically and culturally repressive measures, education policy 
remained largely intact until 1971, when the military regime passed an updated LDB in 
response to rapid urbanization and industrialization, which rapidly increased demand 
for urban labor. The 1971 LDB left much of the 1961 plan intact, but raised the age of 
mandatory school attendance to fourteen, added physical education, and made 
technical/vocational training the focus of high school education (S. Schwartzman 2016). 
Yet while the regime sought to adapt national education policy to meet its goals 
of economic growth and modernization, the same resource shortages undermined these 
efforts and kept education out of reach for the vast majority of citizens. Moreover, while 
national education policy was set at the national level, implementation and resource 
Figure 3.1 Education Completion rates for Brazilians aged 22-26, 1960-2010. Source: IPUMS, 
IBGE.  
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distribution was left to state governments, where these public goods often served as 
political grist in systems of patronage of clientelism (Melo 2017; Plank, Sobrinho, and 
Xavier 1996). On paper, education policy and access to rights seemed progressive and 
expansive, and in many ways it was. Access to education did improve over the course 
of the twentieth century, but poor quality and resources meant that quality remained low 
(Castro 1989), and major gaps in access continued to exist according to race and income. 
By the end of the military regime educational outcomes disappointed many, and 
economists increasingly saw education as the key weakness that would undermine 
Brazil’s joining the ranks of high-income countries. Indeed, economists would come to 
see this period as an “opportunity foregone” (Birdsall and Sabot 1996).  
 Figure 3.1 shows rates of educational attainment from the census from 1960 to 
2010, according to racial identification (Minnesota Population Center 2018). In the 
1960s, education was a rare commodity. The vast majority of Brazil’s population had 
not completed primary school, let alone high school. Rates of university education 
remained in the single digits until 2010, and later survey data reveal that those accessing 
university were of the most privileged class sectors, and likely lighter-skinned. With the 
Brazilian economic miracle from 1968-1973, the regime greatly expanded the number 
of primary schools in the country, but failed to provide additional resources, which 
continued to be reserved for universities (Castro 1989; Plank, Sobrinho, and Xavier 
1996). By 1980, there were improvements in educational attainment at all levels, though 
census data reveal much greater gains for the self-identified white population, compared 
to the nonwhite populations. Of course, given the tendency toward reclassification and 
the prevalence of whitening in this period, these statistics must be taken with a grain of 
salt. In any case, the data suggest that the educational outcomes did indeed improve, 
though in ways that would leave much room for additional improvement.  
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Educational Expansion in the Era of Inclusion, 1985-2014 
 The period of educational expansion that led to the patterns of reclassification 
began with redemocratization, which ratified a new democratic constitution that not 
only codified the universal right to education that appear only on paper in previous 
constitutions, but also lifted literacy requirements for voting rights. As Candelaria Garay 
(2016) argues, the pairing of these rights meant that for the first time politicians found 
themselves competing for the votes of the poor masses, providing great incentive for 
and mobilizing the political will of elites to invest in social policies for “outsiders.” An 
additional facilitating factor was the electoral competitiveness of the leftist Workers’ 
Party (PT), which continued to win greater vote shares in successive elections through 
the 1990s and into the 2000s (Hunter 2010). The presence of the PT as a potential 
electoral threat gave more conservative parties incentive to moderate their policy 
programs so as to appeal to what might be natural constituencies for leftist parties 
(Garay 2016).  
The first set of major education reforms came in the form of an updated national 
education policy, the LDB, which was passed in 1996 under Cardoso. This new law 
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Figure 3.2 All Government Spending on Education, 1995-2015. Source: UN Economic Commission 
on Latin America and the Caribbean. Note: Brazil’s National Institute for Education Research (INEP) 
reports slightly higher figures for spending as a percentage of social spending, though the same trend is 
apparent. 
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entailed a number of reforms, but one set of reforms in particular took aim at the political 
bargaining between state and local governments that undermined resource delivery and 
education quality (Melo 2017; Plank, Sobrinho, and Xavier 1996). The 1996 LDB 
established FUNDEF (the Fund for Maintenance and Development of the Fundamental 
Education and Valorization of Teaching), which reorganized the administration of basic 
education and created new incentive structure designed to circumvent this political 
bargaining. Specifically, FUNDEF mandated a spending floor of 25 percent of state tax 
revenue on education, as well as 18 percent of federal tax revenues. Of the state spending 
earmarked for education, 60 percent was required to be spent on teachers’ salaries and 
training programs to improve quality (de Mello and Hoppe 2005). The 1996 law also 
stipulated that for ten years, 50 percent of  federal funds be dedicated to addressing 
illiteracy and universalizing primary school coverage. Moreover, rather than leave local 
school funding to the discretion of state governors, federal funds would be transferred 
directly to local governments on the basis of student enrollments, creating incentives for 
local mayors to keep school enrollments high (Melo 2017).  
The result of these institutional reforms was immediately apparent. As Figure 
3.2 shows, spending as a percentage of GDP rose from roughly 4 to more than 6 percent 
between the late 1990s and 2015, higher than the OECD average (OECD 2018; World 
Bank 2002). In addition, education came to occupy a significantly larger share of social 
spending overall, growing from roughly 10 to 16 percent of all social spending over this 
same period. This, of course, is not to suggest that there was no room for improvement 
in terms of education quality and coverage in Brazil. But over this period, both domestic 
and international observers agree, Brazil has made encouraging improvements in 
education quality and student performance (INEP 2016a, 2016b; OECD 2011). 
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A common critique, however, is that average figures on education spending overall 
mask inequities in the allocation of resources, which might only be exacerbated by 
increased spending. In particular, a disproportionate amount of resources have 
historically been allocated to free public university, traditionally accessible only to a 
small minority of the population wealthy enough to afford high-quality primary and 
secondary education in expensive private schools. But governments began addressing 
these disparities as well. Figure 3.3 shows public spending on university education 
across all levels of government. Figures indicate that in 2000, universities received 75 
percent of government resources spent on education. By 2015, this figure dropped to 
just above 50 percent. The share of education spending on primary and secondary 
education, which comprises the remainder, thus doubled over this period. Additionally, 
there is no sign that changes in the allocation of resources has meant a decline in the 
quality of public university education: between 2000 and 2015, per capita university 
spending has remained relatively stable. Clear, then, is that increased investments have 
sought to make public education spending more equitable. 
In addition to increases spending and improving resource allocation, the 1996 
LDB took on a distinctly democratic character by incorporating elements of the 
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philosophy of renowned Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire, author of such works as 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed (2014) and Education for Critical Consciousness (2005). 
Freire is best known for advocating a teacher-student relationship based on the shared 
transfer of knowledge, rather than authority and discipline. But Freire also promoted 
education as one of the best ways to combat inequity and intergenerational poverty. 
Freire also saw education as critical to democratic citizenship because it would empower 
individuals to become critically aware of the world in which they lived, and to become 
agents in their lives. Freire’s views initially led to his exile in Chile during Brazil’s 
military dictatorship, where he authored some of his most famous works. He later 
returned to Brazil, where his ideas would gain influence in policy circles and would 
eventually influence in the 1996 LDB reform. The 1996 law states, for example, that 
the goal of national education is to prepare the student for “the exercise of citizenship 
and her qualification for work” (Lei de diretrizes de Base da Educação Nacional, 1996, 
art. 2), as well as that students should be educated on the basis of principles of “pluralism 
of ideas and pedagogical approaches” (art. 3, sec. 3) and “respect for liberty and 
appreciation for tolerance” (art. 3, sec. 4).36 In addition to expanded access and 
                                                 
36 A 2013 amendment (Law no. 12.796/2013) included in Article 3 of the 1996 LDB “consideration for 
ethno-racial diversity” (art. 3, sec. 8).  
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resources, then, national education in Brazil became less vocational, technocratic, and 
elitist, and it incorporated pedagogical philosophies aimed at critical awareness and 
citizenship. 
In any case, the effects of the 1996 LDB (which took aim at primary education) 
on attendance and completion rates was immediately apparent. Figure 3.4 shows 
primary completion rates for Brazilians aged 15 to 18 years of age. First, it is worth 
emphasizing that in 1992 there were massive inequalities in primary school completion 
rates by income quintile: whereas 70 percent of the wealthiest families saw their 
children complete primary school, only 10 percent of the poorest did. Yet the enormous 
gains in educational outcomes over the following two decades are a testament to the 
action on the part of the Brazilian state to improve access to education. It also should 
not go without mentioning that a significant factor in improving educational attendance 
among the poorest sectors is the stipulation included in Brazil’s targeted cash transfer 
program, the Bolsa Família. This program offered cash payments to the poorest 
household conditioned on families’ compliance with social requirements, like children’s 
school attendance. The program began as a state-level initiative during the Cardoso 
administration, but the program was scaled up to the national level in 2003 under Lula 
and greatly expanded in years thereafter, eventually reaching the households of roughly 
30 percent of the Brazilian population by 2014 (Weisbrot, Johnston, and Lefebvre 
2014).  
The 1990s saw unprecedented attention paid to improving primary school 
outcomes and the reform of federal education policy to make educational goals a reality, 
but there was also remarkable continuity between the Cardoso and Lula administrations. 
During Lula’s presidency, the national congress renewed FUNDEF and expanded the 
program to include secondary education as well. In addition, Lula earmarked additional 
federal dollars to expand resources for federal funding of primary and secondary 
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education (Melo 2017; OECD 2011). The results of these renewed commitments are 
again clear. Figure 3.5 shows rates of high school completion from 1992 to 2014 by 
income quintile. As in other domains of education, access to education is stratified along 
socioeconomic lines. Indeed, in 1992 high school completion rates stood at 10 percent 
or less for the bottom 60 percent of the income distribution, and at just under 3 percent 
for the bottom quintile. Yet considerable gains in both access and completion are 
evident: by 2014, 30 percent of those in the bottom quintile completed high school, a 
tenfold increase.  
Lula not only by renewed commitments began under Cardoso, but also extended 
them to the domain of university education. Unlike primary and secondary education, 
which has historically been seen as low-quality and under-resourced, university 
education received the lion’s share of public spending on education (Figure 3.3 above), 
and served a small and elite minority of the country’s population (Artes and Ricoldi 
2015; Gomes and Moraes 2012). Moreover, the country’s federal and state-run 
universities are of exceedingly high quality and do not charge students tuition. The 
irony, of course, is that students educated in public primary and secondary schools are 
dismally prepared to compete for the few university slots in public universities (Artes 
and Ricoldi 2015; Heringer 2015; S. Schwartzman, Pinheiro, and Pillay 2015). 
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Lula sought to combat these inequalities by expanding existing resources for 
federal universities and creating new programs to facilitate access. In 2001, congress 
approved a national education goal of enrolling 30 percent of 18 to 24-year-olds in 
university, a goal that was increased to 33 percent in 2014. To meet these goals, Lula’s 
administration: created 18 new federal universities between 2003 and 2014, including 
universities outside of state capitals to reach rural populations; created the federal 
Program for the Restructuring and Expansion of Federal Universities (REUNI), which 
awarded qualifying universities with up to BR$2 billion to invest in buildings, courses, 
and campuses, and to improve access and retention for vulnerable students; created the 
federal program Prouni, the University for All Program (Programa Universidade para 
Todos) in 2004, which awards full and partial scholarships to low-income and Afro-
descendant students to attend private universities (a total of nearly 3 million scholarships 
were awarded as of 2016); nationalized and centralized the university entrance exam, 
creating a national exam analogous to the SAT in the United States (o Exame nacional 
do Ensino medio, ENEM) as well as a unified application system, allowing students to 
apply to multiple universities without the need to sit for separate entrance exams (SISU); 
and most notoriously, federal and state governments began to expand access through 
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the active inclusion of low-income and Afro-descendant students through the creation 
of means- and race-targeted affirmative action programs (Heringer 2015; Heringer and 
Ferreira 2009; L. T. Soares 2013).  
 The results in the domain of university education are unprecedented. Figure 3.6 
displays rates of university access (those with at least some university education, if not 
completed) by income quintile. The figure omits those in the highest income quintile, 
where university access is far and away the greatest (17 percent in 1992 and 47 percent 
in 2014). The data tell a story similar to that seen in lower levels of education: among 
all levels of the income structure, access to university education has expanded greatly 
over this period, beginning in particular in the 2000s. And while stratification by income 
remains a challenge in efforts to democratize education, when we consider that the 
bottom forty percent of the income structure had essentially no presence in university 
education in 1992, then even the more modest gains among these sectors represent 
unprecedented access for the poor and disadvantaged in Brazil (Artes and Ricoldi 2015; 
Gomes and Moraes 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
Between the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Brazil saw 
remarkable change in both the state’s orientation toward the racial question as well as 
the extent and accessibility of social citizenship. Brazil transitioned from aspirations of 
total whiteness in the era of scientific racism to the recognition of the suffering nonwhite 
populations endured and continue to endure. At the same time, the Brazilian state 
expanded citizenship rights in periodic fashion, moving from relatively few rights 
extended to restricted sectors of the population to universal, basic social rights for all 
citizens. By the end of the twentieth century, the groundwork had been laid for massive 
improvements in the accessibility of public education at all levels. At primary and 
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secondary levels, funding and quality improved and national education policy reflected 
values of democratic citizenship. At the university level, new and reformed policies and 
programs sought to make a university education an attainable goal for lower-income 
and darker-skinned students. Thus education overall became much more inclusive, 
inducing a new wave of social incorporation and upward mobility among lower classes. 
It is these very experiences of upward mobility, I argue, that contributed to the formation 
of racialized political identities and the newfound tendency for Brazilians to reclassify 
toward blackness. In the following chapter, I take up these processes and elaborate the 
mechanisms through which educational expansion could produce such sudden and 
unexpected social and political change. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PATHWAYS TO CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
This chapter seeks to better specify and illustrate the relationship between education and 
racial reclassification by exploring the causal pathways through which individuals come 
to develop political identities rooted in racial categories of social membership. To do 
this, I draw on qualitative analysis of in-depth interview data collected during more than 
15 months of fieldwork in São Paulo and Recife, two major urban centers in distinct 
geographic regions of Brazil. The accounts of Brazilians at various levels of education 
and socioeconomic backgrounds, as well as with reclassifiers and non-reclassifiers, 
brings to light how individuals’ racial self-conceptions are informed first and foremost 
by their personal and lived experiences. Yet by altering individuals’ paths in life, 
inserting individuals into new space and social networks, and modifying their 
expectations, access to greater education and the social mobility this entails have greatly 
impacted individuals’ experiences and their interpretations of them.  
A long line of literature in political behavior highlights education—either as a 
determinant of socioeconomic status or the availability of cognitive skills or resources—
as a strong predictor of individuals’ political participation and engagement (Almond 
and Verba 1963; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 
1996; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1987). More recently, scholars have 
called into question the causal validity of education as an imprecise, endogenous, and 
extraordinarily bundled “treatment” (Berinsky and Lenz 2011; Kam and Palmer 2008). 
I do not wade into these debates, but one contribution of this analysis is a clear 
specification of the mechanisms through which education can operate to impact 
individuals’ political worldviews and engagement. Specifically, this analysis uncovers 
the ways that education increases individuals’ exposure to information, social networks, 
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and labor market experiences. At the same time, greater education endows individuals 
with greater internal political efficacy, making them more confident in their political 
competencies and perspectives. Ultimately, better-educated individuals are more 
exposed to and made more aware of racialized power dynamics, and they are 
empowered to confront the stigma associated with blackness. 
Qualitative analysis of rich ethnographic data is particularly well suited for the 
task of peering inside the black box of education, simultaneously providing opportunity 
to assess whether the effects of education are endogenous to other processes and 
illustrating the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy at work in ways that statistical 
models simply cannot. Before elaborating and documenting the mechanisms of 
exposure and efficacy in detail, I first discuss the sampling strategies and other 
methodological considerations in conducting these interviews. 
 
Empirical Approach and Methodological Considerations 
 The data presented in this chapter come from thirty-four in-depth interviews 
conducted with reclassifiers and stable identifiers between July 2016 and August 2017. 
Interviews were conducted in São Paulo and Recife, both capital cities of their 
respective states, located in distinct geographic regions of Brazil. These two cities 
capture, in broad strokes, important subnational differences that one might expect to be 
related to racial reclassification (A. S. A. Guimarães 1999; Nogueira 1998). São Paulo, 
Brazil’s largest city and one of it’s most important economically, is located in the 
southeast region of Brazil, which is wealthier and more developed, overall, than the 
northern regions. The state of São Paulo, like many southern and southeastern states, is 
also majority-white due to waves of immigration from Europe in the twentieth century, 
which were incentivized to provide labor for the country’s burgeoning industrial 
economy. Recife, the capital city of Pernambuco, is a large coastal city in the country’s 
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northeast region, historically the principal destination for enslaved Africans trafficked 
to Brazil to work predominantly on sugarcane plantations. One legacy of slavery is that 
northeastern regions of Brazil have historically been, and remain, lesser developed than 
southern regions of the country. Moreover, due to the large slave populations in these 
regions, they have also historically been minority-white, according to the census. 
 In addition to demographic and historical differences, from the perspective of 
subnational variation these two cities can be considered “extreme values on Y,” in 
Seawright and Gerring’s (2008) terms: São Paulo is an above-average, and Pernambuco 
a below-average, case of reclassification. Seawright and Gerring suggest that selecting 
extreme values on Y is a fruitful case selection strategy for open-ended probing into 
causal processes, and one that can be combined with other cases or methods to test the 
representativeness of the findings. This is precisely the approach I employed in 
conducting these qualitative interviews. While the insights gleaned from these specific 
interviews leave open questions regarding generalization, the purpose of this 
methodological approach is to generate hypotheses that can account for these patterns 
and shed light on political identity formation (Martin 2013; Morse 1998, 1999). The 
analyses that follow, then, simply aim to probe empirically and illustrate in detail these 
causal processes. In the chapters that follow, I subject these insights to systematic 
empirical testing. 
 In line with these analytic goals (Lynch 2013), I recruited interview subjects via 
snowball sampling in large part because it is neither easy nor obvious how to identify 
who exactly is a reclassifier in this context. One’s physical appearance in Brazil says 
little about how that individual identifies in racial terms, let alone whether or not they 
have reclassified. Because of this, I relied on the contacts I made over time to identify 
reclassifiers, and relied on them for additional references. When I first began fieldwork 
in São Paulo, I was exploring a hypothesis related to the importance of racial quotas in 
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university, both as a material benefit incentivizing black identification but also as a 
symbolic form of recognition by the state that might legitimate black identification for 
Brazilians. As a visiting researcher at the University of São Paulo, I had exposure to 
university students who benefited from affirmative action policies (of all kinds). But I 
also sought out students who had not benefited from such policies, but also might in the 
future. This led me to observing preparatory courses for the university entrance exam 
geared toward low-income students. Many of my contacts were made at courses offered 
with the organization Uneafro, a black-movement linked organization that offered free, 
nightly preparatory courses targeted towards “popular” sectors.  
Table 4.1 presents basic descriptive statistics for my interview subjects. The 
majority of the individuals I interviewed were in their 20s and 30s, in part a function of 
my own access as a university-based researcher and how subjects were sampled. For 
this reason, the majority also had completed high school and university education. In 
general, interviewees came from the lower end of Brazil’s income structure, even if their 
present-day salaries suggested otherwise. The mean monthly household income per 
capita of my interviewees was BR$1,307, roughly 40 percent higher than Brazil’s 
federal minimum wage in 2017. The interviews were roughly split between Recife and 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Recife 0.47 0.51 0 1 34 
Age 31.62 14.01 18 70 34 
Female 0.59 0.50 0 1 34 
Income 1307 1419.72 0 7666.67 34 
Reclassifier 0.56 0.50 0 1 34 
Education 3.15 1.02 1 4 34 
(1)  < Primary 0.15 0.36 0 1 34 
(3)  High School 0.41 0.50 0 1 34 
(4)  University 0.44 0.50 0 1 34 
Racial ID 2.58 0.61 1 3 33 
(1)  White 0.06 0.24 0 1 33 
(2)  Brown 0.30 0.47 0 1 33 
(3)  Black 0.64 0.49 0 1 33 
Table 4.1 Basic Characteristics of Interviewees. Income measures monthly household income per 
capita. Racial ID indicates the interviewee’s self-classification in the official census categories. One 
interviewee declined to self-classify using census categories. 
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São Paulo, and there is reasonable gender balance. Finally, the vast majority of my 
interviewees also identified as brown or black in terms of the official census categories. 
For more on interview sampling and methods sequencing, see Appendix B. 
 My primary analytical goal is to mine the accounts of reclassifiers to illuminate 
how education impacts political consciousness through the mechanisms of exposure and 
efficacy. With regard to exposure, I rely on the detailed and personal accounts of better-
educated interviews. To shed light on efficacy, I make greater use of comparisons across 
educational strata to shed light on differences in efficacy.  To the quantitative researcher, 
thirty-four qualitative interviews may seem a small number, but the logic of determining 
sample size in qualitative research differs importantly from the goal of statistical 
inference in quantitative research (Morse 1998). Rather than aim for statistical 
generalizability, these interviews served to unearth insights into these processes, and 
were thus carried out until I reached “saturation” (Morse 2000). 
 
Exposure: Information, Social Networks, and the Labor Market 
Information 
 To begin, several individuals with whom I spoke discussed how education 
increased their information about salience of race for understand present-day 
inequalities in society, but also how “the racial question” was dealt with in Brazilian 
history, incorporated into Brazil’s conception of nationhood, and is perpetuated through 
everyday forms of racial hierarchies.  
 Consider the case of Paulo, a twenty-year-old freshman whom I met while a 
visiting researcher at USP. Paulo grew up in a poor community in the west-zone of São 
Paulo and gained admission to USP using quotas.37 Paulo has dark skin and kinky black 
                                                 
37 At the time of our interview, USP as an independent institution had not adopted or implemented 
racial quotas in its admissions process, but used the “bonus system” for nonwhite students in its 
independent vestibular. USP, however, also accepts students who enter through the Sistema de seleção 
 72 
 
hair, which he was wearing in the style of an afro at the time of our interviews. Paulo 
himself is not a reclassifier—he has always identified as black, accepting both labels 
preto and negro, and considers the rest of his family black as well. Today, Paulo is a 
politically active student, participating in various student groups on campus. He also 
considers himself a militant of the black movement and tells me that he has even played 
a large role in organizing poetry slams (saraus) in his peripheral neighborhood in the 
east zone of São Paulo. 
 Yet Paulo’s political engagement in general, and in particular with the black 
movement, was a recent development for him. Prior to preparing for the university 
entrance exam—by enrolling in a specialized preparatory course known as cursinhos 
pré-vestibulares, or simply cursinhos—Paulo tells me that he rarely reflected on race. 
Paulo is rare in that as someone growing up in a peripheral neighborhood, he was able 
to attend good-quality public schools for much of his childhood, and in fact attended 
high school in Morumbi, one of the wealthiest neighborhoods in São Paulo, also one of 
Brazil’s wealthiest (and most unequal) cities. During our conversation, Paulo describes 
the diversity in his school’s student body, which mirror the socioeconomic and racial 
inequalities in much of Brazil: 
DD: And, you said that in terms of social class there was diversity. But in terms of 
race, was there also diversity at the school? 
 
Paulo: There was. There was, yeah.  But the majority—I think the, half or the 
majority of the students were white, because of where the school was situated, too. 
And the black (negro) students were from the peripheral neighborhoods in the area. 
And I…but I think there was [racial] diversity in this way…  
 
DD: And did you notice a division between the negro and white students at the 
school? Or was this normal for you, you didn’t think much about this? 
 
Paulo: Yeah. At the time I didn’t think much about that. There wasn’t exactly a 
division, but a lot of times for us to be included in that…in that group, we 
don’t…don’t…you need some characteristics. We need to have some characteristics. 
 
                                                 
unificada, administered by the Ministry of Education. Because SISU slots are allocated by the federal 
government, these included racial quotas.  
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DD: Characteristics? 
 
Paulo: Yeah… 
 
DD: What does that mean? 
 
Paulo: It would be straight hair, or for example things that put us closer to this 
group— 
 
DD: —And did you suffer some kind of prejudice [in high school]? 
 
Paulo: Um… That I noticed? No. But I might have suffered and not have realized. I 
may not have noticed. 
Clear in Paulo’s comments is an awareness of a social hierarchy of inclusion based, at 
least in part, on one salient racial feature, hair, which as we will see emerges as a nearly 
universal grievance in interviews. Yet even as Paulo describes his feelings of social 
exclusion during his time in high school, and his awareness of the correlation between 
race and class (“the black students were from the peripheral neighborhoods”), he 
maintains that race had not surfaced as a salient factor in his social experience.  
 Paulo’s experience in high school contrasts sharply with his perceptions today. 
Paulo reports that his transformation into a racially conscious and politically active 
university student began in a free cursinho he attended at USP’s polytechnic school 
before entering university. Paulo says that history courses in particular played an 
important role in developing consciousness because it was there that he began to 
understand how little he had learned about negros in Brazilian history: 
…[a]nd slavery I [had learned] a few things, but not much. Like, I knew that there was 
slavery, I knew more or less the time period, but it was very…superficial, the lessons 
about this. I didn’t know what slavery was like and a lot of times I never learned for 
example that there were [slave] revolts. For example, the most important was the 
Quilombo dos Palmares with Zumbi, and I didn’t know about it. I came to know about 
it. I didn’t know for example what happened after abolition, for example. After 
abolition came the Republic, and we heard nothing more about negros in the Republic. 
And the negros were there. 
To be sure, slavery and Afro-descendants are integral to Brazil’s official historical 
narrative as a former Portuguese colony and a racially mixed—and united—people. But, 
as is the case with most official histories, there is no guarantee that Brazilians learn  
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about the full extent of the history of slavery as a racialized institution. For example, 
several interviewees with less than primary education told me that they never knew 
about the history of slavery in Brazil—the single largest importer of enslaved Africans 
and the last country in the Americas to abolish slavery in 1888. One of these informants, 
Joanna, knows that slavery entailed coerced labor, but when I ask her where the slaves 
came from, she responds “I forget.” Joanna also says that most of her familiarity with 
the subject comes from depictions on telenovelas, a comment Raquel, another 
interviewee, also relays: 
I didn’t know about that slavery thing. I used to see it in telenovelas, you know, there 
were novelas, they had one of them from some novela that is still on, who is Slave 
Isaura, you know? It’s on channel two. So I used to see it there, slavery there, but I 
didn’t know they had it for real, that there was this thing of blacks suffering so much. 
So [I learned] when [my boss] told me that [slavery] didn’t exist today because Isabel 
signed the freeing of the slaves. 
Joanna and Raquel might seem like extreme examples, but it is striking that even 
students like Paulo, who is relatively well educated and fortunate in that he attended 
good-quality public schools, learned an historical account that downplayed the coercive 
and insidious details of slavery, as well as the fact that the institution enslaved Africans 
exclusively. Part of how this is omitted from Brazil’s official history is via an emphasis 
on the peaceful abolition of slavery by Princess Isabel and scant attention paid to 
centuries of rebellion and maroon communities, known as quilombos. Paulo’s 
invocation of the Quilombo dos Palmares, the most well-known of these communities, 
is a clear indication that exposure to new information led Paulo to rethink—or perhaps 
simply to think for the first time—his previous understanding of the importance of race 
in Brazilian history.  
 Contrasting this newfound awareness of the importance of slavery in Brazilian 
history and its legacies, Paulo reports that “lessons on slavery and Africa opened my 
mind a bit.” He describes what he had previously thought about slavery: “I knew that 
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slavery happened, but I didn’t know how. I didn’t know how much this legacy exists 
today. You learn what happened, but a lot of times it’s that ‘the past is just the past’ and 
has no legacy today, or it’s very little. We just think ‘oh, that’s alright, that was the past 
and it’s not like that anymore.’ But there is a great legacy from this now.” Reflecting on 
what he had previously learned, Paulo reports that the role of slavery was downplayed 
in the historical narrative. Moreover, Paulo goes on to connect this narrative to the 
persistence of racial inequalities into the present-day.  
 Paulo’s comments in this regard were echoed by Glória, another university 
student whom I met at a race-based NGO in São Paulo. During our conversation, Glória 
describes not only what she had learned about Afro-descendants in Brazil’s history, but 
she describes the “alienation” that she sees as a consequences of this official history: 
In high school, I learned just that blacks were enslaved and that they [were beaten], and 
that’s it. If you take a book from primary school, you’ll notice they dedicate two 
paragraphs with a picture of a black man being whipped. And we learn that Princess 
Isabel freed [the slaves] and full stop. That’s what we learn and nothing more. You 
grow up learning that there was slavery in Brazil, but that’s it. That the Italians also 
migrated here, suffered here. So the image that’s spread is that everybody suffered. 
Except that they don’t show the suffering of each ethnicity, each people. So the idea 
that’s cultivated is that everybody suffered, that everybody can get ahead if they want. 
‘Look where the Italians are. Look where the Germans are. Why haven’t the blacks 
[accomplished this]? Because they didn’t want to. Because they didn’t want to work. 
Because they really are lazy bums.’ And so you watch TV and the whole time they 
show this. Who’s stealing, assaulting? Who’s in jail? You see a black guy and think 
‘lord, black guys only.’ So it’s all a structural process, isn’t it? Of alienation. Of trying 
to spread an image of something that really isn’t how it was. 
Here Glória contests the official narrative of slavery as a past and bounded institution, 
its peaceful abolition by Princess Isabel, and the idea that all foreign populations were 
subject to similar conditions in their migrations to and upon arrival in Brazil. Glória also 
echoes Paulo’s grievance that little attention is paid to the long-term consequences and 
legacies of slavery, discussing how the official narrative fuels stereotypes and negative 
portrayals of black Brazilians in ways that “alienate” them.  
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 Returning to Paulo, he reports that he first became interested in history courses 
as he prepared for the university entrance exam. Despite the state’s efforts to expand the 
number of slots, admission to public universities remains competitive, in particular for 
public school students who remain underprepared for the entrance exam. Because the 
quality of public primary and secondary schooling can vary considerably, many public 
school students receive some of their most in-depth lessons in many subjects in these 
preparatory courses. Paulo reports that this is precisely where he gained an appreciation 
for history that led him to change his planned course of study at university from business 
administration to history.  
 Of course, for Paulo, who has always identified as preto, this newfound racial 
consciousness identity does not take the form of reclassification. Yet this newfound and 
racialized political identity nonetheless has altered his perceptions and worldviews, 
what social movement scholars conceive of as a transformation in one’s interpretive 
framework (McAdam 1982; Snow 2013; Snow et al. 1986). Consider, for example, how 
Paulo describes his discomfort with being a racial and numerical minority at USP, an 
experience that contrasts sharply with this experience attending a majority-white high 
school in one of São Paulo’s wealthiest neighborhoods:  
DD: So, you said that at USP, arriving in a classroom you see one, two, four black 
[students] in a class of 80 students, something like that. But you also said that your high 
school was majority white… 
 
Paulo: Yes. The school where I studied was, yes. 
 
DD: And did you feel uncomfortable then? In high school… 
 
Paulo: At that time not so much. Bec— 
 
DD: —Why? 
 
Paulo: Because there is a question of political and racial consciousness. I think that I 
began to have more contact with the black movement through the cursinho and 
university and this made me think more about these questions. And in high school I 
was a teenager, so I didn’t have much contact and I didn’t think much about this. And 
there is also a cultural question. A lot of times…since in high school we don’t, we 
aren’t…we aren’t incentivized to be critical towards this and reflect on this. So we don’t 
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realize, you know? And so when we enter and we start to reflect about this, to be critical 
about this we start to realize that these things are really happening. 
Paulo’s level of education and contact with the black movement are evident in the 
sophisticated way he describes his perspective then and now. But his choice of language 
aside, this brief description captures how existing in a space dominated by whites 
became a source of discomfort for him after developing a political consciousness 
constituted by his racial self-understanding. Certain situations—like being a numerical 
racial minority in a given space—did not register with him as a high school student, 
even though racial inequality and exclusion was apparent at the school. Now a racially 
conscious student at USP, by contrast, this is a circumstance that causes him discomfort. 
 The impact of this newfound political consciousness is also evident in the 
specific terminology Paulo chooses when he identifies. When I ask him about the 
language he uses to describe himself in racial terms, Paulo tells me that he prefers the 
word preto, rather than negro—a distinction not all want to make in Brazil: “Negro is 
monopolizing pardo and preto. That’s what negro would be. And preto is…it’s stronger 
because people reject pretos.” He goes on to say: “there was always this idea of preto 
being bad…‘ah, the preto was a slave.’ […] So that’s why [I choose preto], to break the 
horrible stereotype that preto is bad.” Thus Paulo’s choice of the specific label preto is 
at once a product of his racialized political worldview as well as part and parcel of his 
efforts to confront and challenge racial hierarchies. 
 Education can increase exposure not only historical facts that may be obscured 
in official histories, but also exposure to new interpretive frameworks and worldviews 
through course material and classroom experiences. Such was the case for Jorge, a 
doctoral student in sociology whom I met through on-campus student groups at the 
Federal University of Pernambuco in the capital city of Recife. At the time of our 
interview, Jorge was in his mid-thirties, married, and had a one-year-old son. Jorge 
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describes himself as “a light-skinned negro.” When Jorge and I first spoke, he felt the 
need to qualify himself as “light-skinned,” which he described as a source of 
aggravation for him because many in Brazil do not see him as black.  Despite this, he 
says: “I have a black phenotype, so I have kinky hair, I have the mouth and the nose.”  
 Contributing to his frustration are his parents, both of whom consider Jorge 
white, which is also how he is classified on his birth certificate. Jorge describes his 
mother as white and his father as negro. During our interview he said he would classify 
himself officially as pardo, though in general he prefers to describe himself using the 
term negro. Jorge says his upbringing was solidly middle class—indeed, during my first 
interview with him we met at his parent’s gated home in a relatively safe neighborhood 
close to Recife’s downtown. Jorge and I had our conversation in a private space in a 
building separate from the main house on the property, where he used to live with his 
wife before he moved closer to the university. Growing up, Jorge, like many middle-
class Brazilians, attended private schools, which he describes as mostly white, and says 
that he always knew that he was different from his classmates: 
Jorge: I knew that I wasn’t white, you know? Because I always thought I wasn’t 
white, but like, I had a lot of doubt. […] Since there was no conversation about race 
or ethnicity at home, it was always a really big barrier for me to self-identify, and I 
lived a—since I lived middle class. The middle class is, let’s say this, the middle class 
in Recife is essentially white. I had very few black friends, you know? But, for 
example, from the moment I went to… [a new private school], which really was for 
rich people and the upper middle class, there were almost no negros at the school, 
like, there were a few, very few, super exceptional. 
 
DD: And at the time did you notice [the absence of negros]? When you got there? 
 
Jorge: No, no I didn’t notice. Honestly there is an American expression colorblind, 
colorblind. […] Because I lived in an extremely white environment, and didn’t discuss 
the racial question at home, it was always difficult for me, but like, I wasn’t able to 
verbalize that difficulty, because I felt that difficulty subjectively. I suffered, right? 
With racism, but I didn’t know to say it was racism, because I was a light-skinned 
negro, and I didn’t know that I could be negro, self-identify as negro.  
Despite his parents’ seeing him as white, Jorge reports that intuitively he always felt 
different from his white, middle-class peers in private school, even though he didn’t 
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know to call what he was experiencing racism. In particular, Jorge has always struggled 
with how to understand himself in racial terms, because he has always felt too dark to 
be white, but too light to be black. Describing his confusion during adolescence, Jorge 
says, “No one is going to call me negro in Brazil, but at the same time, they are going 
to classify me as ugly, right?” Recounting his desire to get a piercing in high school, he 
describes his friends’ reactions: 
So I said, ‘I’m gonna get it on my nose.’ And someone says ‘no, don’t, your nose is 
ugly.’ ‘Oh, ok, I’m gonna get it on my [lip].’ ‘No, your mouth, your mouth is really 
big, your mouth already calls a lot of attention, so don’t put it on your mouth.’ And I 
stopped trying because of that. I was hearing comments like ‘you’re a white [guy] with 
big features,’ and in this sense, it’s, like, I was always put in another box, you know? 
Except when there was a dark-skinned negro, like, then it’s ‘he’s black, but you aren’t.’ 
So I…felt closer to this negro, but like, I couldn’t identify as negro, because people 
always…declined, like, always made me believe that I wasn’t black. There exists a 
really strong force in this, like, even dark-skinned negros. If he isn’t the totally darkest 
shade of black, [someone’s] going to be—be like, ‘ah, you aren’t negro, you’re 
moreno.’ This exists, since I have light skin. So for me it was impossible to identify as 
black, like, even today I have to fight to self-identify as black, mainly among my white 
friends, who are the majority [of my friends], and…in some places, among negros too. 
Sometimes they don’t recognize me as black because of my light skin. 
Jorge’s description of his intuitive sense that he was “closer” to the dark-skinned negro, 
but was always denied affinity with him by his white friends captures the deep 
ambivalence Jorge felt and still feels around his racial identity. His self-understanding 
as negro is motivated significantly by his past experiences and in particular how he was 
treated as “ugly,” which he interprets today as instances of racism. But clear in Jorge’s 
description is the battle he faces between the older, status quo discourse of colorism—
in which blackness is defined as one end of a continuum—and a newer discourse, one 
certainly promoted by the black movement, in which blackness is understood in more 
broadly encompassing and political terms. 
 Thus in assuming a black identity, Jorge faced several hurdles. First, he needed 
to come to understand himself as black, something he “felt” early on in adolescence, but 
not something to which he had not assigned an explicit label. Second, he needed to 
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confront the emotional hurdle of accepting the stigma attached to blackness. I describe 
this in greater detail later when I discuss the importance of internal efficacy, but Jorge 
reports that when he began to “discover himself” as black, “it was a moment of great 
pain,” he says, because “I remembered everything I went through.” Third, he needed a 
new way of understanding blackness, one in which he could be included as black and 
that could counter his and others’ logics and euphemisms that distanced Jorge from 
blackness.  
 Jorge gained exposure this new interpretive frame at university. As a graduate 
student, Jorge enrolled in a sociology course on black feminism, where he read texts 
like Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, introducing him to the ways in which the 
dominated internalize the norms and stigma of racial (and other) hierarchies, and even 
participate in their maintenance. But more importantly, Jorge describes his experiences 
in the classroom, and his exposure to other “light-skinned negros who self-identified as 
negros.” Because of the topic of the course, he reports it was common for students to 
share their personal experiences, which allowed Jorge to relate and come to understand 
his own past experiences as racially based: 
We were discussing the body and black hair, which I think hair is a form, I think as 
strong as [skin] color and, for some researchers even stronger than color. Hair, it’s more 
meaningful, isn’t it? For the racial question, for the question of self-identification, and 
of acceptance itself, and…and in the classroom there was a majority of black women 
and such. We were discussing, and they were talking about the cases of racism that they 
went through, and I identified with their stories. In my case what I had gone through [I 
thought] was because I was insecure, or because there were jokes in bad taste that I 
heard, or teasing. [I thought] that wasn’t racism, like…so I had suffered racism and I 
didn’t know to classify it as racism. 
Jorge describes here how he came to understand himself as black by relating to others’ 
shared experiences, even if those other “self-identified negros” also had certain features 
that, according to a colorist logic, might disqualify them as black. Yet through this Jorge 
comes to reinterpret his past experiences—that he had dismissed as cruel jokes or his 
own insecurity—as racial. Whereas previously his own ambivalence about his racial 
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identity, and others’ denial of his black identification, prevented him from 
understanding he could be a target of racism, the experience of identifying with others 
in the class, and in particular with their grievances over hair, led Jorge to both claim a 
black identity and see the world through a racial lens. 
 Jorge identifies one moment in particular that had a particular impact on his 
racial identity and identification (not something all interviewees could do). In high 
school—and indeed even long after completing earlier university degrees in 
communication (with a focus on radio and music)—Jorge describes the affinity he 
shared with other negros, even those with much darker skin than his own, mainly 
because of his feelings of difference from his white peers. Though he knew he didn’t fit 
in, he did not necessarily interpret this as racial difference. This changed in the black 
feminism course, not only because of the academic work or alternative discourses he 
was exposed to, but also from a particular instance in which a student confronted him 
about his racial identification: “from the moment that a student in the class asked me— 
she was really incisive—‘do you self-identify as negro?’ she asked me. And I was like 
this [he acts out sitting motionless]. Without knowing what to say.” Today Jorge looks 
back on this course, and this moment in particular as a turning point for his racial 
identity, but at the time this was moment was filled with doubt and ambivalence. Later 
in our conversation he describes this moment in greater detail: 
[A student] was discussing a text in the front of the classroom, and so the conversation 
was going toward questions of racism, like, it had everything to do with the theme of 
the class, of the text and such, but like, people started giving personal accounts, like, 
so, so there was a time when I said, “damn, I went through that, too,” you know? And 
so [the student] pointed her finger at my face and said, like—like, she was far, you 
know, she was in the front, in the pulpit—and she asked like “do you identify as negro?” 
And I said...[laughter] I didn’t even know what to say. […] So I said, I was there like, 
my heart beating fast, like, my adrenaline was [pumping], and I…I said, “I’m 
discovering myself,” I said. Because it was something I had felt my whole life, but with 
periods of horrible doubt. But like, it’s…it was also something that resonated with me 
and that I didn’t know how to verbalize. 
 82 
 
Intuitively, Jorge felt negro and says that he had a desire to associate himself with dark-
skinned negros. But this moment, in which a classmate is, in a way, inviting him to 
assume the negro label, he is instantly filled with anxiety and even a physiological 
response.  
 In many ways, Jorge’s situation and his ambivalence around his own racial self-
understanding and classification is insightful for understanding the complexity of racial 
identification in much of Brazil. Jorge embodies the racial ambiguity many see in Brazil 
that results from both race mixture and the absence of racial group membership rules. 
Jorge reads his skin tone as light, but also sees that his other features are commonly 
understood to be black. Many in Brazil share Jorge’s ambivalence, and classify 
themselves as mixed-race simply as a residual category, or as some kind of 
institutionalized gray area (Osorio 2004; N. do V. Silva 1996).  
 One challenge in conducting this research through interviewing emerged 
frequently in my conversation with Jorge, which is that he discusses his racial identity 
change as his adoption of negro identity—something rather common for many of those 
with whom I spoke. However in order to understand the broader structural changes that 
appear in the census data, I often pushed interviewees to relate this negro identity to any 
change this might incur on their classification using official census categories. Some, 
like Paulo, have a conscious and clear understanding of their relationship to their census 
category. But for others who prefer racial euphemisms or the label negro, how they 
themselves relate to the official categories is not always so clear. When I push Jorge and 
ask if his adoption of negro identity preceded his self-classification as pardo using the 
census categories, he says he’s unsure because he always “felt a difference” between 
himself and his white friends, but he’s not sure what this meant for his own self-
classification. When I ask him if he can remember the first time he identified as pardo, 
he responds with “the only demarcation I have for certain to give you is from the time I 
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had contact with the professor [of the black feminism class] and of the accounts of my 
peers in the classroom. That’s when I was like ‘I am negro,’ you know?” 
 After my first interview with Jorge, I reached out to him again to ask for a 
follow-up interview. He immediately agreed, saying he also wanted a second interview 
because he felt uncomfortable discussing some things in the presence of this parents, 
even though we had our conversation in a separate building on their property with a 
good amount of privacy. Initially Jorge explained that he wanted to tell me more about 
his parents’ treatment of race and his racial transformation, which he was uncomfortable 
discussing when they were close by. At the end of this conversation, because Jorge 
expressed ambivalence about his own blackness and I felt our rapport allowed it, I asked 
him a question I did not ask any other interviewees: 
DD: Do you think there will come a day when you identify as preto?  
 
Jorge: Preto? I think so. Honestly I already want to. 
 
DD: You do?  
 
Jorge: Yeah. 
 
DD: So why not? 
 
Jorge: It’s…I even wanted to change that in the interview. [Laughter] 
 
DD: You wanted to change it?  
 
Jorge: I did. I wanted to talk with you to change it, because—but it’s a question of— 
 
DD: —well , it’s recorded. 
 
Jorge: [Laughter] Because it’s a question of, like what I told you, that I don’t see a 
problem of being a light-skinned negro, you know? I don’t see a problem. 
 
DD: So, two weeks ago, when I interviewed you the first time, I asked, like, ‘if the 
[census bureau] arrived today for the census [and asked your racial identification].’ 
[And] you would have said pardo. But today, like—today like right now—if the 
IBGE arrived, what would it be?  
 
Jorge: The question today…preto.  
 
DD: It would be preto? 
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Jorge: It would be preto. What I was agonizing about was this—which was something 
that I talked about a lot with [my wife] too—that my son was going be born, and so I 
was with this doubt [of how to classify my son], you know? And so I said, ‘I’m going 
to put pardo,” and then she was like ‘No, don’t put pardo. Put preto.’ And then I [said] 
‘Dammit, that’s right. I’m going to put preto for my son.’ He’s the son of negros, you 
know? 
 Thus for Jorge the transformation of his racial self-understanding from 
something of a social identity—when he “felt closer” to black Brazilians—into a 
political identity has been a slow and ambivalent process, but one that is ultimately 
consequential for his relationship to official census categories. Of course, his self-
classification as preto in this instance is due in part to my own prodding, but what is 
clear throughout our conversation is how much his newfound racial consciousness, and 
his own personal experiences that he reinterpreted as racial, factor into how he classified 
himself racially, departing from a colorist interpretation that could cast him as white. 
 The accounts of Paulo and Jorge illustrate how their pursuits of higher education 
impacted their racial consciousness and education by exposing them to greater 
information. For Paulo, this information included a counter to the idyllic official history 
that largely whitewashes Brazil’s history with slavery and ignores the legacies of this 
institution for understanding present-day inequalities. For Jorge, education and his 
experiences encountering other self-identifying black Brazilians gave him a new way of 
seeing blackness, one that included him. 
 
Social Networks 
 Paulo and Jorge’s accounts illustrate some of the direct effects education can 
have on consciousness, increasing individuals’ exposure to information and alternative 
frames that alter their understandings of blackness and legitimate their own self-
understandings as black. Education, as others have pointed out, is something of a black 
box—it is a multidimensional and drawn-out set of experiences that affect different 
people in different ways. One more indirect, yet no less consequential, effect of 
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education is a change in an individual’s social environment and social networks. For 
Brazilians in the lower classes, who have gained unprecedented access to higher 
education in recent years, access to education often results in a kind of mobility that 
exposes individuals to new environments and new social networks. Even the high 
school-aged, with their sights set on upward mobility or university education, may try 
to attend public schools in neighborhoods that are known to be of high quality (like 
Paulo), or seek slots in the rare public high schools that have great success in placing 
public school students at universities. Important, too, is that those who arrive to 
universities from marginal communities are often suddenly thrust into environments 
where they are in contact with socioeconomic elites (Artes and Ricoldi 2015; Gomes 
and Moraes 2012). For some, these new environments might trigger an awareness of 
class differences, and only later might these become overlain with race. For others these 
differences are immediately inseparable from race. And yet even for those students, like 
Jorge, who would consider themselves financially secure and middle class, university 
campuses can put students in contact with social movements and other civil society 
groups that provide individual with alternative worldviews and discourses, or frames 
(Snow 2013; Snow et al. 1986), that can alter individuals’ understandings of power and 
society. 
 Consider the case of Carol, a former university student in her late 20s whom I 
met at a public debate on the question of religious racism in Recife. Carol grew up and 
lives in a peripheral community in the greater metropolitan area. She describes her 
mother as black and her father as white, and reports that she used to self-identify as 
white, but that today she identifies as black. Explaining this, Carol describes herself as 
“the lightest person on my mother’s side of the family,” and says she was born “white 
with blond hair,” what folks in Recife describe as galega, but that as she grew her skin 
darkened somewhat and her curly hair turned to brown. With regard to her own family, 
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which she calls “black,” Carols says “nobody considers themselves black. No one has 
this black racial identity in my family. I’m the only one on my mom’s side that has this 
black identity and has this black militancy.”  
 Growing up, Carol says that because she was considered the whitest member of 
her family and had blonde hair, “it was like I was the hope, you know, of the family. Or 
like, an opportunity [to be] a bit lighter.” Carol describes many of the racial socialization 
practices Hordge-Freeman (2015) describes in her research on racial socialization 
within families, such as being brought to have her hair straightened starting in her early 
teens and sleeping with a clothespin on her “wide” nose. Though Carol reports that her 
skin and hair began to darken at an early age, she tells me that as a teenager in high 
school, a time when identifying as nonwhite would have been advantageous for using 
affirmative action benefits, she thought of herself as white.  
 Carol reports that her assumption of black identity and consciousness was 
ultimately due to her contact with social movements, but that the initial seeds of this 
process were planted by an ex-boyfriend, who questioned why she straightened her hair:   
I think the beginning of the beginning was the question of hair, which I straightened. 
And so I started to date a person, who isn’t my current partner, he was my former ex, 
and he started to say that—question why I let—why I straightened my hair, why I didn’t 
let my hair [grow] natural. And so I started to think about this. And I started to let it 
[grow naturally] and I think the hair question was important too, which was long before 
I started to participate in movements, before I started in those spaces. I think the hair 
question, black aesthetics were what started [it], you see? So I started to let my hair 
grow. I cut it really short. I think I was about…twenty—twenty-three, twenty-two, 
twenty-three…It was twenty-three and since I let my hair grow, I cut it short and it 
started to grow curly, and I started to like [my] curly hair. So that was also important 
for me to identify the racial question, which is really linked to appearance, isn’t it? To 
black aesthetics. 
For Carol, the process of racial reclassification and consciousness-building began with 
her questioning taken-for-granted practices that she had been socialized into. Her 
boyfriend—an outsider—questioning her practices encouraged her to change these 
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practices and to accept her natural hair even before she began participating in social 
movements.  
 Yet while her acceptance of her natural hair began the process, Carol reports that 
it was as she was pursuing her interests in public health, her area of study at university, 
that she began to gain repeated exposure to “the racial question,” and that these 
experiences paired with her contact with social movements, led her to think more about 
race: 
I started…hmm…to frequent a lot of spaces, like roundtables, where in those spaces 
there is a majority of black people. I also started to frequent feminist social movement 
[events]. In the feminist movement I felt the absence of the question of black women. 
[They] talk a lot about the gender question, but they don’t talk about the racial question. 
Also in my residency I started, I went [to work] for a project focused on the health of 
the black population, so I worked there during my residency, in that project, and so I 
started to have more contact, right, with the racial question. 
Carol describes her experiences in social movement circles as significant for exposing 
her to the political discourse of her “black militancy,” but other experiences at university 
also led her seek out these movement spaces. Speaking about her education at a public 
university in Recife, Carol says that she also “started to read a lot, to get interested…my 
undergrad—my final project in my residency was about black women’s health and my 
current master’s project is too.” Thus Carol has sought to insert the racial question into 
her ostensibly non-racial studies in public health—for which race could certainly be 
relevant, but need not be. Thus Carol’s path is one of questioning, changing her habits 
and practices (hair straightening), and seeking out spaces of political activism that 
ultimately provided her with an interpretive frame that resonated with her. Though 
Carol’s personal journey was somewhat circuitous, she describes her arrival to black 
movement spaces as critical to her ultimate embrace and acceptance of her natural hair: 
Right when I started to participate in those spaces and I started to also see other girls 
with the same hair as mine. I started to frequent groups, um, relating to [their] hair. [I 
started] to leave [my] hair natural on Facebook, where there are some groups. Anyway, 
when it started a lot of people—a lot of women were assuming their hair and I started 
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to see them and frequent those spaces. So I started to like it and I started to assume [my 
natural hair]. 
Ultimately, this all came full-circle for Carol, who drew on her experiences in social 
movement space to deepen her acceptance of her hair, and to ultimately come to 
understand herself as black. 
Tiago, another university student in Recife, also came to reclassify and develop 
a racial consciousness through contact with social movements after enrolling in 
university. Tiago grew up in a peripheral neighborhood in the north zone of the city, but 
because his mother worked in the public sector he describes his upbringing as 
economically secure. With a stable and good salary, his mother paid for him to attend 
private schools through high school, which Tiago describes as populated by 
overwhelmingly white students. 
With regard to race, Tiago describes his racial heritage as “all mixed.” He reports 
that his mother is of black and indigenous, and his father of black and Portuguese, 
descent. Despite this mixture, Tiago reports that he is classified as white on his birth 
certificate, but that he is unsure if he was classified by his mother or hospital or other 
administrators. Growing up, however, Tiago reports that he used to understand himself 
as moreno, and saw his color as “a little bit light,” but not dark enough to be considered 
black. Moreno, of course, is notoriously ambiguous, and Tiago says that at the time that 
he was in primary and high school he “didn’t understand” he was different from others 
in his class. Today, however, he describes old class photos as “very funny” because 
“everyone is white and there in the middle is a black guy. You know those memes ‘find 
the black guy’? That’s me. The only one, you know?” 
It’s clear early on in our conversation that while he was a young student, he 
rarely thought about race and his own racial identification. For example, Tiago says he 
“didn’t understand” that he was racially different from his peers. I ask him to elaborate:   
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DD: But at the time did you identify as— 
 
Tiago: —No, I didn’t think about it, I was a child. 
 
DD: Not at all? 
 
Tiago: Yeah, that’s right. Until I was nine years of age, so I didn’t think about that.  
 
DD: But you, you thought that you knew you were different? You knew— 
 
Tiago: Yes. Yes, yes, yes. 
 
DD: Ok.  
 
Tiago: Right. Thinking about it after, at the time I knew that I had something different, 
for example. That game would start, ‘oh, so-and-so is going to date so-and-so,’ ‘I don’t 
know, I don’t know.’ They never included, I don’t know, the fat kid, the blind kid—the 
blind girl, it was a blind girl in my class—the blind girl and not one negro, you see? 
Those people weren’t included in the game of who would date whom. You know—I, 
at least, knew that I would never be included in those dynamics, so… 
 
DD: Did you know why? 
 
Tiago: I didn’t have the slightest idea. I only thought that I was different. I had no idea, 
I didn’t think about…I didn’t have the slightest idea at all, like, and I think that I only 
came to understand that, I don’t know, two years ago, looking back. Then I realized, 
‘ah, that was being of my skin and such.’ 
As a young student Tiago understood himself to be socially different from his peers 
somehow, but, like Paulo and Jorge, it was not until later on that he came to attribute 
those feelings of difference to race. Drawing on instances of game-playing among 
young students, Tiago identifies moments of playful social interaction as the ways in 
which peers sort themselves into social insiders and outsiders. In his recounting, Tiago 
was not excluded explicitly on the basis of race, and this occurred as well to students 
belonging other stigmatized or “lesser” groups. But Tiago adds that his own racial self-
understanding also prevented him from interpreting this form of exclusion as racialized:  
I remember that at the time I didn’t have—I didn’t know that I was negro, like, I didn’t 
have this perspective. I saw myself as strange and after I came to understand that I felt 
strange because I was negro. But at the time, I was strange and the other people weren’t 
strange, it was like that. I didn’t look around and ‘ah, people are white,’ you know? 
Today I look [back] and remember, and ‘ah, it was because of that, probably.’ But at 
the time it was ‘I’m strange and everyone else isn’t strange.’ 
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Tiago knew he was different, but he did not think he was different racially, necessarily. 
Much like Jorge, who didn’t think he was “dark enough” to be black yet was told he 
was ugly, Tiago believed he had a “strange” personality and assumed this was the basis 
for his social exclusion. Toward the end of our conversation, Tiago reiterates this point: 
I think it’s because I never thought that I was so black. It’s like, I’m dark, but [when] 
you look at me, do you say ‘negro’? Do you think ‘he’s surely black,’ right? You look 
[at me] and you don’t have that certainty. I think it was because of this. I used to say I 
was moreno, so I wasn’t negro. People would say ‘oh, because the negros,’ so I [would 
think] ‘Ok, the negros, is it? That’s not me,’ you know? I didn’t identify, because—
because of my color, which was a bit lighter. 
Like, Jorge, Tiago can also identify feelings of closeness and belonging to those who 
seemed similar to him phenotypically. Tiago eventually tells me that his racial identity 
began to change when, as a university student, he began to date his ex-girlfriend, whom 
he describes as white and socially elite. Yet Tiago had spent a considerable portion of 
his primary and secondary schooling in private schools, overwhelmingly populated with 
light-skinned students. When I ask why his girlfriend suddenly seemed different from 
him when it seemed he had long had exposure to light-skinned elites, he explains that 
as a young student an unconscious social sorting took place: 
In fourth grade I went to study at the [primary school affiliated with the federal 
university] and it was different. In my class I think there were about five negros out of 
thirty and, I don’t know to what extent that was a coincidence or not, but at the time I 
got a more solid group of friends, which was me and two other guys—we were best 
friends, the three of us, the three of us were negros. I don’t know, I can’t remember, to 
know where this association came from, you know? Where there was, if there was 
thinking about race. But like, the fact is, [we] were the three negros in the class, we 
were ‘the trio,’ full stop. 
 Things began to change for Tiago when he arrived at the federal university in 
Recife, the finest for those from Pernambuco and the most elite. There he quickly made 
new friends and contacts. Tiago says he and his best friend from University, Danilo, 
who he describes as white and upper-middle class, became friends “automatically” 
because of their shared interests in jazz, movies, and videogames. He adds: “it was never 
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an impediment, my being black and his being white, never. I never thought about his, 
ever, not even after, like ‘ah, could it be that the situation,’ no. We had various problems, 
but none of them had to do with that.” Though Tiago had attended largely white private 
schools in Recife prior to university, his friendships were limited to “the trio” of the 
handful of other black students, and his exposure to their lifestyles was more limited. 
When he began to date his now ex-girlfriend, however, he gained an inside look into 
her lifestyle and personal life and felt rejected by her parents:  
Tiago: It’s more in the social interaction itself, like, that—you know? [In my] academic 
life I never felt a difference, I never looked at a situation and [thought] ‘this is 
happening because I’m negro.” Never, it’s more in the social life and still in this vein, 
after I had some confusions, after I started to hang out more with [my friend] Danilo I 
started to date [my ex-girlfriend]. […] And so, she was the stereotype of Danilo, except 
even more so. She wasn’t upper-middle class, she was upper class, really rich…yeah, 
the level ‘oh, I, I want to spend some time, I’m gonna spend some time in Switzerland,’ 
you know? Like, that person that has money just like that, but [her] friends were all 
upper-middle class and my [ex-]girlfriend never treated me differently. Ok, I’m going 
to say it, I’m going to say what I always—but her parents didn’t accept me. 
 
DD: Did you notice that at the time?  
 
Tiago: Yes, but then I already, ok, then I was already starting to realize that it could be 
because of skin color. I went to a barbecue at her house and her father didn’t look me 
in the eye [when] we were introduced, and she was like ‘hey, dad, this is my boyfriend.’ 
He kind of didn’t look [at me], opened his hand and left. Her mom was normal, said hi, 
but always with a face—you know that side-eye, like that? 
Tiago’s experiences with his ex-girlfriend were pivotal for him for two reasons. First, 
the rejection of Tiago by her parents and the close-up exposure to her lifestyle 
reaffirmed his understanding that they were different in at least class terms. Second, he 
suspected racism on the part of his ex-girlfriend’s parents, but it was also via contacts 
of this ex-girlfriend that Tiago was led to civil society groups ultimately responsible for 
his racial consciousness. Tiago describes his girlfriend’s friends as leftists, and it was at 
one of the civil society events to which they brought him that he began to understand 
himself as black and develop a racial consciousness:  
So through [them] I went to one of their events, which was the ‘week of racial 
consciousness.’ […] And so I went to this event, it was a whole week, of panels, 
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debates, there were things about…from the turban to,  I don’t know, discussions about 
the history of slavery, it was everything. […] I arrived there and I identified, like, there 
were people who said ‘you know, everybody’s been through that moment where you 
choose a colored pencil [to draw] the skin color of your friend, and you don’t know 
what color he’s going to give you,’ you know? Those situations that black people 
always go through? Always, always. […] It was there that I started to realize. There I 
was like ‘brother, all those situations had to do with the color of my skin. How had I 
not realized this before?’ You know? And so, it’s, when I realized this there, I made a 
few decisions. First was [that] I’m going to let my hair grow. 
Tiago, like many others, describes one of his first steps towards assuming this black 
identity and consciousness as changing the way he wore his hair. Moreover, this was a 
change that was prompted from his relating to the experiences and accounts shared by 
other racially conscious Brazilians. His making new contacts at university—both his 
exposure to his girlfriend’s family life as well as the social movement circles he gained 
access to through her social circles—were a turning point for Tiago. Indeed, after 
breaking up with this girlfriend, Tiago recounts his feelings when seeing how her family 
reacted to her new, white boyfriend: 
And so, she started to date another guy after a while, white [guy]. Soon there were 
photos of her and him with her parents, you know? And I—of course, like, I was already 
in another, it wasn’t that thing where I was still in love with her and feeling—but [it 
was] the situation of going ‘look at that.’ The white boyfriend, that was easy with her 
parents. With me it wasn’t easy. 
Tiago’s experience dating a white and upper-class Brazilian, whom he may not have 
met without attending university, led him to interpret his experiences of perceived 
discrimination as racialized. Comparing their reaction to her new, white boyfriend, 
helped this crystallize even further. 
 In our conversation, these two moments stand out for Tiago, though he places 
much greater weight on how his contact with social movements allowed him to relate 
to other self-affirming blacks: 
DD: I want to ask about the two moments you’ve identified, like, that event with the 
black movement and that photo that you saw of the new [boyfriend] of your ex. So, in 
the black movement, when you started to identify with the speeches of the people there, 
what was the impact on your identity? Like, for you was it—you said that you started 
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to identify, to consider yourself negro, but was it just like that, ‘I consider myself 
negro’? Was that what was happening? How were you thinking about this? 
 
Tiago: It was more a feeling. It was really simple in reality. It was really—I looked and 
said ‘jeez, that all happened because I was black, because I am black.’ It was really just 
like that. It was a discovery. It wasn’t very, like, ‘ah, if I’m black what’s going to 
happen, if I say this?’ It wasn’t, so explicit like that. I looked, like, I went through 
everything the people were talking about, they were saying that they’re black and they 
went through this because they were black. It made a lot of sense and a lot of people…[I 
thought] ‘it must be right.’ And so I started to think this.  
 
DD: So you’re thinking, like, I’m black because I lived through the same things they’re 
talking about? Because before you said that, like, someone would talk about blacks, but 
‘I’m not black,’ so ‘the blacks’ are others— 
 
Tiago: —others. And then I met the others and those others were similar to me. That’s 
what it was.   
 
DD: I see. 
 
Tiago: I used to think blacks were others because I didn’t have contact, but when I met 
the black people there I [said] ‘I am,’ you know?  
 
DD: I see. 
 
Tiago: They aren’t others, I’m part of the others. 
 
DD: And when you saw that photo [of your ex-girlfriend’s new boyfriend], did that 
change anything for you? Was it a confirmation? An affirmation? What was it? 
 
Tiago: Not really, it was more a question…It was another, it was one more [example] 
of that, you know? One more situation. Was it a powerful situation? It was, but it was, 
it wasn’t a significant situation in my life. I don’t think it was, but it was a moment 
where I went, ‘yup. It’s another situation,’ you know? That’s what it was. I think it was 
that, I don’t know, like for example basic situations. If I’m talking with white friends 
and someone says ‘oh, I can’t drink and drive because they have [police checkpoints] 
on the road,’ and someone says ‘oh, but I’m never stopped.’ ‘oh, me either.’ And then 
I say ‘Oh? I’m always stopped.’ Always. One hundred percent, and so you know those 
situations when you realize that you’re different? Everyone says one thing and with 
you it’s exactly the opposite? 
Thus for Tiago his experiences being exposed to a new social class and racial 
environment was an important part of what allowed him to begin to develop an 
awareness of his racial difference, but much more significant was the greater affinity 
and identification with others’ experiences that led him to understand himself as black. 
In turn, Tiago then describes how his understanding of events that transpire in his life, 
like his relationship with his girlfriend’s parents, become racialized. Tiago describes 
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how this change in his racial self-understanding led him to reflect on and reinterpret his 
past experiences, even though at the time he didn’t understand them as racialized:  
So I vented to [my now-girlfriend] that it was a shock, you know, for me to remember 
my school and be like ‘that happened because I was black,’ to remember another school, 
‘lord, that happened because I was black,’ to remember things like that, the things about 
clothes in the end, that happened because I was black, to remember, I don’t know, my 
mom. She always used to say to me, when I would leave the house with messy clothes 
‘you’re going out like that?’ I would go, ‘I am, all my friends go out like this.” And she 
would say ‘but you aren’t like all your friends.” I thought it was something moms just 
say. ‘You’re not like the rest of the world, you’re my son so you…’ you know? But 
after, with time, her comments were changing. She started to talk about police, for 
example, saying ‘you’re going out like that?” and I [say] ‘I am, all my friends go out 
like this.’ And she [says] ‘But for the police you aren’t the same as you’re your friends.” 
And so I—you know? Those things were, honestly I remembered that and was like 
‘aha, that was because I was black and I didn’t realize at the time.’ 
For Tiago and Carol, education had a different but no less consequential effect 
on their racial identities and consciousness by altering their social networks. In Carol’s 
case, education led her to begin participating in civil society groups, exposing her to 
discourses that resonated with her as she began to assume her natural hair. For Tiago, 
education both put him in contact with people he understood to be racially and 
socioeconomically different from him, and through these new contacts he gained 
exposure to a discourse that resonated with his past experiences and that racialized his 
worldview. 
 
The Labor Market 
 As preceding sections have shown, education can have more direct and short-
term effects on one’s consciousness by altering information and social networks, but 
one final and more indirect pathway through which education can shape consciousness 
is through the labor market. Individuals pursue education not necessarily as an end in 
and of itself—that is, simply to acquire knowledge—but also simply as a pathway 
toward upward mobility. Exposure to information and social networks might be 
particularly likely for students with particular academic inclinations (for example, in the 
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social sciences). Many in Brazil and elsewhere, however, pursue education in more 
specialized and technical fields, such as medicine, law, engineering, or business and 
may not have the same exposure as students selecting into certain fields of study. 
Nonetheless, the pursuit of education can still affect individuals’ political 
consciousness by altering one’s set of labor market experiences. Individuals may pursue 
education simply for the promise of greater economic opportunity and advancement, 
but in these pursuits they might come face-to-face with racialized inequalities in the 
labor market. Foundational studies of racial inequality in Brazil document that wage 
penalties for nonwhites are greatest in high-status jobs (Campante, Crespo, and Leite 
2004; Hasenbalg 1979, 1985; Lovell 1999; Lovell and Wood 1998; Osorio 2009; N. do 
V. Silva 1985; S. S. D. Soares 2000; E. E. Telles 2004). As one ascends socially, 
moreover, it becomes increasingly difficult to accept class-based explanations for 
instances of perceived discrimination. For darker-skinned Brazilians, higher education 
may not bring economic success, or those who succeed may find themselves suddenly 
thrust into elite and largely white spaces. Thus education can also have the effect of 
racializing one’s worldview by altering one’s expectations and experiences in the labor 
market, in particular those from marginal communities for whom access to higher 
education is not a foregone conclusion. 
 Consider the case of Gilberto, a thirty-four-year-old doctoral student in 
anthropology, whom I met through a mutual friend in Recife. Gilberto grew up in the 
northern state of Rio Grande do Norte and moved to Recife for graduate school. Gilberto 
describes his upbringing as middle class, but says that his family experienced economic 
hardship at times and describes the neighborhoods he grew up in as peripheral. Despite 
some financial struggles, his parents always prioritized his education, paying for him to 
attend private primary and secondary schools before attending public universities. 
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Gilberto has medium-tone skin, though unlike many men with kinky hair, he 
does not keep his hair short and instead wears it in long dreadlocks. Today Gilberto 
identifies as black, accepting both labels negro and preto, though in the past, he tells 
me, he thought of himself as moreno, despite his father—whom Gilberto describes as 
dark-skinned and self-identifying as negro—always referring to him as negão, a 
colloquial term reminiscent of “big guy” in English, with an additional racial inflection. 
Gilberto describes himself as something of a contrarian, saying that quite young 
he had developed a reputation for himself as a “militant.” He says that growing up he 
was always a natural leader among his classmates, and that once in middle school when 
students were unhappy with a teacher, he organized this discontent among the students, 
brought the issue to the school director, and eventually got the teacher fired. Describing 
himself, Gilberto says, “I was always on the left…I was also counter, I always 
questioned a lot.”  
In many ways, Gilberto fits stereotypes of movement activists, yet he tells me 
that the development of his racial consciousness was a slow process, and one that began 
when he was a university student. Reflecting back on his time before university, 
Gilberto says that his self-understanding as moreno was a “euphemism of non-
recognition,” one that he equates to the mixed-race census category: “[pardo] doesn’t 
mean anything either. [Laughter.] It’s a word that tells you nothing.” When I ask 
Gilberto when he stopped identifying as moreno and assumed the label negro, he reports 
that this began for him while a university student, and that prior to this he paid much 
more attention his socioeconomic condition, rather than his racial identity: 
DD: Because you were always a militant of something, like, in school you were the 
student organizer to remove that teacher. And you arrived to university, you said you 
were part of the student movement. It’s—but did these activities have to do with color, 
with race? 
 
Gilberto: In middle school, no. In middle school, no. At university, yeah. It took a while, 
the racial question. It look a long time.  
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DD: Ok.  
 
Gilberto: It was class. It was a question of class consciousness, but not race.  
 
DD: So you had—when you were in [middle] school, you had class consciousness? 
 
Gilberto: In school, it was really visceral. It wasn’t exactly consciousness, but I also 
wasn’t unconscious. Because I was even living through my family’s bankruptcy, so I 
knew that we weren’t middle class. I had consciousness that, of the forces that put me 
there. Of things that [made] me not equal to my peers. So no, it’s not, yeah, to some 
extent I was always conscious of my class situation. I didn’t know that some reactions, 
some facts that mattered to me had to do with this position, with knowing that this 
position [was about being] negro as much as class. For example, I suffered racism from 
the director of the school at one time. And my response seemed like someone who had 
a lot of consciousness. [But] it was a visceral response. It was that thing [where] 
someone was jolted, of someone who was in pain. A metaphorical scream. 
Thus Gilberto describes a situation in which he was well aware of his family 
economic situation. Gilberto also hints here that he indeed experienced racism as a 
teenage student, and that he reacted against this treatment, but that he may not have been 
fully aware of the racist content or of why exactly he had the particular reaction he did. 
He describes one such incident in middle school, which he reacted to viscerally at the 
time, but that, like many others, he says he did not come understand as racialized until 
much later: 
For example, I participated in a play in school and I played god. And the principal [of 
the school] came [and] suggested to the teacher that they make me lighter. And so my 
reaction [to the principal] was “[You’ve] seen god?” And she left, not getting it. And 
so I only came to understand that I was confrontational because of the racism I suffered, 
but ten years after I suffered it. I was twelve, thirteen at that time. So, I used to hear 
things like “ah,” from a peer I remember well saying, “the only black my dad likes at 
home is our dog.” It was an all-black dog. Or [I] wear an earring and hear “oh, you’re 
wearing that to try to be pretty?” When the reference point for beauty was all white 
people with straight hair. So there has always been [stuff like] that. 
When I ask Gilberto what changed, how exactly he came to reinterpret his past 
experiences as racial, he says for certain that this began while he was at university. But 
Gilson link university to his personal experiences in the labor market, rather than 
something he learned or new access to social movements. At one point in our interview, 
I press Gilberto on when exactly and what happened to push him to start thinking more 
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about race. He reports that it was when he became a high school teacher as a side job 
while attending university. While public universities are free in Brazil, students are often 
responsible for such costs as books and printing, transportation, not to mention the 
wages foregone by attending university in the first place. Even these costs can burden 
students and families with low incomes. To compensate, Gilberto began working as a 
philosophy teacher in a high school: 
Gilberto: That’s when I started to problematize with the students of the school being 
black and being white. Because that was thrust upon me, because the doorman of the 
school didn’t recognize me as a teacher. I got there, young, I was twenty-one, twenty. 
It was a while ago. And like, it’s…I…went to go into the school and he opened the gate 
for a Portuguese professor, an old white lady, kind of old. And then when I went to 
enter he closed the gate, ‘what do you want, young man?’ And I [said], ‘if you let me 
in I want to teach class.’ And so that’s when he looked at my face, ‘oh, sorry, but I 
didn’t recognize you.’ I said, ‘it’s alright. Next time I’ll wear a button-down shirt and 
old jeans and leather sandals, maybe then you’ll recognize me as a teacher.’ […] I 
understood, it wasn’t because I was young, because there were other young teachers at 
the school. It was because I was black. So from that point forward [things] started to 
change. Because in 2004, which was up until that year, I was against racial quotas, 
because that’s what generally happens with middle-class blacks. 
 
DD: When this happened with the doorman, were you shocked? You weren’t expecting 
this? 
 
Gilberto: No, I wasn’t expecting it.  
 
DD: What were you feeling? 
 
Gilberto: At the time I, I had to teach, I was at work. I didn’t understand and stuff. I 
didn’t even think about it. But I know that that was a turning point in my life, you 
know? Because I had been participating in various debates about racial quotas and I 
was always against [them], I was the black guy against racial quotas. And it was my 
class condition that prevented me from thinking about the racial quotas, [because] I 
never needed them, so I thought that—I had a meritocratic discourse that I have nothing 
in common with at all today. I don’t believe in meritocracy at any level, in any state, in 
any country. I see countries like Sweden, Norway, people always use them as example 
of something, don’t they? But I tried to believe that story, [but] it really produced the 
place of whiteness in Brazil. I had a really white trajectory—not white, whitened. It 
was never white. 
 
DD: But you—that wasn’t the first time you were occupying a middle class space, 
meaning, ‘really white.’  
 
Gilberto: No, no. My whole life.  
 
DD: So why did this situation provoke you? For example, [when you were] in school 
why didn’t—you were a minority— 
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Gilberto: —always. 
 
DD: But that didn’t provoke you, other than the joking? 
 
Gilberto: No, you don’t think about it. Because it’s that thing, you naturalize. Thinking 
hurts. You create a self-defense mechanism to not feel pain. You don’t think about that. 
[…] How can I say it? I never thought about it, you know? I knew that I wasn’t the 
same, I knew that I was a minority. This was obvious, people call you black. But I 
didn’t reflect on this, I didn’t reflect in that way. And so, it’s, honestly it took a long 
time, it took me more than ten years to understand that these things had to do with being 
black. I took a long time. And I think that the fact of you being in a predominantly 
white environment, middle class, your social class blinds the black man to reflecting 
on his situation of blackness.  
Two things become clear from Gilberto’s experience as a racial minority 
attending private school as a teenager, and his experiences as a high school teacher. 
First, though he has difficulty articulating this explicitly, one obvious difference 
between being a student and teacher is the position of authority—supposedly. Gilberto 
ascended socially but was not treated by others in the job as presumably having the look, 
intelligence, or training, and this bothered Gilberto. Second, Gilberto’s telling here 
highlights the complexity of this process of identity change. Gilberto reports that it took 
him a decade to feel he understood how race was a significant factor in his past 
experiences, and that, when they occurred, he naturalized and/or individualized the 
incidents that inform his racial consciousness. 
Also clear here is the complexity of the change between how individuals 
understand their own racial identities (negro, negro assumido, negro consciente, etc.) 
and the relationship to the census categories. Many individuals invoke the term negro 
as a kind of collective label that indicates their support for group politics. Others do so 
without this political intention. And some individuals, like Paulo, opt specifically for 
the census category preto, which is stigmatized and can even be deployed as a slur, but 
many individuals understand the development of racial consciousness as claiming the 
label negro—in contrast to the famously ambiguous moreno or some other euphemism 
that emphasizes mixture over difference. Understanding this transformation as it relates 
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to census identification, then, can be difficult for some to articulate, or even to recall. 
At one point in our interview, I push Gilberto on trying to figure out why this was “the 
moment” for him, and he responds: 
You’re provoking me now to think about what that moment was. So, I chose that 
moment from 2004 because of that experience, but I had never thought, until now, that 
that experience was all of that. But it was, in fact. In fact, because 2004 was the year 
that I changed my position on racial quotas, that I started to change. […] I…took a 
while to understand that I was the first in my family [to attend university], the first 
black man in the family and the second black person, the first black person was a 
woman, and there’s that factor too. But I was the first black man in the family, in a 
family that is really numerous, as much on my father’s side as my mother’s.  
Today Gilberto considers himself an activist and militant in the black movement. 
Gilberto tells me that “teaching did that to me. It provoked me toward this because the 
students, on the first day of class they didn’t think I was a teacher.” He goes to explain: 
Because I was black. But what they said is that it was ‘No, professor, it’s because [you] 
are really young,’ and I said ‘you don’t have teachers as young as me?’ They did. So 
what’s left for us? ‘ah no, it’s the dreadlocks.’ And I [said] ‘The dreadlocks? The 
dreadlocks I get too.  But let’s say it, how many black teachers do you have besides 
me?’ ‘Ah, just [you].’ So that was shocking, like it was in 2004, it’s linked to teaching. 
So work, which is the thing I love most in life—teaching, and research—work made 
me realize how black I was and close that cycle of what we in the movement today call 
empowerment. Of understanding blackness as a political position. It was above all my 
experience as a teacher that led me to this. And so I start[ed] to look at my history and 
see ‘oh, it was only me teaching while black.’ 
Thus Gilberto links his development of racial consciousness directly to his experiences 
in the labor market, during which he ought to have been endowed with authority, but 
which was challenged by other staff in his workplace, as well as his own students. The  
process of developing consciousness unfolded over a considerable period of time for 
Gilberto, and because he reports also having identified as preto officially, the 
development of this consciousness is not manifest as reclassification. Yet the impact of 
these experiences on Gilberto’s self-understanding, the strength of his attachment to this 
social category, and the meaning he attaches to it, are clear. While officially he also 
identified as preto, Gilberto reports that he at one point thought of himself more as 
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moreno than negro. I ask him about this change, and he is somewhat ambivalent because 
his father used to call him negão. 
DD: And when did you adopt the word negro? 
 
Gilberto: Adopt, I don’t know. It always existed in my life.  
 
DD: But there was a time when you considered yourself moreno.  
 
Gilberto: Yeah, but that category moreno lived—I was moreno on the street, but negão 
at home. So negro was always present at home, but it gained a political identity in the 
last ten years, like I was telling you, 2004. But from 2007 until now, which is mainly 
the end of university, is when it started to gain a political weight. It’s understanding 
racial identity, understanding identity as something politically constructed in relation 
to the other, whites.  
Though not a reclassifier, and though Gilberto has some ambivalence 
pinpointing the exact moments when his identity changed its form, Gilberto is certain 
that his racial identity morphed into something “political,” in his words. Whether or not 
Gilberto’s understanding of political identity conforms to that which I employ 
throughout this research, it is clear from his articulations of his own experiences and his 
worldview that Gilberto exhibits a clear commitment to his racial group, and that this 
shapes his understanding of power in Brazilian society.  
Gilberto’s experiences in the labor market resonate with, and are also clearly 
illustrated by, Yasmin’s experiences of upward mobility in São Paulo. Yasmin is a 35-
year-old, light-skinned woman who wears her hair in long, purple-colored braids. In 
response to an open-ended question about her racial identity, Yasmin identifies 
emphatically as a “black woman” (uma mulher preta). She says that her mother, who 
has light skin and eyes, likely self-identifies as white, but Yasmin thinks she doesn’t 
have good reason to because of her mixed-race heritage and physical features that 
Yasmin describes as African. Yasmin says that when she was a child her mother always 
used to tell her—pejoratively—that she was “the blackest daughter she has,” that 
members of her family often referred to her as morena, but that she often thought of 
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herself as brown (marron). She is unsure of how exactly she is classified on her birth 
certificate, but believes her mother considers her brown (parda).  
In describing her transformation into a black woman, Yasmin says that she first 
came to understand how she was emulating whiteness in effort to be accepted as 
beautiful, and only later, after ascending the social ladder, did she come to reinterpret 
many of her experiences as racialized and connected to political and economic 
inequality. For example, Yasmin describes her experience when she started 
straightening her hair in her early teens: “I remember well when my mom brought me 
to have my hair straightened, and I saw myself with that hair and I thought I was so 
beautiful. I thought, ‘ahhh.’ Because I always had curled up hair, and suddenly I could 
let my hair down…my hair was huge, it was so big, so I said ‘lord’…at the time I thought 
it was beautiful.” Yasmin recalls others’ responses to her hair, in particular from boys 
at school, saying “the day I arrived [to school] with my hair straightened, I started 
getting looks…I was the girl that the boys wanted to get with, you know? They wanted 
to hook up with me, to date me. Suddenly it wasn’t the same game, you know?” Today 
she looks back on this differently: “you start remembering…the…it’s because…we take 
a while to understand the process, you know? Of racism…but it…after a while you say, 
‘god, that was racism,’ something like that. And I didn’t at the time, obviously. At the 
time I was just thirteen. For me, it was just…nothing.” 
Yasmin reports that what led to her reinterpretation of these interactions as 
racialized was landing a competitive and well-paid job at a public-sector bank. Before 
the affirmative action era, Yasmin attended a private university in São Paulo, where she 
studied pedagogy—a common major for many university students from marginal 
communities, like Yasmin. She worked for several years as an underpaid teacher before 
deciding to apply for a better-paid public-sector job, for which she was qualified by 
virtue of having a university degree. Much to Yasmin’s own surprise, through the civil 
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servant exam she earned a job at the public bank where she worked when I interviewed 
her. While working as a teacher in a peripheral neighborhood in São Paulo, Yasmin 
reports she did not suffer racism because she was surrounded by black women in the 
job and almost everyone in the community was in a vulnerable economic position, 
which she says prevented discrimination. This changed, however, when Yasmin began 
working at the bank: 
I was whitening myself from the moment I straightened my hair because I have a light 
[skin] color, straight hair, so it was easier to be accepted. I worked in a school where I 
also didn’t suffer racism because the majority of educators were black 
women…poor…because…[as a teacher] you work a lot and it’s precarious. From there, 
soon after, I entered the bank, you know. In the bank you have a different 
situation…because…because in the bank where I work you see very few blacks in 
management positions, because they often don’t pass the exam, because the exam is 
very competitive and is really difficult.  
Yasmin’s social and professional environment changed from economically 
precarious and majority-nonwhite to elite and majority-white. As Yasmin reports, this 
new exposure to elite, white spaces planted the seeds of her racial consciousness by 
giving her a close-up view of the absence of nonwhites in high-status positions and the 
barriers nonwhites face in ascending the social ladder. Moreover, with this new high-
status job, Yasmin began to earn significantly more money, which in turn further 
exposed her to the whiteness of elite spaces:  
And so at the bank I…there I think the process was more difficult because you’re more 
alienated, you know? In relation to this, because there you start to live another way of 
life, you know? So, for example, when I entered the bank, I think I escaped the cycle 
of economic violence. Obviously the racial [cycle] I can never escape, but from the 
economic [cycle] I think I escaped from the moment that I started to earn more [money], 
frequent other places. And then you start to notice, like…we go to some places, there 
are no black people. You go to another, no black people. You got to a restaurant, no 
black people. You get on a plane to go to Europe, almost no black people. Families of 
all black people? Impossible, depending on the destination. 
Working in a high-status job and starting to enjoy the luxury goods that 
disposable income affords made her even more aware of the absence of nonwhites in 
these socially advantaged circles. Yasmin is cognizant of her privilege as someone who 
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earns an enviable salary in Brazil, but she calls her current social position a stroke of 
luck and says she “hate[s] the word meritocracy.” In describing why, Yasmin talks about 
the lack of opportunities for her sisters: “[w]hile I was able to leave that cycle of 
[economic] violence, my sisters never will. They are there, at the bottom, you know?” 
She even goes so far as to link this marginalized status and the inaccessibility of quality 
education to a lack of political interest and/or efficacy, saying “in the periphery people 
don’t even know what is happening in the politics of Brazil today.” She points to her 
mother as an example: 
My mother is a layperson, you know? She didn’t study. Later she—she studied until 
fifth grade (quinta série), she finished her studies as an adult, you see? So she never 
had this political foundation, you know? And so, my—in public school you never find 
this, you know? Obviously race isn’t discussed in school, never in public school, 
truthfully. You see, the books that you use in school don’t talk at all about African 
religions. Blacks are treated in history books only as slaves. You don’t have…in school 
you don’t talk about race, you know? You talk vaguely about slavery, and that’s it. 
Yasmin’s trajectory illustrates one pathway of reclassification, through which 
individuals might move from mixed-race identification or more euphemistic forms, such 
as marron, to an affirmed black identification. Yasmin’s story illustrates how social 
ascension and experiences in the labor market made her cognizant of racial inequalities 
by granting her an enviable degree of upward mobility and showing her firsthand how 
poorly nonwhites are represented in elite spaces, professional or otherwise. Noticing the 
contrast of these spaces with the marginal areas with which she had been familiar, 
Yasmin develops an awareness of racial differences and starts to reinterpret her own 
past experiences, her aesthetic practices, and the misfortunes of her family members as 
racialized.  
 The accounts of Gilberto and Yasmin shine a light on the indirect ways that the 
effects of education can unfold over varying lengths of time. While for individuals 
whose worldviews were altered via information they acquired or new social contacts 
they made, individuals in the labor market may come to understand their own success 
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and their relative positions as shaped by race long after they complete their education. 
Indeed, Gilberto reports that his racialized reinterpretation of his past experiences took 
place over a decade. Thus even for those individuals whose areas of study do not directly 
expose them to alternative interpretive frameworks, education can still be a 
consequential mechanism for altering individuals’ political consciousness and racial 
identities. 
 
Efficacy: Challenging Hierarchies and Confronting Stigma 
 In addition to increasing individuals’ exposure, equally important in 
understanding the effects of education is the effects on one’s sense of internal efficacy, 
which can empower them to confront the stigma attached to blackness and challenge 
commonsense racial hierarchies. Ethnographic research has documented the ways in 
which Brazilians participate in the maintenance of racial hierarchies through such forms 
of institutional racism as negative stereotyping, beauty standards, and holding 
discriminatory attitudes (Hanchard 1994; Twine 1998). Hordge-Freeman (2015) argues 
that racial socialization leads Brazilians to internalize these hierarchies and actively 
reproduce them. One consequence of education, I submit, is that education endows 
individuals with a greater sense of internal efficacy—that is, the individual’s sense of 
their own self-competence and self-esteem—that empowers them to recognize and 
confront racial hierarchies and discrimination when they encounter them, and to 
challenge their reproduction. Efficacy matters, I argue, because it leads individuals away 
from individual-based interpretations of their relative positions – for example, I didn’t 
get that job because I wasn’t qualified – towards more systemic interpretations – I didn’t 
get that job because I am black.  
 Through greater exposure, education can have the effect of altering the personal 
experiences and logics that inform individuals’ racial identities. Moreover, as one 
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ascends the social ladder, it can become increasingly difficult to accept class-based 
explanations for one’s relative social position. But if exposure provides personal 
experiences and worldviews, then efficacy can provide individuals with the fortitude to 
face and embrace stigmatized social categories.  
 It can be difficult to observe “efficacy” directly, and even more difficult, then, 
to link this to racial identification and reclassification. My approach in this final section 
is to rely on comparisons of individuals at different levels of education with regard to 
their own racial self-understanding and the logics behind their racial identifications. 
What I aim to show here is that individuals at all levels of education have, to varying 
degrees, been socialized to internalize stigmatized blackness. But what is much more 
likely at higher levels of education is the willingness – and, in some cases, desire – to 
recognize and challenge racial hierarchies. Thus education contributes to consciousness 
by endowing individuals with the internal fortitude needed as they attempt to interrupt 
the reproduction of racial hierarchies. 
 When I first began interviewing reclassifiers, one expectation I had was that 
reclassifiers, whom I suspected to exhibit some degree of racial consciousness, would 
describe positive feelings with regard to their assumption of black identities. My 
expectation was motivated by a logic that accepting this label would, to a certain extent, 
mean self-acceptance and perhaps feelings of liberation from self-inflicted oppression. 
One reclassifier in São Paulo, Isabel, did express such feelings, saying that identifying 
as black made her feel “empowered,” and described it as a “self-affirming” process to 
“show that you have value.” However far more common were negative and painful 
feelings reported by interviewees. Consider, for example, how Jorge responds when I 
ask him about how assuming a black identity makes him feel:  
DD: And you were in that moment, and you start to discover yourself, and was it…a 
positive moment? 
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Jorge: Totally, like, it was very—honestly it…it was a moment of great pain.  
 
DD: Why? 
 
Jorge: Because I remembered everything I went through. […] Because being black 
isn’t [a] good [thing] in Brazil, so like, you suffer a lot of racism, you suffer violence, 
you, um, suffer all kinds of prejudice, you’re abandoned, and you’re in the favela, 
you’re in prison, you suffered a past of violent exploitation, so…it’s very much in 
education in Brazil. What do schools teach in history [class]? That the black is a 
slave, that the black was—is—primitive, that the black—you know?  
 
DD: Mhm. 
 
Jorge:  So who wants to be black, you know? So who wants to have been tortured? 
Enslaved, imprisoned, raped, you know? Who wants this as their heritage? 
Recall that Jorge had assumed a nonwhite identity less than a year before I interviewed 
him. At the start of his “process of discovery,” he says he “spent a week without being 
able to do anything…just thinking, half-dumbfounded. Sometimes I had, I, sometimes 
I was really pensive and sometimes half-euphoric.” Jorge’s comments resonate with 
Gilberto’s, who described his process of assuming a political black identity this way: 
“Thinking hurts. You create a self-defense mechanism to not feel pain.” He goes on: 
This development of consciousness was really slow, it was really gradual because it 
was really painful too. Thinking hurts, doesn’t it? [I think] we can agree that we don’t 
become happier after we start to study. I don’t know about you, but I didn’t become 
happier, I became more conscious. [And] so more critical. But there is an ignorance, a 
happiness in ignorance, but you lose that. […] Not knowing that pain exists leads you 
to feel less pain, at least I think. That’s where the problem is, racism is there acting 
upon my way of seeing the world, on my self-esteem, on my belief in myself, on my 
belief in my people, black people. But not reflecting about this avoids more 
disturbances too, doesn’t it? 
 In addition to the pain caused by “thinking,” taking steps to alter one’s 
appearance, such as hair, which is common among those who accept blackness, also 
invites discrimination. Carol, for example, says that her process of reclassification 
began with her hair: “initially I thought that—I thought I was going to [look] horrible 
with my natural hair.” When I ask Carol how she felt once she decided to let it grow 
naturally, she says “The beginning was difficult…because a lot of people started to 
criticize [my hair]. I heard, would hear a lot of criticisms saying, ‘what ugly hair’…A 
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lot of negative criticisms, you know?” Nina, a 19-year-old enrolled in the university 
preparatory course in São Paulo who reclassified from parda to preta and who now lets 
her hair grow naturally, tells me, “the process of your assuming afro hair is painful, 
because you, like, you come up against the standard of beauty established in society.” 
Thus individuals who decide not to conform to prevailing standards of beauty often 
anticipate, and indeed need be prepared for, negative reactions and direct criticisms from 
others, including family members. 
But individuals also internalize these ideas and inflict them on themselves. Nina 
tells me that she used to straighten her hair so much that, as a teenager, her hair began 
to fall out, prompting her to start wearing partly synthetic braids as an alternative to 
straightening: “I didn’t like braids very much, but I had to use them because my hair 
was being damaged and, when—when the idea came up of me wearing my afro hair, I 
even said ‘no, I’d rather stay with braids because can you imagine my natural hair? 
People, like, people are going to think it’s ugly. I’m going to feel ugly.’”  
 Thus taking on a black identity, which may involve reclassification for some but 
not necessarily for all, entails a degree of accepting the stigma attached to blackness and 
the pain of reflecting back on one’s experiences. Isabel describes how the internalization 
of black stigma can affect racial identification:  
It’s as if the person felt ashamed to admit it, you see? That they’re black. Because it’s 
associated with, I don’t know, you being poor. Not everyone says it, you know? And 
people do [this thing] of saying pardo, just to not say the word negra. Here it also 
isn’t…How do I say this? People are afraid of saying the word negra, preto, you see? 
They don’t like saying it….It’s like Harry Potter saying the name of Voldemort. 
In Isabel’s view, “people are afraid” of even saying the word “black,” let alone using it 
to describe themselves. If individuals comply with racial hierarchies by conforming to 
commonsense views that features considered “black” or “African” are inherently 
inferior to those considered “white” or “European” then it becomes clear how an 
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individual’s self-esteem, and desire for a positive self-image, might motivate decisions 
related to racial identification.  
 Of course, the perspectives shared here all come from reclassifiers, who given 
my sampling methods have had access to secondary and higher education in Brazil. Yet 
the insights these informants provided with regard to self-esteem and internal efficacy 
find support in the behaviors and rationales exhibited by my lesser-educated informants. 
 As the hypothesis regarding the link between education and reclassification 
emerged during my fieldwork, I began to seek out greater contact with individuals I 
suspected were candidates for reclassification towards blackness (that is, were of 
somewhat darker complexion and thus met commonsense understandings of 
nonwhiteness) but that had not had access to the same levels of schooling as my other 
interviewees. This was also crucial, in my view, because while educational 
opportunities had expanded in recent decades, these opportunities were available mostly 
to younger generations. Older generations, on the other hand, came of age when public 
education was far less accessible and of poorer quality at primary and secondary levels. 
To gain access to these sectors of the population, I began to observe adult literacy 
courses offered for free at an NGO located in a lower-class neighborhood of Recife. 
These courses were oriented toward individuals needing basic skills: many classes were 
spent practicing writing one’s own name, reading aloud, and basic arithmetic. The 
circumstances of the individuals enrolled in these courses might seem extreme, but sadly 
they are modal: according to the 2010 census, just over half of the population is illiterate 
or did not complete primary schooling, and just among those aged 50-59 and over 60, 
these figures rise to 57 and 75 percent, respectively. This setting, therefore, offered an 
opportunity to gain insight into how the absence of education can affect racial 
identification. 
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 A large majority of the students in the course, in my view, could identify as black 
without controversy—the large majority had kinky hair and skin on the darker side. But 
for much of my time observing this course, I knew nothing about how they self-
identified in racial terms. Most in the class were women and grew up in poverty in either 
the capital city of Recife or in Pernambuco’s interior. All the students whom I got to 
know personally worked as domestic workers beginning at a very young age, and those 
who did not used to, but found themselves unemployed at the time. Almost all students 
were over the age of 50, and most were in their 60s and even 70s. 
One day in the course, the teacher decided to hold a group discussion with the 
students on the topic of prejudice. The conversation became somewhat energized when 
the discussion turned specifically to racial prejudice and when one student, Joanna, 
reacted hostilely to a question about her racial identification. Joanna has medium-dark 
skin such that no others in the class consider her white, but she is not the darkest-skinned 
member of the classroom. She wears her dark and graying hair in a neat bun, which 
conceals the texture of her hair to an extent. When I interviewed Joanna after the fact 
and asked in an open-ended format how she identifies racially, she describes herself as 
morena; when I ask her to classify herself using the census categories, she classifies 
herself as white. Many students in the class, including Joanna, identified as morena 
when the teacher first asked. When the teacher asks Joanna if she “would accept it” if 
someone referred to her as negra. Joanna replies, “I would not accept it, no! Why would 
someone call me that?” Her response was met with a burst of laughter from others in 
the class. After settling down the room, the teacher then asked Joanna if she would be 
offended, to which Joanna replied: “If someone called me negra? Yes!” This was met 
with another burst of laughter. Joanna’s hostile reaction to these questions are clear 
evidence of her awareness of and, to an extent, compliance with racial hierarchies. And 
her resistance to the label negra, unlike the reclassifiers who claim blackness, suggests 
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that she seeks to maximize her status and self-esteem by distancing herself from the 
stigma of this category.  
Joanna’s racial self-understanding and her discussions of racial prejudice and 
the word negro that emerge in later conversations reveal the contradictions of her 
approximations to whiteness as well as the logic behind her distancing herself from 
blackness. When faced with the census categories, Joanna opts for the white category, 
instead of parda, which many understand to be between white and black. In this 
instance, I do not suggest to Joanna that parda might be closer to her open-ended 
response of morena, in fear that doing so might alter how she responds to my questions. 
Because of this, it is difficult pin down exactly whether Joanna’s self-classification as 
white reflects a distancing from any nonwhite category, or a lack of familiarity with the 
census categories. If the latter is true, this would be far from the first time in Brazil that 
someone expressed this lack of familiarity to me.  
During my interview with Joanna, I return to the topic of prejudice which 
provoked her strong reactions, first asking her if she thinks that she suffers from 
prejudice. She responds: “Boy, that’s our life, isn’t it? I’m this color. [Gestures to her 
arm.] There are still people that pass by you like [gesturing], don’t even want to touch 
you, because I’m this color and they’re white, you know? I’m not [prejudiced], but there 
is always prejudice. But I pay no attention.” Notably, when I ask her about prejudice 
generally, she understands this to mean color-based prejudice—a response that she 
confirms later on, saying “[prejudice] has to do with color, right? It’s because you see 
[it].” In describing her own experiences, Joanna points to her own skin color as a source 
of prejudice—an implicit admission that she understands her skin color is likely read by 
others as nonwhite. Moreover, she then describes whites as “they,” as others. 
Thus it seems Joanna herself sees her claims to whiteness as tenuous. Later in 
the conversation, knowing well that Joanna doesn’t like the label negra, I ask her if 
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anyone ever referred to her in that way. She reports that only as a child was she called 
neguinha, saying: “because that’s how kids are, right? The little ones, ‘monkey.’ 
Monkey over here, monkey over there. Kid stuff, you know?” Joanna clearly associates 
blackness and its less ambiguous labels with stigma and discrimination, which informs 
her decision to opt for the more euphemistic label morena: 
DD: So in that conversation we had as a group, there were a few people—I think it was 
[teacher] who asked the question, like, how many of you identify as negros. Two people 
raised their hands, and someone said to you, said that you identify as morena, like many 
in the class. And someone asked you something about the word ‘negro,’ but you—what 
do you think about this word? What does negro mean? Is it the same as moreno? 
 
Joanna: Boy…alright, how am I going to say this, my lord. Because when a guy is 
really black, he [gets] prejudice. He’s called monkey, you know? […] I don’t like 
anyone to—I myself don’t like it when anyone calls me black [nêga]. 
 
DD: But you don’t call yourself negra? 
 
Joanna: I call myself morena.  
 
DD: Morena?  
 
Joanna: Right. 
 
DD: So, for you is ‘negra’ offensive? 
 
Joanna: It is. 
 
DD: It is? What does it mean exactly? 
 
Joanna: It’s like, because…because—I’m white. ‘My lord, look how black so-and-so 
is, so-and-so is so black, that guy is a piece of charcoal.’ Because they say, people say 
this, right? I don’t…like it very much. 
 
DD: Who says this? 
 
Joanna: People say this, so much. Even on [the TV news program] Repórter. Even on 
TV we see it. 
 
DD: So, do you think—for example, Raquel, she calls herself negra.  
 
Joanna: Yeah, but…I call myself morena. 
 
DD: But what do you think about the fact that Raquel calls herself negra, for example? 
 
Joanna: Boy, I think it’s because she likes her color, right? She likes her color. 
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Again here, Joanna identifies as morena and white, and associates the word negra with 
stigma and discrimination, describing racist insults she hears hurled at dark-skinned 
people. When I ask her to contrast herself with her classmate, Raquel, who is lighter-
skinned than Joanna but who confidently claimed the label negra in the classroom 
discussion, Joanna reports that this must be because “she likes her color.” When I ask 
Joanna if her reluctance to accept the negra label for herself means she doesn’t like her 
own skin color, she denies this. But her visceral reaction to even the suggestion she 
would be labelled as such, as well as her descriptions of the word as offensive, suggest 
that Joanna’s identifications as morena and white reflect an internalization of racial 
hierarchies and an attempt to avoid the stigma and discrimination attached to blackness 
that she herself describes. 
 Of course, the label moreno is too ambiguous to be logically incompatible with 
whiteness (N. do V. Silva 1996; E. E. Telles 2004), but other students in the class make 
sense of Joanna’s visceral reaction to the word negra as a consequence of the 
stigmatized blackness and her internalization of racial hierarchies. Gisele, one of the 
students in the class and who has tan-colored skin and also identifies as morena, says 
“the word negro is very heavy, you know?” She goes to speak specifically about Joanna:  
I think that she isn’t satisfied with the color god gave her. I think it’s like, because if I 
were negra, if I am a dark color and someone says that I am morena escura and I 
don’t accept it, it means that I don’t like being morena. I don’t like, I don’t accept the 
color god gave me. That’s it, I think that it’s because she is dark [morena escuraI, she 
doesn’t accept it. She’s not accepting it.  
Gisele makes sense of Joanna’s reaction as a lack of acceptance of her skin color. 
Raquel, the self-identified negra, understood Joanna’s reaction in the same way: 
“because, David, she doesn’t like being—having the color she has. I think that the 
moment someone calls someone else black [nêgo] and she [goes] ‘no, don’t call me 
black,’ I think that’s because she doesn’t accept her color.” Of course, others’ 
interpretations of Joanna’s reaction can give us limited insight into Joanna’s thought 
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processes, but Raquel tells me during our interview that soon after the incident, she 
spoke with Joanna on the phone: “Soon after leaving [the discussion], speaking with 
[Joanna] on the phone, I said ‘Look, creature of god, you said you don’t like being called 
negra, but you’re negra.’ So she says ‘And because I’m black others have to call me 
[black]?’” Thus Joanna may not deny certain aspects of her physical appearance, but 
insists that others don’t “have to call” her black. Instead, she prefers the ambiguous 
terminology that allows her to minimize her association with blackness, and at times to 
approximate whiteness.  
 Joanna, however, is probably the most extreme case in the class in that she 
exhibited such a strong reaction to being labelled black and also makes a claim to 
whiteness. Farthest from Joanna in this regard is Raquel, who has medium-light skin 
and kinky hair that she straightens. When I interview Raquel, she identifies as morena 
and parda, but in the discussion she also unabashedly accepted the label negra. Unlike 
Joanna, Raquel reports that she accepts and even likes, her color: “Are you black? 
Accept what you are. People call you black, you feel offended? You don’t have to feel 
offended, lady, you have to say ‘I’m black and very proud,’ you know?”  Yet even in 
Raquel’s case the desire to evade, rather than confront racial stigma, can be found. 
During our interview Raquel, who works for a family as a domestic worker, tells me 
through tears that her boss once falsely accused her of stealing from the family a sum 
of money that was later discovered to be misplaced, and as a result she spent six years 
working for the family without pay. This shocking story prompted me to ask Raquel 
about modern slavery, a topic that had been broached in the group discussion, and one 
she could easily relate her terrible personal experience: 
DD: Let me ask, a few weeks back we had a group conversation, remember? We were 
talking about modern slavery. Do you remember? 
 
Raquel: Yes. 
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DD: What did you think? I think the question was, like, do you think slavery still exists 
today. 
 
Raquel: That was it.  
 
DD: Yeah, what do you think? 
 
Raquel: David, I think…slavery…I think it doesn’t, no. 
 
DD: It doesn’t? Why not? 
 
Raquel: Because we…when we feel…then I would be [one]. If I believed that slavery 
still existed, I would be a slave, to my bosses, because I’m there twenty-four hours and 
I don’t get anything for that. So if I believed in slavery then I would be one. But I don’t 
believe, no. I believe that we accept that situation because we want to, because we like 
to be there with our boss, so I don’t consider it slavery, no. 
Raquel would likely agree with Jorge, who said regarding slavery, “who wants this as 
their heritage?” Striking here is the explicit admission by Raquel that her denial of 
modern slavery is motivated by her desire to not be labelled a slave—regardless of 
whether her lived experience might qualify as such. 
Yet even with this in mind, Raquel is an example of how not all attempt to 
distance themselves from blackness or have internalized this stigma to the same degree. 
Take, for example, Madalena, one of the darkest-skinned members of the classroom, 
who self-identifies as negona and preta. Unlike Joanna, Madalena doesn’t opt for the 
ambiguous label morena and claims blackness. In a conversation I had with Madalena 
and Alice, another student in the class who identifies as morena and parda, Alice tells 
me in response to Joanna’s reaction, that she thinks “it’s wrong” to call someone negro. 
But Madalena contends that “sometimes it’s with love, to call [someone negro], you 
know? When a woman says ‘negona, come here,’ she says it with love.” Thus for 
Madalena, being called black in this way is affectionate, and Madalena even reports that 
in her neighborhood “everyone just calls me negona. [Someone says] ‘Negona!’ [and] 
I say ‘on my way.’” Madalena, then, does not exhibit the evasive strategies that Joanna 
seems to employ to avoid identification as black. But this is not to say that Madalena 
necessarily exhibits racial consciousness or challenges racial hierarchies. In fact, one 
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domain in which they comply is regarding attitudes toward hair. At one point, discussing 
her son, Madalena says “he’s white with bad hair.” When I ask her after she invokes 
this widespread expression to describe what exactly qualifies hair as “bad,” Madalena 
responds by telling me that my hair is “good” “because you’re white,” and that “real 
whites have to have good hair.” 
Thus the individuals in the course participate in the maintenance of racial 
hierarchies to varying degrees. But also evident in these interviews is how they choose 
not to confront instances of racism, even when they recognize it. When Joanna, for 
example, describes people avoiding sitting next to her in public because of her color, 
she reports that she chooses to simply ignore it: “I pay no attention (eu não ligo, não).” 
Madalena reports that she handles instances of racism the same way. She says that 
because her son is much lighter-skinned than she is, she often hears comments like “‘that 
negra with a white son,’” but that she often says nothing in response: “I didn’t respond. 
I stayed quiet because I’m a believer [crente] and I can’t hit back [revidar].” Alice’s 
decision to ignore racism seems to go even further:  
DD: Do you think you suffer prejudice? 
 
Alice: Ah, why, I don’t know. People…a lot of people have that prejudice thing, right? 
But…for me, it’s all normal.  
 
DD: It’s normal?   
 
Alice: Not normal. I think everyone is equal. It’s not up to someone to— 
 
DD: But do you think other people treat you with prejudice? 
 
Alice: No, I don’t pay any attention. 
 
DD: You don’t think so? 
 
Alice: I’m saying, whatever they say, I pay no attention. I pretend that I didn’t hear 
anything. 
 
DD: I see. 
 
Alice: It’s…I pretend I didn’t hear anything, I let it go. I’m not looking to yell, to argue, 
no. I come, or I go, and that’s it. 
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Not only does Alice “pay no attention,” she pretends to hear nothing. Contrast this with 
the response of Yasmin, the public bank employee. She describes her husband as white 
and says that people regularly ask her, as they do Madalena, if her light-skinned 
daughter is really hers. Unlike Madalena’s silence, Yasmin instead opts for a subtle, yet 
confrontational, response: “If I’m walking down the street and [someone] asks ‘lord, is 
she yours?’ I say ‘Yes,’ and that’s it. I don’t respond any more than that. That person 
can swallow their prejudice, you know?” 
 Yasmin’s response was like those of my better-educated interviewees. Isabel, 
for example, says that when she encounters everyday forms of even subtle racism, she 
intervenes: “for example, if I hear some comment like ‘ah, a black woman with white 
features’ as if beauty was only the white stereotype, with delicate features, more 
feminine, you know? It’s…I don’t know. There I intervene. ‘What do you mean?’ […] 
Day to day, when I’m somewhere that generates some [racial] question, I give my 
opinion, you know?” Isabel says that she often notices comments like these, and that 
rather than “paying no attention,” she prefers to confront these commonsense racial 
hierarchies, not shying away from inserting her view on the matter. Ednilda, a primary-
school teacher in her late 50s who identifies as negra and preta, similarly describes how 
she would react when receiving comments about her hair: “and if someone asked ‘why 
are you wearing your hair like that?’ ‘Because I want to! Because my grandmother did 
it!’ ‘You don’t think it’s ugly?’ ‘No, I don’t. Go mind your own business,’ you know? 
I was always like that too, very...I always had comebacks [muito respondona].” Here, 
too, we see Ednilda responding to a common form of racial prejudice by asserting 
herself against racial hierarchies and those that perpetuate them through racism. Nina, 
too, expresses a similar sentiment: 
When you go through that situation [racism], and you see other people going through 
it…Today I say ‘No,’ today I have my essence of the fact that I’m black and the fact 
that even people, even people attacking me, carrying out racist attacks against me—I 
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know who I am. Now I’m not going to allow another racist attack, kind of cast doubt 
on who I am. So you see people who don’t have this consciousness, they slip into doubt, 
‘could it be that I really am?’ Or even like, someone’s a victim of racism, and 
sometimes she ends up propagating that racism toward other people who are like her.  
When she encounters racism, Nina not only identifies it rather than ignoring it, but she 
also draws on internal reserves of strength to prevent others from “casting doubt” on her 
self-esteem. Here, Nina also distinguishes herself from others who experience racism 
and either perpetuate it themselves by subjecting others to it, or by questioning whether 
a racist comment is accurately applied to them, rather than questioning the content of 
the racist comment itself. 
 In sum, what comes through in these data is the susceptibility of my less 
educated interviewees to the commonsense racial hierarchies and the logics they 
perpetuate. Of course, the better-educated in my sample are also reclassifiers, which 
complicates inferences drawn from these individuals alone. But by their accounts it is 
clear that the assumption of black identities – in official census as well as everyday and 
euphemistic forms – entails some degree of internal efficacy. That is, it entails an ability 
to understand that another’s racist or discriminatory opinion about blackness in general 
is not a reflection of one’s individual worth or value. This internal efficacy, then, 
empowers individuals to pursue voice over exit.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has relied on qualitative analysis of in-depth interview data with 
Brazilians at various levels of education and with reclassifiers and stable identifiers to 
shed light on the mechanisms through which education produces political consciousness 
and racial reclassification. These interviews have been fruitful in this regard, helping 
flesh out and illustrate the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy. The heterogeneous 
and complex personal narratives that interviewees offered revealed that, indeed, 
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education is a multidimensional variable. In particular those with access to secondary 
and university education, they gained access to new information, social networks, and 
labor market experiences, all of which can contribute to consciousness-building. 
Moreover, the better-educated exhibited greater levels of internal efficacy, endowing 
them with the confidence and self-esteem to confront racial hierarchies and challenge 
the stigma associated blackness through commonsense. Of course, the insights gleaned 
from these data are not conclusive on their own. In following chapter, I subject the 
observable implications of these insights to systematic empirical testing, alongside tests 
of the alternative hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONSCIOUSNESS OR CONVENIENCE? 
 
The previous chapter elaborated the processes and mechanisms of political 
consciousness that are central to the political identity hypothesis. While the interview 
data are particularly useful for illustrating and elaborating mechanisms in detail, the 
sampling strategy employed and the limited sample size call into question the 
generalizability of those findings. This chapter systematically tests the insights and 
propositions generated through qualitative fieldwork. Namely, it focuses on the 
observable implication of the political identity hypothesis, that individuals with higher 
levels of educational attainment, and those with lower-class backgrounds, are most 
likely to reclassify toward blackness. Without panel data that spans the time period of 
this recent trend, I test this hypothesis by conducting longitudinal analysis of annual 
household surveys. 
 In addition to subjecting the political identity hypothesis to systematic testing, 
this chapter also presents tests of the alternative hypotheses. The first, which I term the 
instrumental hypothesis, attributes these patterns to new material and strategic 
incentives generated by the implementation of race-targeted affirmative action policies. 
The second, which I term the recognition hypothesis, attributes these patterns to the 
Brazilian state’s stunning shift in its posture toward the racial question. In this view, it 
is the symbolic meaning of the state’s explicit recognition of racial difference, the 
historical roots of racialized inequalities, and the present persistence of racial 
discrimination that has encouraged the growing and newfound tendency to identify as 
nonwhite. 
 To test these alternative hypotheses, I draw on two survey experiments to test 
the casual validity of these hypotheses:  first, a priming experiment in which respondents 
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are reminded of the material incentives created by affirmative action policies and of the 
historical recognition of nonwhite suffering by the state to see how these primes affect 
racial identification; and second, a list experiment to probe for evidence that individuals 
have manipulated their identifications in the past, if not on the survey. Finally, to probe 
for additional evidence of instrumental behavior, I conduct a panel analysis of university 
applicants’ racial identifications, based on an panel dataset of university students’ racial 
identifications in high school, on the university entrance exam, and in university. 
 The coincidence of many of the institutional changes each explanation 
hypothesizes is responsible for these patterns presents inferential challenges to 
adjudicating between competing explanations. The general strategy in this chapter is to 
employ distinct empirical strategies that test each hypothesis most appropriately and 
that most plausibly isolate specific effects. To begin, we turn first to the political identity 
hypothesis. 
 
The Political Identity Hypothesis: A Longitudinal Analysis of Birth Cohorts 
 The main hypothesis this chapter aims to test is that individuals with greater 
levels of education are most likely to reclassify toward blackness in Brazil. This ought 
particularly be the case among individuals arriving to higher education from lower class 
backgrounds, that is, who tend to be darker skinned and yet who are racially ambiguous. 
As prior scholarship has shown, it is among these social sectors that individuals are most 
susceptible to compliance with racial hierarchies and colorism, who might otherwise 
capitalize on the fluidity of racial boundaries to self-whiten. Among these newly mobile 
sectors, by contrast, greater access to education is expected to increase their exposure 
to information, social networks, and the labor market, all of which inform their 
racialized political consciousness.  
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This hypothesis entails not only classificatory change, but a process that unfolds over 
time. Ideally, the empirical test would involve a microlevel panel dataset to allow for 
repeated observations of individuals’ racial identifications over the relevant time period, 
in this case from 1992 to the present. In the absence of such panel data, I test this claim 
by constructing a synthetic panel, or “pseudo panel,” from repeated cross-sections of 
household surveys, carried out by the census bureau.  
Not particularly common in political science, pseudo-panel approaches are 
regularly employed in other social sciences following Angus Deaton’s (1985) 
pioneering application. In many cases, researchers are interested in testing hypotheses 
that would require panel data but are able to find only repeated cross-sections of surveys 
carried out annually, with samples drawn anew. Such surveys, like the household survey 
under examination here, allow researchers to construct estimates of aggregated 
individual-level behavior by tracking “cohorts,” defined as a group with fixed 
membership over time. In my application, I rely on repeated cross-sections of household 
surveys to follow birth cohorts and estimate the aggregate likelihood, in any given year, 
that individuals in these cohorts will identify as nonwhite. Rather than estimate repeated 
individual-level probabilities of racial identifications over time—that is, direct 
observations of racial reclassification—the pseudo-panel approach replaces individual-
level observations with cohort means as indirect estimates of the likelihood that 
individuals belonging to particular birth cohorts will identify in any one racial category 
over time (Deaton 1985; Verbeek and Nijman 1992).  
 My analysis relies on the Annual Household Sample Survey (PNAD, Pesquisa 
Nacional de Amostra de Domicílios), a large demographic survey similar to the 
American Community Survey in the United States, commonly viewed as the census in 
census off-years. For consistency in the racial classification scheme employed, I analyze 
PNAD surveys for each year from 1992 to 2015 (excluding 2000 and 2010 census years, 
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and 1994, when the survey was not conducted). As a demographic survey, this survey 
provides the sample sizes needed to construct adequately sized birth cohorts in each 
survey year to compute reliable estimates. One drawback, however, is that demographic 
surveys rarely include information for typical control variables in the social sciences. 
Nonetheless, these data are sufficient to test the major propositions under consideration 
here.  
Moreover, applying this method to these data offers its own advantages. Because 
the first survey suitable was conducted in 1992, long before affirmative action policies 
became a salient topic of national political debate in Brazil, the analysis can focus on 
individuals who likely completed university long before nonwhite identification offered 
any incentives or benefits. If instrumental motivation alone accounts for the observed 
changes in racial identification, then older cohorts—those highly unlikely to seek to 
benefit from racial quotas in university admissions—ought demonstrate stability in their 
racial identifications. This approach and these data, therefore, offer leverage on the 
political identity hypothesis by allowing me to isolate the effects of education in at least 
some time periods without potential contamination from affirmative action policies. 
 Table 5.1 shows the cohorts under examination in this analysis. Pseudo-panel 
analysis naturally requires the analysis to specify the size and number of cohorts in an 
analysis, inducing a bias-variance tradeoff. Verbeek and Nijman (1992), however, show 
that the effect of ignoring bias will be small so long as there is sufficient variation in 
 Birthyear  Age  Observations 
Cohort Min Max  1992 2015  Min Max 
1 1950 1954  37-42 60-65  8,877 11,403 
2 1955 1959  32-37 55-60  10,252 12,674 
3 1960 1964  27-32 50-55  9,962 14,496 
4 1965 1969  22-27 45-50  6,722 14,135 
5 1970 1974  17-22 40-45  2,058 13,472 
6 1975 1979  12-17 35-40  104 12,610 
7 1980 1984  - 30-35  6 11,509 
8 1985 1989  - 25-30  4 8,349 
Table 5.1 Birth Cohorts in PNAD Sample 
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cohort means over time. These authors recommend a minimum cohort size of 100 
observations in any given year, but suggest a minimum of 200 observations. It is clear 
from Table 5.1 that cohorts 7 and 8 suffer from small sample sizes in some survey years 
(because the sample is restricted to heads of household), and are thus not suitable for 
analysis. 
Pseudo-panel analysis makes two additional assumptions. First is that the 
cohorts identified across surveys are based on reasonably stable membership over time. 
An obvious and common choice is respondent birthyear, the criterion employed here. 
Second is that the cohorts analyzed are based upon stable populations (Guillerm 2017). 
This second stipulation is relevant with respect to age, which is used to construct the 
cohorts, and with respect to education, the explanatory variable of interest. In the former 
case the rationale is ensure accurate identification of cohorts across surveys. In the latter 
case, stability in educational attainment will be important to identify the effect of 
 Cohort 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1992 1.97 2.06 2.07 1.97 1.81 1.60 
1993 1.99 2.07 2.09 2.01 1.89 1.70 
1995 2.01 2.07 2.07 2.04 1.92 1.78 
1996 2.01 2.08 2.11 2.07 1.97 1.82 
1997 2.03 2.11 2.11 2.08 2.01 1.86 
1998 2.04 2.11 2.12 2.10 2.06 1.95 
1999 2.03 2.11 2.14 2.12 2.08 2.01 
2001 2.02 2.11 2.14 2.13 2.12 2.04 
2002 2.06 2.13 2.18 2.18 2.17 2.14 
2003 2.05 2.13 2.17 2.18 2.19 2.19 
2004 2.05 2.13 2.18 2.20 2.21 2.22 
2005 2.05 2.14 2.19 2.22 2.23 2.27 
2006 2.06 2.16 2.22 2.24 2.27 2.31 
2007 2.06 2.17 2.22 2.25 2.29 2.35 
2008 2.06 2.18 2.26 2.31 2.32 2.38 
2009 2.08 2.18 2.26 2.36 2.32 2.40 
2011 2.05 2.16 2.26 2.36 2.33 2.44 
2012 2.07 2.20 2.30 2.39 2.38 2.49 
2013 2.07 2.19 2.30 2.41 2.42 2.51 
2014 2.06 2.21 2.29 2.40 2.42 2.52 
2015 2.07 2.22 2.31 2.42 2.47 2.53 
Table 5.2 Cohort Education Means in Each Survey Year, 1992-2015. In this analysis, education is 
coded categorically to capture four major levels of educational attainment: 1) less than primary 
education, 2) primary education, 3) high school, and 4) university. 
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education on likelihoods of racial identification. In other words, stability in educational 
attainment is ideal so that estimated changes in likelihoods of racial identification can 
be attributed to education, per se, rather than movement between levels of education by 
respondents. These two constraints limit the number of cohorts that are suitable (or 
ideal) for pseudo-panel analysis of education and racial identification: because mortality 
rates spike among Brazilians aged more than 55 years, the underlying population of 
cohorts that reach this age during the period in question is not stable (Appendix Table 
A3); and because younger individuals are most likely to gain additional education over 
time, educational attainment is unlikely to remain stable in younger cohorts. Thus the 
analyses below will place the greatest weight on models estimated from cohorts 3 and 
4: these individuals are old enough to have completed university education in the first 
survey year, but not so old that their mortality rates will spike by the final survey year. 
 This strategy, of course, entails a number of tradeoffs and is less ideal than true 
panel analysis. First, because of assumptions of stability in cohort populations, this 
analysis will focus predominantly on cohorts that attained higher levels of education 
prior to the time period that I hypothesize is relevant to understanding the apparent shifts 
in patterns of racial identification, namely the mid-1990s through the 2010s. Restricting 
the analysis to these cohorts thus raises questions about the temporal generalizability of 
these findings to younger cohorts. It also raises the question of whether individuals in 
older cohorts will match the socioeconomic profile of those citizens who were granted 
unprecedented access to education in the recent era of social inclusion. On the first point, 
I stress that the main goal of this analysis is to test the proposition that greater education 
increases the likelihood of nonwhite identification. This entails prioritizing the internal 
validity of this analysis, that is, in isolating and identifying the effect of educational 
attainment on patterns of racial identification. To address concerns over external 
validity, I will also expand the analysis to include younger and older cohorts to test the 
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robustness of findings in the restricted analysis, setting aside potential assumption 
violations.  
 Finally, in the absence of panel data that covers the relevant period in question, 
it bears reemphasizing that the pseudo-panel approach offers leverage in particular with 
regard to the recently-implemented affirmative action policies in Brazil. By constructing 
cohorts in the first survey-year of 1992, this enables analyzing individuals who acquired 
university education before the affirmative action era, and long before affirmative action 
policies became a politicized issue in Brazilian national politics. Thus analyzing the 
behavior of older cohorts also offers the unique advantage of eliminating the potential 
contaminating factor of affirmative action as a material incentive for nonwhite 
identification. 
 
Data and Samples 
 Construction of the pseudo-panel requires repeated cross-sections of an 
underlying population, in this case the Brazilian population, over a relevant period of 
time. PNAD surveys are conducted annually with the exception of census years, with 
samples drawn anew in each survey-year. Because these samples are intended for 
demographic purposes, the samples are considerably (and fortunately) larger than most 
social science surveys, which allows for the construction of a sample restricted for 
theoretical reasons while still providing a large number of observations for efficient and 
unbiased estimation. 
 A test of the political identity hypothesis ought be able to cover the period 
relevant to the shifting patterns of racial identification apparent in the census data. While 
these patterns became apparent in the early 2000s, this analysis includes as many survey 
years as is possible while maintaining consistency in the survey and enumeration 
practices employed by the census bureau. In particular with regard to the classification 
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scheme, PNAD surveys are consistent from 1992 through 2015. Before 1992, an 
indigenous category was not included in the close-ended survey response. Since 1992, 
the five-category classification scheme has remained consistent (Appendix Table A1). 
While including prior PNAD surveys would add to the temporal scope of the analysis, 
the classification scheme is not consistent and those surveys are unfortunately not 
suitable for analysis. 
 PNAD surveys are household surveys, and thus they enumerate all members of 
randomly selected households. However we cannot be certain that all household 
members are present and respond themselves to survey questionnaires. In such cases it 
may be that heads of household provide information regarding other household 
members, and thus racial identifications are ascribed and do not reflect self-
identification. Given this constraint, this analysis restricts the sample to heads of 
household.  
Year < Primary Primary High School University 
1992 0.65 0.46 0.32 0.14 
1993 0.66 0.46 0.35 0.17 
1995 0.65 0.46 0.36 0.17 
1996 0.64 0.46 0.34 0.19 
1997 0.66 0.46 0.35 0.19 
1998 0.66 0.47 0.35 0.18 
1999 0.67 0.47 0.36 0.19 
2001 0.67 0.49 0.39 0.21 
2002 0.67 0.50 0.40 0.22 
2003 0.69 0.52 0.42 0.24 
2004 0.68 0.52 0.43 0.26 
2005 0.71 0.54 0.45 0.26 
2006 0.71 0.54 0.45 0.28 
2007 0.71 0.56 0.47 0.28 
2008 0.71 0.57 0.48 0.31 
2009 0.71 0.56 0.48 0.32 
2011 0.70 0.56 0.50 0.35 
2012 0.73 0.58 0.50 0.35 
2013 0.72 0.57 0.50 0.34 
2014 0.74 0.58 0.51 0.38 
2015 0.73 0.60 0.52 0.38 
Table 5.3 Mean Nonwhite ID by Education and Year (Cohorts 3 and 4) 
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 The samples analyzed below, then, are comprised of heads of household in 
Brazil from 1992 to 2015, totaling 21 individual surveys. Because autoregressive 
models are estimated, estimates span 1993 to 2015. The sample is time-pooled, and the 
full sample of heads of household across all 21 surveys contains 1,339,169 observations. 
Because the analyses below are interactive-fixed effects models, models are estimated 
on reduced samples spread over time (1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2015). In this 
reduced sample, the total number of observations is 328,122 observations. Select 
models below will include all cohorts or select cohorts, and models will also be 
estimated on select subsamples based on one’s location in the income structure. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables in these analyses are coded from the close-ended racial 
identification questions employed by the census bureau. Specifically, respondents are 
asked “what is your race or color?” and are asked to self-classify in one of five 
categories: white, black, yellow (Asian), brown, or indigenous. Because Asian and 
indigenous identification fall outside the scope of this study, respondents identifying as 
such are excluded from the analysis. I analyze respondents’ white, black, and brown 
identification in two ways. First, I construct binary white/nonwhite variables by 
collapsing black and brown identification together. This coding reflects the 
understanding of blackness promoted by the black movement, in which “negro” is 
meant to unite all Brazilians of African descent, and is sometimes understood to describe 
one’s “race” rather than one’s “color.” Table 5.3 presents means of nonwhite 
identification by level of education for each survey-year in the sample. 
In addition to binary measurements, I also analyze racial identification as a 
trichotomous variable, which, according to some, better reflects the panoply of racial 
identifications in Brazil, does not impose a black/white divide, and better reflects the 
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choice set from which survey respondents are asked to choose. In the analyses below, I 
begin with analysis of the binary variable and follow with analysis of the trichotomous 
variable. 
 
Independent Variables 
 The independent variable of interest in this analysis is education, measured as 
years of formal education completed and categorized into four categories: 1) less than 
primary education completed, 2) primary completed, 3) high school completed, and 4) 
university or more completed. In addition, the models also include controls for income, 
which is measured as the respondent’s decile of household income per capita; and 
dummies for gender, and migration status at the municipal and state levels. In the case 
of migration, scholars suggest that subjective understandings of racial classification 
vary across geographic regions of Brazil (A. S. A. Guimarães 1999; E. E. Telles 2004), 
thus changes in classification might be shaped by movement across geographic 
boundaries. Additionally in this vein, I include fixed effects for the respondent’s state 
of residence, to control for these differences and any other state-level heterogeneity. 
Summary statistics of the independent variables are presented in Table 5.4. 
 
Models and Estimation 
 To capture changes over time, I estimate the likelihood of nonwhite 
identification with time-interactive, autoregressive, fixed-effects logit models. In 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 1,339,169 2004.83 6.46 1992 2015 
Education 1,339,019 2.19 0.90 1 4 
Income 1,307,554 5.85 2.90 1 10 
Female 1,339,169 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Local Native 1,339,165 0.43 0.49 0 1 
State Migrant 1,339,169 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Cohort Lag 1,300,213 0.52 0.04 0.45 0.63 
State 1,339,169 32.66 10.63 11 53 
Table 5.4 Summary Statistics of Independent Variables 
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keeping with the econometrics literature on pseudo-panels, I estimate fixed-effects 
models by measuring time with survey-year fixed effects (Deaton 1985). Additionally, 
to control for autocorrelation in the dependent variable, namely that Pr(nonwhite ID) at 
time t depends in part on that probability at time t – 1, I include lagged means of 
nonwhite identification for each cohort. In the absence of individual-level fixed effects 
that can be controlled for in time-series or panel analysis, these models interact the 
survey-year and cohort mean lags, which instruments for individual-level fixed effects, 
as Moffit (1993) shows. 
 In the analyses that follow I estimate models of the form 
log(Yi,c,t) = α0 +  year ∙ τt · ( y̅c,t-1 · λ + educi,t · γ + ∑ 𝑿𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
𝑘  ∙ βk + δi,t · ζ ), 
where Y is the binary variable indicating nonwhite identification for individual i in 
cohort c in year t. Year is a survey-year fixed effect, ?̅? is the lagged cohort mean of Y, 
educ is the categorical education variable, X is a matrix of control variables, and δ 
represents state fixed effects.  
Because the proposition being tested here hypothesizes change over time in the 
relationship between select covariates and the probability of nonwhite identification, the 
survey-year variable is interacted with the full model. In the case of binary dependent 
variables, models are estimated with logistic regression; in the trichotomous case, 
multinomial logit models are estimated. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, below I 
present fixed-effects models drawing on select survey-years over this period, and 
present coefficients only for relevant variables. Full estimates for these models, along 
with predicted probabilities and difference tests of marginal effects, are presented in 
Appendix Tables D1-D24. 
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Longitudinal Analysis of Nonwhite Identification 
 Table 5.5 presents estimates from logit models estimating self-identification as 
either black or brown (nonwhite), relative to white identification. This model, which 
estimates this relationship on the full sample of heads of household, shows a positive 
and increasing relationship between education and nonwhite identification. The main 
effects of education show a negative relationship between education and nonwhite 
identification on average. This clearly reflects baseline racial inequality in education 
 Full Sample  
 (1)  
1998 x Primary -0.033 (0.061)  
1998 x High School -0.106 (0.082)  
1998 x University -0.094 (0.137)  
    
2003 x Primary 0.028 (0.060)  
2003 x High School 0.172 (0.078)*  
2003 x University 0.198 (0.129)  
    
2008 x Primary 0.077 (0.061)  
2008 x High School 0.252 (0.076)*  
2008 x University 0.424 (0.122)*  
    
2013 x Primary 0.048 (0.064)  
2013 x High School 0.271 (0.078)*  
2013 x University 0.422 (0.123)*  
    
2015 x Primary 0.110 (0.064)+  
2015 x High School 0.301 (0.078)*  
2015 x University 0.527 (0.122)*  
    
1998 -0.918 (0.878)  
2003 -0.279 (1.043)  
2008 -1.812 (1.167)  
2013 -0.057 (1.002)  
2015 -1.152 (0.923)  
Primary -0.321 (0.046)*  
High School -0.777 (0.061)*  
University -1.460 (0.107)*  
Interactive Controls Y  
Interactive State FX Y  
Observations 137,410  
AIC 156984.253  
Table 5.5 Estimated Longitudinal Relationship between Education and Nonwhite Identification. 
+ p < .1, * p < .05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each fixed-effects interaction term is 
estimated relative to the baseline year of 1993 and the education category “less than primary.”  
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(and potentially a tendency to self-whiten) in that darker-skinned Brazilians remain 
under-represented in higher levels of education. Over time, however, there is a positive  
relationship between education and nonwhite ID. The model estimates slight declines 
in nonwhite ID across all education groups in 1998, but by 2003 these estimates are 
positive and considerably higher for the high school and university-educated. For the 
university-educated in particular, the coefficient on the interaction term more than 
doubles between 2003 and 2015, from 0.2 to 0.53. 
 Figure 5.1 puts these estimated effects in substantive terms, displaying the 
changes over time in the predicted probability of identifying as black or brown. The 
figure displays the difference between the probability estimated in each given year, 
relative to that probability in the baseline year of 1993. As these are pseudo-panel 
estimates, these probabilities can be interpreted as changes in the probability that, in the 
aggregate, individuals in the given cohorts will identify as nonwhite over time, given 
their levels of education. These probabilities thus reflect not individual-level changes in 
the sample, but changes in the cohort means over time (Deaton 1985). As is clear, over 
the long-term there is a monotonic relationship between greater educational attainment 
and growth over time in the likelihood of identifying as nonwhite. For the university 
Figure 5.1 Changes in the Estimated Probability of Nonwhite Identification by Level of Education 
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and high school-educated in particular, there is consistent growth. Between 1993 and 
2015, this probability grew by 14 percentage points for the university-educated (0.29 to 
0.42) and 11 percentage points (0.41 to 0.52) for the high school-educated (see 
Appendix Tables D3 and D4 for difference tests).  
Of course, the central hypothesis I am advancing has to do not only with 
education itself, but access to education for particular social classes. In these cohorts in 
particular, a considerable portion of the university-educated falls into the top income 
decile of the income distribution (51 percent in 2015, and 68 percent in 1993). Based 
 (2) (3) (4) 
 Excl. Top Decile Bottom 5 Deciles Top Decile 
1998 x Primary -0.043 (0.062) -0.090 (0.073) 0.634 (0.591) 
1998 x High School -0.108 (0.085) 0.098 (0.133) 0.385 (0.578) 
1998 x University 0.117 (0.196) 0.205 (0.599) 0.279 (0.586) 
       
2003 x Primary 0.020 (0.060) 0.044 (0.072) 0.242 (0.561) 
2003 x High School 0.146 (0.080)+ 0.298 (0.125)* 0.523 (0.545) 
2003 x University 0.282 (0.184) 0.836 (0.529) 0.458 (0.551) 
       
2008 x Primary 0.066 (0.061) 0.087 (0.074) 0.642 (0.522) 
2008 x High School 0.201 (0.079)* 0.423 (0.121)* 0.857 (0.507)+ 
2008 x University 0.570 (0.172)* 1.075 (0.467)* 0.669 (0.513) 
       
2013 x Primary 0.029 (0.064) 0.074 (0.080) 0.630 (0.492) 
2013 x High School 0.244 (0.081)* 0.475 (0.125)* 0.631 (0.478) 
2013 x University 0.554 (0.173)* 1.108 (0.467)* 0.552 (0.484) 
       
2015 x Primary 0.086 (0.065) 0.028 (0.081) 1.197 (0.497)* 
2015 x High School 0.256 (0.081)* 0.495 (0.125)* 1.320 (0.483)* 
2015 x University 0.573 (0.171)* 0.963 (0.465)* 1.333 (0.488)* 
       
1998 -0.453 (0.917) -0.082 (1.247) -6.511 (3.143)* 
2003 -0.862 (1.092) -0.034 (1.495) 4.307 (3.609) 
2008 -1.624 (1.234) -2.021 (1.755) -2.613 (3.730) 
2013 0.202 (1.065) 1.327 (1.566) -0.911 (3.104) 
2015 -0.665 (0.987) 0.245 (1.453) -4.281 (2.822) 
Primary -0.325 (0.046)* -0.306 (0.055)* -0.928 (0.409)* 
High School -0.750 (0.064)* -0.887 (0.102)* -1.318 (0.401)* 
University -1.387 (0.157)* -1.591 (0.447)* -1.827 (0.407)* 
Interactive Controls Y Y Y 
Interactive State FX Y Y Y 
Observations 120,468 61,464 16,942 
AIC 139551.998 70295.603 17285.052 
Table 5.6 Estimated Longitudinal Relationship between Education and Nonwhite Identification. 
+ p < .1, * p < .05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each fixed-effect interaction term is 
estimated relative to baseline year 1993 and the “less than primary” education category. 
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on the discussion above and in earlier chapters, the top percentiles of the income 
distribution (and the light-skinned) are not likely candidates for reclassification. Table 
5.6 presents estimates computed from separate income-based subsamples. Model 2 
removes the top income decile from the sample and estimates the same patterns, though 
in this case the positive relationship between university education and nonwhite 
identification is consistently positive and increasing even in 1998. Model 3 further 
restricts the sample to the most theoretically relevant population, individuals in the 
bottom-half of the income distribution. This model estimates an even more pronounced 
pattern, with large, positive, and increasing coefficients estimated for the high school 
Figure 5.2 Estimated Longitudinal Probabilities of Nonwhite Identification Computed From 
Models 2-4. 
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and university-educated. Model 4 estimates the model for those in the top income decile 
alone. A much noisier and unclear pattern emerges among these respondents. There is 
initially a strong positive effect in 1998, but this diminishes considerably and then 
surges in 2015. Moreover, there is no clear relationship between greater education and 
nonwhite identification among this decile of the income distribution. 
 Figure 5.2 displays predicted probabilities computed from each model presented 
in Table 5.6. The top-left panel displays estimates from Model 2, which excluded 
respondents in the top income decile. By and large we see the same longitudinal pattern 
in these data, with a monotonic relationship between greater levels of education and the 
over-time change in the probability of nonwhite identification. The over-time change, 
however, is estimated to be slightly larger for the university-educated (17 percentage 
points). The bottom-left panel displays estimates from Model 4, which restricted the 
analysis to those individuals in the top income decile. No clear pattern emerges from 
these data: there is no clear monotonic relationship between levels of educational 
attainment and over-time change. Though there appears to be an upward trend following 
2003, the estimated probabilities among the top decile bounce somewhat randomly.  
The top-right panel displays estimates computed on the subsample comprised of those 
in the bottom half of the income distribution. The estimated probabilities indicate that 
the relationship between greater education and over-time change in the probability of 
nonwhite identification are quite pronounced, providing strong support for the political 
identity hypothesis. Indeed, among the better educated there are consistent and 
substantial gains in the likelihood of nonwhite identification. For the university 
educated, this probability increased by 24 percentage points between 1993 and 2015, 
(from 0.36 to 0.6). Among the high school-educated, this figure is 14 percentage points 
(from 0.51 to 0.65). By contrast, those with primary education and less show little to no 
change substantial change in their likelihoods of nonwhite identification, 4 and 3 
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percentage points, respectively (see Appendix Tables D6 to D11 for predicted 
probabilities and difference tests).  
 
Longitudinal Analysis of Additional Cohorts 
Though the sample in this analysis has been restricted to cohorts 3 and 4 for 
theoretical reasons, questions linger as to whether these findings are the product of 
subsamples analyzed. To test for this possibility, I estimate these same models with a 
sample expanded to include the two older cohorts (1 and 2) as well as the two younger 
cohorts (5 and 6). Of course, for reasons detailed above, one ought be skeptical of 
Figure 5.3 Over-Time Change in Probability of Nonwhite ID by Level of Education (All Cohorts) 
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estimates computed from analyses of these samples alone. But expanding the samples 
included in the analysis can, at the very least, address concerns as to whether these 
findings are artifacts of particular birth cohorts. 
 Full model estimates for these samples can be found in Appendix Tables D12 
and D15. These models estimate similar patterns as those restricted to cohorts 3 and 4: 
with the exception of respondents in the top income decile, there is a monotonic 
relationship between greater education and nonwhite identification, a relationship that 
grows stronger over time. Among the top income decile, no clear pattern emerges. The 
substantive findings of these analyses are presented in Figure 5.3, which displays the 
longitudinal changes in the probability of identifying as nonwhite by level of education 
and relative to the baseline probability in 1993. The two panels in the top estimate these 
changes for the full sample and excluding those in the top income decile. As is clear, 
the same pattern emerges as in the restricted analysis, with the exclusion of the top 
income decile leading to slightly stronger effects of greater education. The bottom-left 
panel again shows particularly strong effects among those in the bottom-half of the 
income distribution, the most theoretically relevant population in the sample. 
Substantial changes in this probability are estimated for those with high school and 
university education, and little to no change for those with primary or less education. 
Finally, in the expanded sample the lack of a clear pattern remains among the top income 
decile. 
 While the findings of this expanded sample should be taken with a grain of salt, 
this additional analysis lends further support to the hypothesis. The main empirical 
finding, that individuals with greater education are more likely over time to identify as 
nonwhite, does not appear to be limited to cohorts born in the 1960s.  
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Longitudinal Multinomial Logit Models of Racial Identification 
 The analysis above provides evidence in support of the main empirical claim of 
the political identity hypothesis. However the aggregation of black and brown 
categories might potentially obscure interesting variation that can shed additional light 
on the shifting patterns of racial identification over time in Brazil. In particular, while a 
decline in the probability of white identification is clear, one might wonder if the growth 
in nonwhite identification is a function primarily of identification as black or brown. 
From the perspective of the instrumental hypothesis, growth only in the brown category 
might be interpreted as suggestive evidence of instrumentality, as it is the 
white/nonwhite boundary one must cross to claim affirmative action benefits. Growth 
in the black category, by contrast, would suggest motivations beyond short-term 
calculations of material payoffs.  
Figure 5.4 Predicted Probabilities of Racial Identification by Level of Education and over Time 
 139 
 
 I thus further test the political identity hypothesis by disaggregating the coding 
of racial identification into three categories and estimate multinomial logit models. In 
this analysis, I focus again on cohorts 3 and 4 to maximize internal validity of the 
longitudinal analysis. I also focus on a sample that excludes respondents in the top 
income decile. While the logit model led to strong findings in the binary case, further 
dividing the sample in the case of the trichotomous variable leads to too few 
observations, seeing as lower-income Brazilians are not well represented in higher 
education in the early 1990s. Thus the estimates discussed here are computed from a 
sample that is relevant to the theoretical propositions, within reason. 
 Full estimates from the multinomial model are available in Appendix Table D22. 
Figure 5.4 presents the substantive findings of this analysis, displaying the change in 
the probability of identifying in each category relative to the baseline probability in 
1993. Each quadrant shows these trends by level of education. First, clear from the plots 
is that the greatest decline in white identification over time is among those with high 
school and university education. Second, growth in both black and brown categories is 
most consistent over time among the most highly educated, those with university 
education. Third, growth in the black category is clear among all education levels, 
suggesting there is a general upward trend that is accentuated by education. Finally, 
growth in the brown category is rather uneven across education groups. Individuals with 
less than high school education show no significant growth in brown identification. The 
high school-educated show inconsistent and substantively insignificant growth.  
 Of course, these pseudo-panel estimates are not indicative of individual-level 
movement out of the white category and into the black category, per se. Instead they 
suggest net changes in the likelihood of individuals moving in or out of these categories. 
The patterns nonetheless suggest that the greatest identifiable shifts in patterns of 
identification is away from whiteness and specifically toward the black category. This, 
 140 
 
again, provides additional support for the political identity hypothesis: not only are the 
better educated more likely to challenge status quo compliance with racial hierarchies 
(through whitening), they are more likely to classify themselves in the stigmatized black 
category.  
 
Alternative Hypotheses: Evidence from Survey Experiments 
 The longitudinal analysis provides evidence in support of the political identity 
hypothesis. But, of course, this and the alternative hypotheses are not mutually 
exclusive. Individuals might exhibit similar behavior for different reasons, rendering 
these hypotheses observationally equivalent. The longitudinal analysis sought to 
remove the potential for the alternative hypotheses to confound the effects of education 
by analyzing individuals who gained access to education before the implementation of 
affirmative action and the shift in the state’s discourse. That strategy leaves open the 
possibility that alternative factors explain reclassification in later time periods.  
 This section assesses the two alternative hypotheses by drawing on original 
survey experiments conducted in July 2018 in São Paulo and Recife. The first, a priming 
experiment, is designed to simultaneously test the causal plausibility of both the 
instrumental and recognition hypotheses. The design seeks to take into account the 
entanglement of these two possibilities, seeing that the introduction of affirmative action 
policies and the historic shift in state discourse occurred simultaneously. Respondents 
are thus randomly assigned to primes to remind them of the change in state discourse 
and the availability of race-targeted benefits to assess the effect on racial identification. 
The second experiment provides an additional test of the instrumental hypothesis with 
a list experiment. While respondents may or may not feel compelled to alter their 
identifications in the context of an anonymous survey, they might still reveal that they 
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have in the past manipulated their identifications in pursuit of material benefits, 
provided a certain degree of anonymity.  
 
The Priming Experiment 
 The first experiment is designed to test the effects of two contextual factors on 
racial identification. The first is, of course, institutional change in the form of race-
targeted affirmative action policies (the instrumental hypothesis). The second is a 
symbolic change in the state’s posture toward the racial question, namely the move to 
formally and explicitly recognize the historical suffering of Afro-descendants in Brazil, 
and the perpetuation of racialized inequality and discrimination (the recognition 
    Instrumental Treatment 
    Control Treatment 
Recognition 
Treatment 
Control 
Control 
 
Now I am going to ask specifically 
about your color and racial 
identification. 
  
Benefits 
 
Now I am going to ask specifically 
about your color and racial 
identification. 
In recent years, the government 
began reserving slots for blacks 
and browns in public universities 
and the civil servant exam.  
Treatment 
Recognition 
 
Now I am going to ask specifically 
about your color and racial 
identification. 
In recent years, the government 
recognized the inequality and 
discrimination suffered by black 
and brown populations in 
history and present-day Brazil.  
Both 
 
Now I am going to ask specifically 
about your color and racial 
identification. 
In recent years, the government 
recognized the inequality and 
discrimination suffered by black 
and brown populations in history 
and present-day Brazil. 
Also, the government began 
reserving slots for blacks and 
browns in public universities 
and the civil servant exam. 
Table 5.7 Experimental Primes  
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hypothesis). In both cases, state-level shifts are hypothesized to affect racial 
identification.  
Whether each, or both, of these hypotheses is true, however, is difficult to 
discern observationally because the endorsement and implementation of affirmative 
action policies occurred simultaneous to the state’s unprecedented recognition of black 
suffering in Brazil. Moreover, these discursive and policy changes also coincide with 
the impressive expansion of educational access that, I argue, has also increased the 
likelihood of nonwhite identification. Thus while casual observation of the longitudinal 
patterns would suggest that one or both of these factors are responsible for the observed 
reclassification, such claims require further scrutiny and firmer empirical foundation. 
To test the causal validity of the instrumental and recognition hypotheses, as 
well as disentangle their effects from one another, I employ a survey-based priming 
experiment in which respondents are randomly primed about each of these watershed 
shifts in Brazilian politics prior to self-identifying in racial terms. The experiment is a 
2 x 2 factorial design, designed to prime respondents to think about both the recognition 
of the racial question by the state as well as the material benefits of affirmative action 
policies. Respondents assigned to receive the combined prime are informed of both 
changes, providing an additional test as to whether either of these factors matter in 
conjunction, rather than independently.  
The result is four experimental conditions, which are displayed in Table 5.7. 
Respondents in the control condition are simply told that the interview will turn toward 
Variable Control Recognition Benefits Both F-Stat P-value 
Income 0.86 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.36 0.78 
Age 4.08 4.02 4.04 4.01 0.09 0.97 
Female 0.52 0.57 0.47 0.51 1.54 0.20 
Recife 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.34 0.79 
Education 2.54 2.61 2.55 2.58 0.21 0.89 
Hair type 3.47 3.58 3.48 3.62 0.29 0.83 
Skin tone 1.84 1.79 1.76 1.81 0.40 0.75 
Ascribed race 1.84 1.80 1.76 1.83 0.56 0.64 
Table 5.8 Balance Tests across Experimental Conditions 
 143 
 
questions of racial identification. These respondents are then asked to self-identify in 
racial terms in an open-ended format, followed by the close-ended census question. 
Respondents in one of the three experimental conditions, however, are informed that 
the survey will turn toward questions of racial identification, but before being asked to 
self-identify, are read their assigned primes. In the “benefits” and “recognition” 
conditions, respondents are informed of affirmative action benefits for blacks and 
browns (pretos e pardos) in Brazil and the state-recognition of racial suffering, 
respectively. Respondents in the combined (“both”) condition receive both of these 
primes. This conjoint design will thus allow for testing of the causal validity of these 
two hypotheses, independently and together.  
Table 5.8 presents means for each of the independent variables and balance tests 
across experimental conditions. F-tests indicate that randomization was successful and 
that respondents are statistically balanced across treatment groups. Because the goal of 
the priming experiment is to test the effects of these primes of racial identification and 
link this to the observed patterns in the census data, these analyses use the respondent’s 
self-classification in the close-ended census categories as the dependent variable. 
Figure 5.5 Predicted Probabilities of Racial ID by Experimental Condition. Figure displays 90 
percent confidence intervals. 
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Respondents who self-classified as Asian or indigenous are removed from the sample 
in these analyses (43 observations). Respondents’ self-classifications as white, brown, 
or black are then dichotomized to allow simple comparisons across treatment groups.   
 Figure 5.5 displays predicted probabilities of self-classifying in each racial 
category across treatment conditions. Respondents are most likely to self-classify as 
brown (roughly 45 percent), followed by white (roughly 30 percent), and followed by 
black (20-25 percent. There is no significant variation in the likelihood will self-classify 
in any of the racial categories based on whether they were informed of the presence of 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 White ID White ID Brown ID Brown ID Black ID Black ID 
Recognition 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
       
Benefits -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
       
Both -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
       
Education  -0.02  0.02  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
       
Income  0.04*  -0.06*  0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
       
Age  0.03*  -0.02  -0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
       
Female  0.02  -0.05  0.03 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
       
Recife  -0.02  0.01  0.00 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
       
Skin tone  -0.32*  0.03  0.29* 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
       
Constant 0.31* 0.87* 0.44* 0.44* 0.24* -0.31* 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) 
Hair type FX N Y N Y N Y 
N 864 864 864 864 864 864 
R2 0.068 0.367 0.020 0.048 0.039 0.363 
Table 5.9 Regression-Adjusted Treatment Effects. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Treatment effects are estimated relative to the baseline control condition.  
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race-targeted affirmative action benefits, the shift in the state’s posture toward the racial 
question, or both. 
 Simple estimates of the differences-in-proportions across treatment groups does 
not yield evidence that material incentives or discursive changes alter individuals’ racial 
identification. To test the robustness of these null effects, I estimate regression-adjusted 
treatment effects to enhance precision and ensure that these null findings are not simply 
an artifact of statistical inefficiency. Table 5.9 present regression-adjusted estimates of 
treatment effects, each relative to the baseline control group. For each racial category, 
respondent classification is regressed on the treatment indicator variable, first in a 
univariate model then in a regression-adjusted model. These estimates show little 
change in the standard errors of the estimated treatment effects, suggesting that the null 
effects observed in Figure 5.5 are not due to statistical inefficiency. There is also little 
movement in the estimated magnitude of the treatment effects in the regression-adjusted 
models, and the effects remain statistically insignificant.  
Figure 5.6 Estimated Treatment Effects by Level of Education. Figure displays 90 percent 
confidence intervals. 
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 Another possibility is that estimating average treatment effects on the full 
sample obscure potentially significant effects for specific subgroups within the sample. 
Any heterogeneity that is apparent across levels of education would be relevant in this 
case, as affirmative action benefits in Brazil are most relevant for individuals of higher 
levels of education. Thus Figure 5.6 presents estimated differences in proportions for 
each racial category by level of education. By and large, the estimated effects are not 
statistically different from zero across treatment conditions and for each racial category. 
One exception is the effect of the benefits prime on black identification among the high-
school educated. This effect is estimated effect of 14 percentage points is sizable and 
statistically significant (p < .05). But this effect is negative, inconsistent with the 
instrumental hypothesis that material benefits ought to increase nonwhite identification. 
One experimental prime, the joint benefits and recognition prime among the least 
educated in the sample, is estimated to have a positive and significant (p < .05) effect of 
20 percentage points on black identification. This prime is also estimated to have a 
negative effect of 13 percentage points (p < .1) among those with primary education. In 
sum, while there is evidence of heterogeneity by level of education in the sample, the 
results are mixed and are not clearly consistent with either the instrumental or 
recognition hypotheses. 
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 A final potential source of heterogeneity that might be masked in the estimation 
of average treatment effects is in respondents’ skin tones. The instrumental hypothesis 
in particular suggests that at least some reclassifiers might alter their racial identification 
without meeting commonsense (phenotypical) understandings of blackness, even in a 
context of racial ambiguity such as Brazil. To test whether individuals of lighter skin 
tones—“afropportunists” in common Brazilian parlance—indicate racial manipulation, 
Figure 5.7 presents estimates of average treatment effects according to respondents’ 
skin tones, as measured by the survey interviewers. These estimates provide no evidence 
that survey respondents of any particular skin tone were likely to alter their racial 
identifications in response to survey primes. 
 In sum, the priming experiment conducted as part of this survey provides little 
evidence in support of either the instrumental or recognition hypotheses: neither 
informing respondents of either the material benefits newly available to Afro-
descendants nor of the state’s shifting posture toward the racial question had a 
Figure 5.7 Estimated Treatment Effects by Respondent Skin Tone. Figure displays 90 percent 
confidence intervals.  
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statistically discernible impact on respondents’ identifications consistent with the 
predictions of these hypotheses. These findings thus run counter to the idea that the 
patterns of racial reclassification in the census can be reduced simply to savvy 
opportunists, or to the diffuse effects of changing state discourse.  
 
The List Experiment 
 Even with the null results of the priming experiment there is reason to question 
whether such an approach is the best way to probe for evidence of strategic manipulation 
of racial identification. First, as with anonymous responses to census questionnaires, 
savvy opportunists who seek to take advantage of affirmative action policies are likely 
aware of the fact that their responses to a survey questionnaire are unlikely to yield any 
material benefits. With this in mind, respondents have little reason to engage in the kinds 
of strategic calculations that they might under other circumstances. Thus the null results 
of the priming experiment could be understood as a failure to replicate the conditions 
under which individuals are incentivized to manipulate their racial identifications. 
 To address this concern and to probe for additional evidence of instrumental 
behavior, I also analyze a list experiment in which survey respondents are provided with 
anonymity to reveal whether or not they have in the past manipulated their 
identifications in pursuit of material benefits. List experiments have become a common 
technique for eliciting honest responses regarding practices or attitudes that might be 
seen as socially undesirable, and that thus might lead individuals to conceal their true 
responses. While affirmative action policies remain controversial in Brazil, so-called 
Assignment Behaviors 
 I used a fake ID to get discounts or free items 
Control I used the internet to watch TV or movies 
 I tipped a civil servant to get something I needed 
  
Treatment I changed my declared color to qualify for a racial quota 
Table 5.10 List Experiment Design 
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“fraud” in the use of affirmative action has provoked criticism and outrage from folks 
of all political stripes (albeit for different reasons). Respondents who have in fact 
engaged in such manipulation may then respond dishonestly to direct questioning about 
the strategic use of affirmative action, leading to biased estimates of such behavior. 
 I employ a list of ethically questionable behaviors and instruct respondents to 
inform the interviewer not which behaviors that have done in the past, but rather how 
many. Treated respondents are randomly assigned to receive an additional list item, 
which is the sensitive behavior of interest. The list items are displayed in Table 5.10. 
The selection of these list items follows common practice in the literature on list 
experiment design. First, the non-sensitive items are on a topic similar to that of the 
sensitive item: engaging in ethically questionable behaviors to gain something of 
material value or in one’s own interest (Droitcour et al. 1991). Second, non-sensitive 
list items include both high- and low-prevalence items. Using the internet to watch TV 
or movies without paying, for example, is a common practice in Brazil, whereas 
engaging in direct bribes by tipping a civil servant is less common. Including high- and 
low-prevalence items reduces variance which avoids ceiling effects (which can 
  (A) (B)     
Variable Control Treatment (A) – (B) T-Statistic 
Income 0.80 0.83 0.02 0.41 
Age 4.07 4.01 -0.06 -0.61 
Female 0.52 0.52 0.00 0.03 
City 0.51 0.49 -0.02 -0.48 
Education 2.55 2.60 0.05 0.69 
Hair type 3.59 3.48 -0.12 -0.87 
Skin tone 1.77 1.83 0.06 1.20 
Racial identification 1.89 1.94 0.05 1.07 
Table 5.11 Covariate Balance Tests of Treatment and Control Groups 
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undermine the anonymity intentionally provided to the respondent) and improves 
statistical efficiency (Glynn 2013).38 
 Table 5.11 displays covariate balance tests across treatment conditions, showing 
that randomization was successful. I analyze the list experiment in various ways, 
including standard difference-in-means tests, regression-adjusted estimation of average 
treatment effects, and other multivariate statistical methods to analyze item counts and 
to exploit information provided by covariates to attempt to understand subgroup 
heterogeneity in the sample. Following Glynn (2013), Table D27 in the appendix shows 
the proportion of responses falling in each item count by control condition. There is 
some suggestion of possible design effects, whereby the presence of the sensitive item 
affects respondents’ responses to control items; but difference-in-proportions tests show 
no significant differences across treatment groups, and Blair and Imai’s (2012) 
likelihood-ratio test for design effects (Table D28) in their “list” statistical package fails 
to reject the null hypothesis of no design effect (Bonferroni-corrected p-value = 0.43).   
                                                 
38 The standard deviation among baseline respondents was 0.73. 
Figure 5.8 Comparison of Means of Item Counts by Treatment Group. Figure displays 90 percent 
confidence intervals. 
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 Figure 5.8 presents mean values of respondents’ reported item counts across 
treatment and control groups. The left panel shows mean values for the full sample of 
respondents, with a slight difference of -0.01 items in the treatment group (T-test p-
value = 0.76). The mean count for both groups is just above 0.5, which is rather low 
given the inclusion of a high-prevalence item. Indeed, roughly 59 percent of the sample 
reported having participated in zero activities on the list. Such a high rate of non-
participation raises concerns over prevalence of satisficing and/or non-response bias in 
the sample. Following Glynn (2013), I attempt to mitigate this bias in the sample by 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
At Least 1 At Least 1 At Least 1 
Treatment -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
       
Education  -0.01 -0.01  -0.05 -0.06 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) 
       
Age  -0.15* -0.14*  -0.02 -0.03 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) 
       
Female  -0.20* -0.21*  -0.12+ -0.13+ 
  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) 
       
Income  0.13* 0.10*  0.05 0.05 
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) 
       
Brown ID  0.09 0.08  0.06 0.06 
  (0.07) (0.07)  (0.09) (0.09) 
       
Black ID  0.02 0.03  0.05 0.09 
  (0.10) (0.10)  (0.13) (0.13) 
       
Skin tone  -0.05 -0.03  -0.02 0.01 
  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.07) 
       
Recife   -0.20*   -0.07 
   (0.05)   (0.08) 
       
Constant 0.54* 1.23* 1.24* 1.30* 1.50* 1.52* 
 (0.03) (0.13) (0.13) (0.04) (0.18) (0.18) 
Hair type FX N N Y N N Y 
N 950 857 857 389 354 354 
R2 0.000 0.126 0.148 0.000 0.021 0.039 
Table 5.12 Regression-Adjusted Estimated Treatment Effects. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors 
in parentheses. 
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restricting the analysis to those respondents who reported participation in at least one 
activity. The comparison of means in this subsample is displayed in the righthand panel. 
This analysis also reveals no difference in the estimated mean number of activities 
participated in across treatment groups. The estimated difference is 0.02 (T-test p-value 
= 0.70). Thus even accounting for potential satisficing and nonresponse bias, simple 
difference-of-means tests provide little evidence of this instrumental behavior.  
 Table 5.12 presents regression-adjusted estimates of treatment effects on both 
the full sample (Models 1-3) and removing responses of zero (Models 4-6). Adjusting 
for covariates adds little to no precision to the estimated treatment effects, which 
substantively remain close to zero. Appendix Table D30 also presents negative binomial 
estimates, which are more appropriate for analyzing item counts. These models estimate 
similar null effects.  
 The foregoing analyses focused on average treatment effects but do not consider 
heterogeneous treatment effects. As with the priming experiment, compelling evidence 
in favor of the instrumental hypothesis would be that individuals with higher levels of 
education respond affirmatively to the sensitive item. In the case of “fraud,” one would 
Figure 5.9 Estimated Treatment Effects by Level of Education. Figure displays 90 percent 
confidence intervals. 
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expect individuals of lighter skin tone to respond affirmative to the sensitive item. 
Appendix Tables D31 and D32 present full estimates of heterogeneous treatment effects 
by education and respondent skin tone. Figure 5.9 display average treatment effects by 
respondents’ level of education for both the full sample and removing potential 
satisficers. These estimates provide no evidence of participation in the sensitive activity 
at any level of education.  
 Figure 5.10 presents similar estimates according to respondent skin tone. As 
with education, there is no evidence that respondents of lighter—or any—skin tone 
reveal participation in the sensitive activity. Removing potential satisficers, there is 
some movement among those with medium skin tone, though this fails to reach even 
marginal levels of statistical significance. The estimates are computed from simple 
interactive models without covariate adjustment, however full models in Appendix 
Tables D31 and D32 further confirm these null results.  
 Finally, I also analyze responses to the sensitive item by taking Imai (2011) and 
Blair and Imai’s (2012) multivariate approach to list experiment analysis, estimating 
how the probability of answering affirmatively to the sensitive item varies according to 
Figure 5.10 Estimated Treatment Effects by Respondent Skin Tone. Figure displays 90 percent 
confidence intervals. 
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respondents’ characteristics, as well as leveraging covariate information to more 
efficiently estimate the proportion of respondents who respond affirmatively. Given the 
particular concern for “fraud” in the use of university quotas, I estimate these 
probabilities according to various levels of educational attainment and respondent skin 
tone.  
 Because estimates from these models are difficult to interpret, I focus on the 
substantive findings on these analyses, though Appendix Table D33 presents full 
estimates from four models: linear and nonlinear least squares models, and constrained 
and unconstrained maximum likelihood models. All models assess the relationships 
between the covariates and the sensitive item.  In only one model, the constrained 
maximum likelihood model, is the probability of affirmative response to the sensitive 
item estimated to vary significantly with covariates. This probability does not vary 
significantly according to gender, though this probability is estimated to diminish with 
respect to age and education. Darker skin tone is also negatively correlated with this 
probability, though this is only marginally significant and these estimates are not robust 
to alternative model specifications.  
 Figure 5.11 plots the predicted proportions of sample respondents who 
responded affirmatively that they have in the past manipulated their racial 
Figure 5.11 Estimated Proportions of Respondents Responding Affirmatively to Sensitive Item 
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identifications to use affirmative action benefits. Predictions from each model are 
presented alongside a simple difference-in-means estimate. Three of five specifications, 
the difference-in-means and two linear models, estimate that no respondents in the 
sample responded affirmatively to the sensitive item. The maximum likelihood models, 
however, estimate small, but statistically significant, proportions of the sample 
responded affirmatively, roughly 8 percent in the constrained model and 4 percent in 
the unconstrained model.  
Figure 5.11 estimates average proportions for the sample as a whole, which 
again may obscure conditionalities of affirmative response according to respondents’ 
characteristics. Figure 5.12 displays estimates of these proportions according to 
respondents’ levels of education. As with the sample averages, linear specifications 
estimate no significant proportion of the sample responded affirmative at any level 
education. Maximum likelihood models, however, do identify these responses and some 
variation by education. The constrained model in particular, finds sizable proportions of 
Figure 5.12 Estimated Proportions of Affirmative Responses by Level of Education  
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the lesser educated, 19 percent and 11 percent of those without and with primary 
education, respectively, reported having manipulated their racial identifications for the 
use of racial quotas, compared to 6 percent of the high school-educated and no 
significant proportion of the university-educated. By contrast, the unconstrained model 
estimates a slight positive relationship between education and affirmative response, 
though these estimates are significantly smaller, if statistically significant. This model 
estimates that roughly 5 percent of the university-educated responded affirmatively to 
the sensitive item, compared to 2 percent of those without primary education.  
 Figure 5.13 computes these estimates according to respondent skin tone. Again, 
linear models estimate no significant proportion of respondents responded 
affirmatively, regardless of skin tone. The constrained maximum likelihood model 
estimates that 13 percent of light-skinned respondents answered affirmatively, 
compared to 6 percent of medium-skinned respondents, and no significant proportion 
of dark-skinned respondents, responding affirmatively. The unconstrained model again 
Figure 5.13 Estimated Proportions of Affirmative Responses by Respondent Skin Tone 
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produces smaller estimates, estimating between 3 percent (of light-skinned) and 5 
percent (of dark-skinned) respondents responded affirmatively to the sensitive item. 
 The overall picture that emerges from analysis of the list experiment is unclear. 
There is evidence that respondents have, indeed, manipulated their racial identifications 
to take advantage of race-targeted affirmative action benefits. This evidence, however, 
is not robust to model specification, and simple difference-in-means calculations do not 
provide any such support. Moreover, the constrained maximum likelihood model 
provides evidence that lighter-skinned and better-educated respondents were most likely 
to respond affirmatively to the sensitive item; but this pattern is not borne out in any 
other specification. 
 Taken together, these two experiments appear to lend additional empirical 
support to the findings of Francis-Tan and Tannuri-Pianto (2012, 2013, 2015). While 
there is some discernible evidence that individuals will act strategically to manipulate 
their racial identifications, questions remain regarding the prevalence and longevity of 
such change in racial identifications. For greater insight into such patterns, we turn to a 
final analysis of the racial identifications of Brazilian university applicants.   
 
A Panel Analysis of University Applicants 
It may be the case that the presence of affirmative action policies has little impact 
on racial identification in contexts such as a survey (or, by extension, the census), where 
respondents’ anonymous responses are unlikely to result in any kind of material benefit. 
Yet the fluidity of racial boundaries in Brazil and the common reliance on self-
declaration as the standard mode of racial measurement make it possible for savvy 
opportunists who wish to take advantage of affirmative action policies to manipulate 
their racial identifications in the short-term. The lack of evidence uncovered in the 
survey experiments, however, raises questions about the longevity of such a shift in 
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one’s racial identification. If material incentives are indeed responsible for the patterns 
of reclassification apparent in the census, then opportunists must not only alter their 
identifications to use racial policies, but they must remain in a nonwhite category.  
To examine these dynamics empirically, I rely on an original panel dataset of 
university applicants constructed post hoc from three independent databases held by the 
Brazilian Ministry of Education (MEC) and the Anísio Teixeira National Institute of 
Educational Study and Research (INEP). Inep carries out two censuses of all students 
enrolled in accredited educational institutions (public and private), a school census 
comprising primary and secondary schools (censo escolar) and a university census 
(censo da educação superior). In addition, Inep administers the Enem, the public 
university entrance exam, and collects microdata on all individuals who register for the 
exam. These three sources of data collecting identifying information that allows 
individual students to be matched across databases.39 These three sources of data thus 
provide repeated observations of racial identifications at three key moments: first, when 
they are in high school, before they may see incentive in nonwhite identification; 
second, when they register for the university entrance exam, corresponding to the 
moment when nonwhite identification dis/qualifies one for race-targeted affirmative 
action; and third, after matriculating at university, after one no longer stands to gain 
from using racial quotas for university admission. 
These data are uniquely positioned to shed light on the dynamics of racial 
identification surrounding university admissions in this context. If patterns of 
reclassification are due to opportunistic behavior, then we ought to observe an increase 
in nonwhite identification at the time of the university entrance exam that does not 
recede at later points in time. If there is no such increase, or the increases prove 
                                                 
39 The construction of the panel dataset relied on access to students’ masked CPFs (cadastro pessoa 
física), as well as two additional identifiers assigned internally by Inep. For more information on data 
availability and gaining access to protected data, see “Serviço de Acesso a Dados Protegidos” (2018). 
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temporary, then instrumental motivations struggle to account for enduring change in 
racial identifications. 
 To gain empirical leverage on these questions, I conduct a difference-in-
difference analysis exploiting the implementation of the federal affirmative action law, 
passed in 2012 and implemented starting in 2013. Though state-level affirmative action 
laws (which apply only to universities administered by state governments) creating race- 
and means-targeted quotas in public university admissions began to be implemented in 
the early 2000s, the federal law was not passed until 2012 and implemented starting in 
2013. Thus the implementation of the federal law can be exploited to estimate the causal 
effect of material incentives on the likelihood of racial identification. 
 The sample is constrained in several ways to allow for valid comparisons and 
estimates. First, because this analysis exploits the federal law, only students enrolled at 
federal universities (i.e., those who might benefit) are analyzed. Second, because of the 
presence of state affirmative action laws, only students enrolled in universities located 
in states that did not already have race-targeted affirmative action laws prior to the 
federal law are analyzed (see Appendix Table D34). Third, to create similarly sized and 
comparable groups, this analysis focuses on students enrolling in the three years before 
the passage (2010-2012) and the first three years of implementation (2013-2015) of the 
federal law. And finally, the sample is restricted to those individuals that could be 
identified in each of the three databases. This means that the sample is comprised 
exclusively of individuals who not only applied to federal universities, but who were 
also admitted and chose to enroll. Given the highly competitive nature of university 
admissions in Brazil, this sample is surely to differ from the general population. But the 
motivation of this difference-in-difference analysis is to compute an internally valid 
estimate of the causal effect of affirmative action policies on racial identification.  
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  The resulting dataset contains 409,725 observations, comprised of 136,575 
individuals whose racial identifications were observed at each time period. Within each 
time period (high school, the exam, and university), individuals’ racial identifications 
were observed multiple times (in each year of high school, for example). For the sake 
of simplicity, these data were collapsed to create a balanced panel. Racial identifications 
were measured to generate liberal and conservative estimates of reclassifications: to 
compute a liberal estimate, individuals were coded as nonwhite (1) if they identified as 
black or brown at any point during each of the three time periods, and white if they 
identified consistently as white (0); to compute a conservative estimate, individuals 
were coded as white (0) if they identified as such at any point in the three time periods, 
and nonwhite (1) otherwise.  
 I estimate the effect of affirmative action policies on racial identification with a 
simple difference-in-difference regression framework of the form 
Yi,t = α + β ∙ Di + ζ ∙ Timet + δ ∙ Di · Timet + εi,t, 
where Di indicates the treatment of enrolling in university after the implementation of 
the federal law; where Time indicates the period of time in which the individuals’ racial 
identification was observed; and where δ, the coefficient of interest, estimates the 
difference in the over-time difference in the probability of nonwhite identification. I 
estimate the differences for the university exam and in university separately, and in both 
cases relative to the probability of nonwhite identification in high school. 
 Random and fixed-effects model estimates, along with full difference estimates, 
can be found in Appendix Tables D35 and D37.40 Substantive findings are presented in 
Figure 5.14, the left-hand panel of which shows the predicted probability of identifying 
as nonwhite at each time period and across treatment groups. First, there is a clear 
                                                 
40 There are no substantive differences across fixed and random-effects models, nor for estimates of the 
liberal or conservative codings of racial identification. Estimates in Figure 5.14 are computed from 
random effects models based on the conservative coding of racial identification. 
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increase in the probability of identifying as nonwhite at the time of the exam, relative to 
the probability in high school, as the instrumental hypothesis predicts. This is the case 
for both treatment and control groups, suggesting that the implementation of the federal 
affirmative action law, specifically, may not have had a considerable impact on the 
identifications of applicants residing in non-affirmative action states. This is perhaps 
due to the broader or more diffuse effects of prior affirmative action policies, which 
may have incentivized students residing in non-affirmative action states who might 
leave their home states for university. Second, there is a considerable decline in the 
probability of nonwhite identification after the period of the university exam. Indeed, it 
appears that a large majority of those individuals who reclassified at the time of the 
exam reverted back to white identification at university, that is, once nonwhite 
identification no longer served the objective of gaining admission. Again, this is the 
case both before and after the implementation of the federal law, with a potentially 
steeper  decline before the federal law. 
Figure 5.14 Predicted Probabilities and Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effect of Affirmative 
Action Policies on Racial Identification. The left-hand plot shows predicted probabilities of nonwhite 
identification in each time period across treatment groups. The right-hand panel plots the difference-in-
difference estimates at the time of the university exam and in university.  
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 The right-hand panel plots the difference-in-difference estimates. This analysis 
estimates that the federal law had a negative effect of roughly 5 percentage points. It is 
clear from the left-hand panel, nonetheless, that there is a sizable increase in this 
probability prior to admissions, but there is not evidence that this law has further 
incentivized nonwhite identification in this way. On the other hand, for those enrolling 
after the implementation of the federal law, the analysis estimates a positive effect of 
roughly 3 percentage points on the probability of nonwhite identification at some point 
during university. Thus insofar as there is evidence to suggest that the federal 
affirmative action law has led to an increase in nonwhite identification, this appears to 
occur after one stands to gain materially from such identification.  
 Of course, the results from this analysis must be taken with a grain of salt seeing 
as the presence of prior state-level affirmative action laws makes it difficult to find a 
fully isolated control group for comparison. Limitations on the availability of data rule 
out any possibility of assessing the impact of the first affirmative policies in the early 
2000s with these data. But this analysis is minimally sufficient for lending face validity 
to the instrumental hypothesis. Indeed, just as Francis-Tan and Tannuri-Pianto found at 
the University of Brasília (2012, 2013; 2015), university applicants more broadly do 
manipulate their identifications prior to university admissions. But these forms of racial 
reclassification reflect the short-term strategies of savvy opportunists, who quickly 
revert in their identifications in pursuit of the benefits of whiteness. In sum, then, there 
is evidence that the instrumental hypothesis might explain some of the observed 
reclassification, but it leaves much to explain and struggles to account for enduring 
identity change. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has subjected the political identity and alternative hypotheses to 
empirical testing. The longitudinal analysis of birth cohorts provided strong support for 
the hypothesis that better educated Brazilians are most likely to reclassify toward 
blackness, in particular those occupying lower rungs of the class structure. By contrast, 
survey experimental evidence provided little to no support for the alternative hypotheses 
that such trends of reclassification were motivated by material incentives in the form of 
affirmative action policies, or by the symbolic shift in the state’s posture toward the 
racial question. Finally, panel evidence struggles to account for enduring identity 
change. 
There is no denying, of course, the broader significance of these institutional and 
discursive changes in the Brazilian state, brought about in no small part by the militancy 
and tireless efforts of black movement activists. Yet while it was clear that these efforts 
have affected the behavior state elites, the impact of these shifts on the racial 
identifications and commonsense of everyday citizens had yet to be subject to 
systematic empirical test. These findings, then, raise questions regarding the extent to 
which the state’s racial posture directly shapes individuals’ racial identifications, and 
how readily everyday citizens will adhere to the understandings of race espoused by the 
state. As Robin Sheriff (2001) found in her ethnography of a Rio de Janeiro favela, on 
the ground individuals’ racial worldviews can differ strikingly from the state’s master 
narrative, at that time defined by the myth of racial democracy. Yet Sheriff’s point may 
well stand regardless of whether scholars agree with, or see as normatively preferable, 
the state’s newly adopted posture of racial recognition and inclusion. 
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that the longitudinal analysis sought, to an extent, 
to decontextualize the patterns of racial reclassification in order to isolate and test the 
effect of greater educational attainment. But this analysis nonetheless makes clear how 
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the unprecedented access to high school and university education for Brazil’s lower 
classes can have induced this sudden reversal in microlevel patterns of reclassification 
and, by extension, the macro-level shift in Brazil’s racial composition. As the decades 
of the 1990s and 2000s introduced a number of major institutional reforms to Brazil’s 
constitution, its franchise, and the accessibility of educational and other social benefits, 
lower-class citizens, those most likely to reclassify with greater educational attainment, 
gained unprecedented access to secondary and university education. Assuming and 
articulating these racial identities as political identities is one way, I argue, in which 
these newly conscious citizens exercise voice, that is, their civil and political citizenship 
rights. In the following chapter, we turn to the consequences of these newly formed 
political identities in shaping the exercise of citizenship and political engagement. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONSCIOUS CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 
 
Previous chapters of this dissertation established educational expansion as the driving 
force of recent patterns of reclassification toward blackness, and explored the 
mechanisms through which education impacts political consciousness and 
reclassification. This final empirical chapter draws on original survey data designed to 
tap into these racialized political identities in order to test the relationship between 
political consciousness, racial identification, and reclassification, as well as to explore 
the consequences of these political identities for political engagement. These original 
microlevel data enable several systematic and empirical tests of propositions suggested 
or alluded to in earlier chapters, but for which second-hand data did not allow direct 
testing. This final chapter, then, aims to establish more systematically and precisely the 
consequences of this political identity formation for patterns of racial identification in 
Brazil, as well as its consequences for political engagement and the exercise of 
citizenship. 
 
Measuring Political Identity 
 Central to the conceptualization of political identity elaborated in Chapter 2 is 
heterogeneity among members of a social category, in particular in the extent to which 
this social membership shapes their understandings of power relationships between 
racial “groups.” Central to this analysis is the conceptual distinction between political 
identity and identification: whereas an individual may identify with a group (or classify 
oneself in a category) out of some awareness of membership, political identity refers to 
an affirmed attachment to a social group that shapes one’s understanding of power. 
Because individuals vary in the extent to which any one social membership constitutes 
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a political identity, more individuals will consider themselves members of a given racial 
category than there are category members with a political identity rooted in that 
membership. Thus while it may seem obvious that identifications reflect political 
identities, the goal of this analysis is to test empirically and systematically the extent to 
which nonwhite, and in particular black, identification reflects individuals’ racialized 
political attitudes and worldviews. 
To tap into this variation empirically, I employed a battery of survey items 
designed to probe respondents’ beliefs about the degree to which members of their racial 
group suffer from various asymmetries of power between groups. These survey items 
were developed first and foremost from insights gleaned from the qualitative interviews 
presented in the Chapter 4. The survey items were designed to include classic questions 
regarding group consciousness, like Dawson’s (1995) linked-fate survey item (Item 5), 
and social identity (Item 4), as well as more specific views regarding the fair distribution 
of opportunities and resources, the prevalence of racism in Brazilian society, as well as 
the personal importance respondents place in their own race (or color). This battery was 
pre-tested on a convenience sample of university students at the Federal University of 
Pernambuco in Recife in June 2017. More information on the survey itself is provided 
in Appendix E. 
Table 6.1 below presents the battery of ten questions revolving around the key 
issues that interviewees cited as legitimating their racial consciousness. Respondents 
were read each of the statements in the battery, and asked to describe their level of 
agreement with each statement using a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly agree 
to strongly disagree. These survey items were pre-tested in using both quantitative and 
qualitative interviews to ensure that even individuals who did not exhibit high levels of 
political consciousness would understand the content of each survey item, and could 
confidently respond affirmatively or not.  
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 Because many Brazilians often discuss race and employ racial terminology in 
terms of “color” rather than “race,” I conformed to this usage in the wording of these 
survey items. This is done primarily to ensure that individuals with low levels of 
racialized political identity, for whom the word “race” might not make sense, could 
respond without confusion. On the other hand, for individuals with high levels of 
political identity, speaking in terms of “color” will probably be equally likely to cue and 
carry the same meaning as the word “race,” even if they take objection to avoidance of 
the word “race.” Finally, these items were also worded in such a way that the measure 
of political identity could apply to all respondents, regardless of skin tone or any 
particular racial identification. 
 Respondents’ responses to these ten items were averaged to create a continuous 
summary measure of “political identity,” which ranges from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates 
strong disagreement and 5 strong agreement with the survey items on average.41 Figure 
6.1 presents a histogram of political identity in the sample, showing a relatively normal 
distribution around a mean of 3.02. In the analyses that follow, I will employ this 
measure of political identity as an independent variable to assess whether within-group 
variation in political consciousness systematically explains patterns of racial 
                                                 
41 Responses to Item 3 were flipped, since disagreement indicates greater belief in disadvantage by 
power asymmetry. 
Num. Survey Item 
1 I think that my color is an important part of who I am. 
2 I think that my color affects my opportunities to get a good job. 
3 I think that people with my color have the same opportunities in life as people of another 
color. 
4 I feel more comfortable [when I am] with people of my color. 
5 To the extent things get better for people of my color in general, I think that things will get 
better for me. 
6 I think that people should be more aware of their color. 
7 My color influences my political opinions. 
8 I think that Brazilians should take color into account when they organize politically. (For 
example, social movements, political parties, etc.) 
9 I think that racism is a serious problem in Brazilian society. 
10 In my life, I have suffered racism because of my color. 
Table 6.1 Survey Items for Political Identity Index 
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identification, and whether this consciousness carries broader consequences for political 
engagement.  
 
Political Identity and Racial Identification 
 In Chapter 2, I elaborated the theoretical expectation that reclassification toward 
blackness, and black identification in particular, are functions of racialized political 
identity – that is, a racialized understanding of power relationships between groups42 
that is shaped by “race.” The implication of the hypothesis is simple: individuals that 
exhibit high levels of political identity ought be more likely to assume nonwhite, and 
particularly black, identities, above and beyond the physical attributes commonly 
believed to determine one’s racial identification. This reflects the idea that self-
classification in the stigmatized black category, in particular, is an articulation of the 
individual’s race-based understanding of power. The political identity index is central 
to the direct and empirical testing of this proposition. But in keeping with the racial 
measurement employed by Telles (2014) and colleagues, the survey collected several 
                                                 
42 The “groups” and group boundaries are left unspecified, allowing this to be interpreted by survey 
respondents. 
Figure 6.1 Distribution of Racialized Political Identity among Respondents 
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different forms of racial identification and classification, including respondents’ self-
identifications and interviewer-based classifications of the respondent, and collected 
less ambiguous measures of physical attributes (based on the interviewer’s evaluation): 
the respondents’ hair type, which is known to affect racial identification; and skin tone, 
based on the 11-point color palette employed in the PERLA survey. This 
multidimensional approach to measuring race not only allows for richer analyses, but 
will also help to separate the effects of political identity, per se, by controlling for 
physical attributes commonly believed to determine one’s racial category of 
membership, even though phenotype is not the sole determinant of racial identification. 
Additionally, employing multiple measures of physical attributes also allow for 
additional tests of the instrumental hypothesis by providing some indication of whose 
identifications have been in flux in these recent period, that is, what reclassifiers “look 
like” in this random sample. Are lighter-skinned Brazilians the most likely to opt for 
darker categories, in the presence of affirmative action benefits? Or are medium- and 
darker-skinned Brazilians, the traditional candidates for “whitening,” the most affected? 
The analyses that follow further dispel the notion that recent tendencies toward 
blackness are simply the products of “fraudulent” or opportunistic behavior on the part 
of lighter-skinned Brazilians, as journalistic accounts and critics might lead one to 
believe. 
I proceed through these analyses in three stages. First, I analyze binary racial 
identification, distinguishing between white and nonwhite classification in the official 
census categories. Second, I analyze trichotomous racial identification in white, brown, 
or black categories, including the close-ended census categories and open-ended racial 
identifications. Finally, I systematically analyze mismatch in respondents’ self-
classifications and how they were classified by survey interviewers, and self-reported 
reclassification. While the analyses presented here are similar to those that have  
 170 
 
appeared in previous sociological scholarship,43 this analysis is the first to include a 
direct and multidimensional measure of political identity, allowing the study to move 
beyond estimating purely socioeconomic correlates, and to center political worldviews  
as determinants of racial identification in Brazil and Latin America. 
 
                                                 
43 E.g., (Bailey 2009; Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz 2013; Bailey and Telles 2006; Harris et al. 1993; 
Loveman, Muniz, and Bailey 2012; Mitchell-Walthour 2018; Mitchell-Walthour and Darity 2014; N. do 
V. Silva 1994; E. E. Telles 2004, 2014; E. E. Telles and Lim 1998; E. E. Telles and Paschel 2014). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Education -0.10 0.18* 0.19* 0.19+ 0.19+ 0.18+ 0.21+ 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
        
Skin Tone  2.68* 2.42* 2.44* 2.44* 2.45* 2.43* 
  (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) 
        
Income    -0.27* -0.27* -0.25+ -0.27+ 
    (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
        
Age    -0.19* -0.19* -0.19* -0.27* 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
        
Female    -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.27 
    (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) 
        
Recife     0.01 0.05 0.13 
     (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) 
        
PT/Lula      0.10  
Partisan      (0.48)  
        
Other      -0.11  
Partisan      (0.63)  
        
Ideological       -0.22* 
Conservatism       (0.11) 
        
Constant 1.05* -3.83* -3.86* -2.79* -2.79* -2.83* -2.60* 
 (0.18) (0.38) (0.38) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) (0.59) 
Hair type FX N N Y Y Y Y Y 
N 942 942 942 864 864 857 679 
AIC 1171.12 790.52 780.65 709.52 711.52 705.62 560.74 
Table 6.2 Effects of Education on Nonwhite Identification. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in 
parentheses. DV = 1 (nonwhite) or 0 (white). Skin tone = light (1), medium (2), and dark (3). PT and 
Other Partisans are estimated relative to the baseline category of nonpartisans (the overwhelming 
majority of the sample). Ideological conservatism captures self-placement on a 5-point scale ranging 
from -2 (far left) to 2 (far right). 
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The White-Nonwhite Divide 
 The Brazilian context is known for the complexity of racial identification 
beyond the white/nonwhite divide. Nonetheless, analyzing nonwhite identification in 
dichotomous terms helps to establish the link between political identity and the growing 
tendency to identify as nonwhite that is apparent in the census data. Table 6.2 presents 
logistic regression models estimating identification in either black or brown census 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education x      0.35* 
Pol. Ident.      (0.17) 
       
Pol. Ident. 1.29* 1.30* 0.50* 0.52* 0.50* -0.43 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) (0.22) (0.47) 
       
Education  0.02 0.21* 0.21* 0.25* -0.81 
  (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.49) 
       
Skin Tone   2.33* 2.34* 2.32* 2.35* 
   (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) 
       
Income   -0.24+ -0.21 -0.24+ -0.23+ 
   (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) 
       
Age   -0.20* -0.20* -0.29* -0.20* 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
       
Female   -0.09 -0.08 -0.28 -0.10 
   (0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) 
       
Recife   -0.04 0.00 0.09 -0.00 
   (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) (0.21) 
       
PT/Lula    0.03   
Partisan    (0.49)   
       
Other    -0.22   
Partisan    (0.62)   
       
Ideological     -0.19+  
Conservatism     (0.11)  
       
Constant -2.98* -3.08* -4.09* -4.21* -3.91* -1.42 
 (0.41) (0.50) (0.75) (0.77) (0.86) (1.44) 
Hair Type FX N N Y Y Y Y 
N 925.00 925.00 851.00 844.00 672.00 851.00 
AIC 1047.82 1049.70 698.26 691.86 552.30 695.78 
Table 6.3 Effects of Political Identity on Nonwhite Identification. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard 
errors in parentheses. DV = 1 (black or brown) or 0 (white). 
 172 
 
categories, relative to white identification, first focusing on the effects of education. 
 Model 1 is a bivariate analysis estimating the average effect of education on 
nonwhite ID. The effect is estimated to be negative on average, reflecting racial 
inequalities in education, but it is not statistically significant. Model 2 includes a control 
for skin tone, which correlates strongly with nonwhite ID. Once we control for skin 
tone, education becomes a positive and significant correlate of nonwhite ID. Models 3 
to 5 additively include controls for hair type, income, age, gender, and survey-city. 
Education remains a positive correlate of nonwhite ID and the effect falls just shy of 
conventional significance (p = .054). This remains the case in models 6 and 7, which 
add controls for partisanship and political ideology, suggesting that education affects  
racial identification independent of other political attachments or ideational factors that 
might affect one’s political consciousness. 
 Table 6.3 repeats this analysis and includes the continuous measure of political 
identity. Bivariate analysis in Model 1 shows that political identity correlates with 
nonwhite ID, and Model 2 shows this correlation is robust to a control for education. 
Model 3 includes controls for skin tone, hair texture, and other covariates. The size of 
the estimated effect of political identity decreases substantially once these controls are 
added, though the effect remains significant, and is twice the size of the average effect 
of education. Partisanship does not correlate with nonwhite ID (Model 4), though 
ideological conservatism is negatively correlated (model 5). 
 Model 5 estimates on average that a one-unit increase in political identity is 
associated with a 6 percentage point increase in the probability of nonwhite ID (p < .05). 
Model 6 tests for any conditional effects of political identity by level of education by 
interacting the two variables. The interaction term is statistically significant and 
positive. Figure 6.2 plots the conditional effects, showing the average marginal effect 
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of a one-unit increase in political identity at each level of education. The model reveals 
a monotonic interaction: the effect of political identity increases as education increases. 
But increases in political identity are statistically distinguishable from 0 only among the 
high school and university-educated, by 7 and 11 percentage points, respectively (see 
Appendix Table E3 for difference tests). Analysis of respondents’ identifications as 
either white or nonwhite, therefore, reveals a significant correlation between greater 
political identity and nonwhite identification, in particular among the highly educated. 
White, Brown, and Black Identification 
  To gain a finer-grained understanding of how education and political identity 
shape racial identification in each of the three major census categories, I also estimate 
the effects of education and political identity on self-classification in each of the three 
census categories using multinomial logistic regression. Full estimates from these 
models can be found in Appendix Table E4. Substantive findings from this analysis are 
presented in Figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.2 Average Marginal Effect of Political Identity on Pr(Nonwhite ID) by Level of 
Education. Figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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These models bear out a similar trend. Relative to brown identification and once 
controlling to skin tone, better educated Brazilians are significantly less likely to self-
identify as white, though they are not necessarily more likely to self-identify as black. 
Political identity, however, is significantly correlated with both white and black 
identification: individuals with greater levels of political identity are significantly less 
likely to self-classify as white, and significantly more likely to self-classify as black, 
even controlling for skin tone, hair type, education, income, age, gender, and survey-
city (model 4). On average, a one-unit increase in political identity decreases the 
probability of white identification by 6 percentage points (p < .01) and increases the 
probability of black identification by 8 percentage points (p < .001), with a statistically 
insignificant negative effect of 2 percentage points on brown identification. 
Figure 6.3 Average Marginal Effect of Political Identity on Pr(Racial ID) by Level of Education. 
Figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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 I similarly test for conditional effects by interacting political identity with 
education (model 5), as well as skin tone (model 6). The conditional effects of political 
identity vary significantly with education. Estimated marginal effects from this Model 
5 are presented in Figure 6.3, which shows the average effect of a one-unit increase of 
political identity on the probability of identification with each category by level of 
education. The figure reveals that the effect of political identity on white identification 
decreases significantly as education increases. Racially and politically conscious 
Brazilians with high school or university educations are significantly less likely to 
identify as white, even controlling for physical attributes. Political identity appears to 
have no discernible effect on brown identification, though there is suggestion of an 
increase in the effect of political identity with greater education. Finally, there is no 
conditional effect of political identity on black identification: at all education levels, 
individuals with greater levels of racialized political consciousness are significantly 
more likely to self-identify as black (see Appendix Table E5 for difference tests). 
 One lingering question is whether individuals affected are those that might meet 
conventional understandings of blackness, or if those whose racial identifications are in 
Figure 6.4 Average Marginal Effect of Political Identity on Pr(Racial ID) by Respondent Skin 
Tone. Figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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flux are instead lighter-skinned respondents who might be strategically manipulating 
their identifications. Thus model 6 interacts political identity with skin tone to test for 
heterogeneity that might suggest instrumental manipulations on the part of lighter-
skinned respondents. The interaction between political identity and skin tone itself is 
not significant in model 6, though the marginal effects reveal some heterogeneity. 
Figure 3 plots the estimated marginal effect of political identity by respondent skin tone. 
Inconsistent with this hypothesis, however, is that there is no discernible effect among 
lighter-skinned respondents on the probability of identification. Indeed, the estimated 
effect on black identification is precise, and estimated to be zero. On the other hand, 
respondents of medium skin tone are less likely to identity as white, no more or less 
likely to identify as brown, and more likely to identify as black. Dark-skinned 
respondents are less likely to identify as brown, and more likely to identify as black. 
Thus to the extent that there is heterogeneity in these effect by skin tone, light-skinned 
respondents show little to no fluctuation in their racial identifications; political identity 
leads medium-toned respondents (the racially ambiguous) to resist white identification, 
and encourages black identification; and dark-skinned respondents are less likely to 
identify as brown, and more likely to identify as black.  
 
Open-Ended Identification 
 Analysis of open-ended racial identifications offers a final robustness check. A 
common critique of analyses of racial identifications is that everyday forms of racial 
identification depart from the terminology employed on the census, and thus does not 
accurately capture individuals’ sincere self-understandings (Harris et al. 1993; E. E. 
Telles 2004). Thus I code and analyze respondents’ open-ended racial identifications. 
Before self-classifying in the official census categories, respondents were asked: “In 
regard to your color or race, how do you identify?”  Appendix Table E6 displays the 
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full list of responses, as well as how they were recoded for quantitative analysis. In sum, 
responses were recoded into three categories: 1) a category for respondents who 
responded “white” or with a similar euphemism (light, blond, etc.); 2) a category for 
mixed-race or brown, or with similar euphemisms (moreno, etc.); 3) and finally, a 
category for individuals who identify explicitly—and exclusively—as either negro or 
preto, both of which are associated with racial consciousness and depart from the 
euphemisms commonly employed among individuals who might otherwise avoid black 
identification. 
 Complete estimates from the multinomial logit analyses are presented in 
Appendix Table E7. In sum, these models corroborate the findings from analyses of the 
census categories. Education inconsistently predicts racial identification, but is 
estimated to have a negative effect on white identification and a positive effect on black 
identification. Political identity, by contrast, is consistently and significantly correlated 
with open-ended black identification. In a model with all controls, a one-unit increase 
in political identity is estimated to decrease identification with a white euphemism by 5 
percentage points (p < .05); has no discernible effect of identification with mixed-race 
euphemisms; and increases identification as black by 9 percentage points (p < .001).  
Figure 6.5 Average Marginal Effects of Political Identity on Pr(Identification) by Level of 
Education. Figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals.  
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 Figure 4 presents average marginal effects of political identity by level of 
education, computed from a model interacting political identity and education, 
including all controls. These results bear out the same pattern: political identity is 
estimated to decrease white identification among the higher educated, has no discernible 
effect on brown identification, and increase the probability of black identification 
regardless of education level.  
 Analysis of respondents’ racial identifications relying on this original 
operationalization of political identity thus paints a clear picture of how political identity 
shapes racial identifications. Individuals who indicate high level of a racialized political 
consciousness are significantly more likely to claim black identities. Once we control 
for physical attributes, it becomes clear that better educated respondents, in particular, 
demonstrate a clear tendency to resist whitening and identify in darker racial categories.  
 
Classification Mismatch 
 Political identity informs not only self-classification, but also sheds light on the 
mismatch in individuals’ classifications when they classify themselves, compared to 
how they are classified by survey interviewers. Systematic analysis of category 
mismatch thus provides an additional opportunity to understand the political nature of 
racial identifications as well as the nature of the flux in those identifications in Brazil. 
In Chapter 2, I presented a cross-tabulation of these classifications to emphasize 
the tendency for Brazilians to self-whiten. Table 6.4 above presents the same cross-
tabulation computed from these survey data. Unlike the previous cross-tabulation, 
which showed an unmistakable tendency to self-whiten, the mismatch in racial 
classifications is more balanced in this case, for two reasons. First, these data were 
collected roughly sixteen years after the earlier survey data, and thus in a context in 
which significant reclassification toward blackness had already occurred. Second, the 
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Political Identity Survey was designed to test hypotheses related to reclassification and 
political identity formation, and thus oversampled darker-skinned Brazilians with 
higher levels of education. The result is a picture of category mismatch that is more 
useful for systematically analyzing patterns of classification, rather than for 
generalizing, in a strict sense, to the overall Brazilian population. 
I analyze category mismatch by coding respondents according to whether they 
self classify in a category lighter than that ascribed to them (1), in the same category 
ascribed to them (2), or in a darker category than that ascribed to them (3). With 
reference to Table 6.4, individuals located in cells below the diagonal are coded as 
“lighter;” individuals in cells on the diagonal are coded as “matched;” and individuals 
in cells above the diagonal are coded as “darker.” Roughly 10 percent of respondents in 
this sample self-whitened, 69 percent matched, and nearly 21 percent self-darkened. I 
analyze these patterns using multinomial logistic regression. In these analyses, the 
measures of respondent skin tone control for potential floor and ceiling effects in the 
likelihood of mismatch.  
Full model estimates can be found in Appendix Table E8. Figure 6 presents 
predicted probabilities of each outcome by level of political identity. Clear in these 
analyses is the association between political identity and the tendency to opt for darker 
racial categories. Moving from the lowest to the highest position of political identity 
decreases the probability of opting for a lighter category by 24 percentage points, from 
27 percent to 3 percent (p < .01). The same increase in political identity increases the 
  Respondents’ Self-Classifications  
  White Brown Black Total 
Respondents as White 26.23 12.79 1.07 40.09 
Classified by Brown 4.80 28.46 6.93 40.19 
Interviewer Black 0.21 4.90 14.61 19.72 
 Total 31.24 46.16 22.60 100% 
Table 6.4 Comparing Self-Classifications to Ascribed Classifications 
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probability of opting for a darker category by 34 percentage points (p < .001), from 8 
percent to 42 percent. The association between political identity and category match is 
less clear. Imprecise estimates and high and low levels make it difficult to discern a 
clear trend. There is some suggestion that the likelihood of category mismatch is 
negatively correlated with political identity, though this is not statistically significant. 
Nonetheless, this analysis sheds light on patterns of reclassification by providing 
systematic evidence that racialized political identity can lead individuals to not only 
avoid opting for lighter identification, but to lead one to opt for darker identification – 
a practice that suggests that such behavior underlies the apparent and growing tendency 
to reclassify toward blackness in the census. 
 
Reclassification 
 Finally, I conclude the analysis of racial identification by considering the effects 
of political identity on self-reported racial reclassification. Of course, this measure of 
reclassification is imperfect, as it relies on individuals to be aware of changes in their 
racial identifications and to reveal any decision to change how they identify in racial 
terms. This is not always reliably the case: many individuals, for example, are unsure 
Figure 6.6 Predicted Probability of (Mis)Match in Classification by Level of Political Identity. 
 181 
 
how they are classified on their birth certificates, or how they were classified as children 
by their parents. This self-reporting, however, can be seen as a conservative measure of 
reclassification, one that provides an additional opportunity to test the effects of 
education and political consciousness on shifting patterns of racial identification. 
Analysis of reported reclassification also provides additional opportunities to probe for 
evidence of strategic manipulation of racial identification, as well as if and how usage 
of recently implemented educational programs has effected individuals’ identifications. 
 To capture reclassification, respondents were first asked for their racial 
identifications using an open-ended question and a close-ended census question. 
Following the close-ended census question, respondents were then asked: “Have you 
always classified yourself in this category, or did you previously classify yourself in 
another?” Respondents who reported always classifying themselves in the same 
category—stable identifiers—were coded 0, and those who reported previously 
classifying in a different category were coded 1. Roughly 13 percent of respondents 
reported themselves to be reclassifiers. 
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 Table 6.5 presents estimates from logit models of reclassification. Political 
identity is a robust and positive correlate of reclassification, including in a bivariate 
regression (model 1), as well as after controlling for education and skin tone (model 3), 
and other basic controls (model 4). Education is also a robust and positive correlate of 
reclassification (models 2-4). Models 5 and 6 include controls for partisanship and 
political ideology, respectively, neither of which correlates significantly with 
reclassification. Average marginal effects computed from model 4 estimate that a one-
unit increase in political identity increases the probability of reclassification by 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pol. Ident. 0.40*  0.50* 0.42* 0.41* 0.39+ 
 (0.16)  (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) 
       
Education  0.23* 0.29* 0.32* 0.31* 0.35* 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
       
Skin tone   0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 
   (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) 
       
Income    0.07 0.09 0.04 
    (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
       
Age    0.05 0.05 0.06 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
       
Female    -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 
    (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) 
       
Recife    0.10 0.10 0.18 
    (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) 
       
PT/Lula     0.43  
Partisan     (0.41)  
       
Other     0.15  
Partisan     (0.67)  
       
Ideology      -0.01 
      (0.12) 
       
Constant -3.14* -2.54* -4.27* -4.61* -4.53* -4.49* 
 (0.52) (0.26) (0.64) (0.79) (0.79) (0.88) 
Hair type FX N N Y Y Y Y 
N 966 983 966 885 877 695 
AIC 742.21 753.45 735.78 675.40 676.09 552.95 
Table 6.5 Effects of Political Identity on Reclassification. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  
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percentage points (p < .05). Moving from the lowest to highest levels of political identity 
increases this probability from 6 to 24 percent. Similarly, a one-unit increase in 
education increases this probability by 3 percentage points (p < .01), and moving from 
less than primary education to university education increases the probability from 8 to 
18 percent. 
 Table 6.6 presents estimates of the association between social program usage—
namely, of recently created educational policies designed to expand access to university 
education—and the likelihood of reclassification. Program usage was captured through 
self-reporting, asking respondents whether or not they had ever received, used, or taken 
part in any of the following programs: the civil servant exam for public sector jobs 
(concurso público), a private university entrance exam (vestibular), the public 
university entrance exam (Enem), federally funded financial aid to attend a private 
university (Fies), or the federally funded scholarship program for private university 
tuition (ProUni). Models 1 through 5 add one of these at a time to estimate the 
association between program usage and reclassification. Usage of the three public 
educational policies correlate positively and significant with reclassification. The civil 
servant exam, which at times includes racial quotas, and the private university entrance 
exam, do not correlate with reclassification. Model 6 estimates the usage of at least 1 of 
these programs on reclassification. This is positively correlated and statistically 
significant. Usage of at least one educational program is estimated to increase the 
probability of reclassification by 8 percentage points (p < .05), from 9 to 17 percent. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Political Identity 0.43* 0.42* 0.41* 0.43* 0.38+ 0.42* 0.42* 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
        
Education 0.27* 0.26* 0.25* 0.26* 0.27* 0.14 0.15 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
        
Skin tone 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.24 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.24) 
        
Income 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.04 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
        
Age 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
        
Female -0.13 -0.10 -0.13 -0.14 -0.10 -0.13 -0.13 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) 
        
Recife 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
        
Civil Servant 0.37       
Exam (0.24)       
        
Vestibular  0.33      
(Private Exam)   (0.28)      
        
Enem   0.48*     
(Public Exam)   (0.24)     
        
Fies    0.91*    
(Financial Aid)    (0.39)    
        
ProUni     0.81*   
(Scholarship)     (0.37)   
        
Program usage      0.75* -0.21 
(at least 1)      (0.26) (0.59) 
        
Program usage x       0.51+ 
skin tone       (0.29) 
        
Constant -4.54* -4.53* -4.66* -4.51* -4.44* -4.59* -4.02* 
 (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) (0.84) 
Hairy Type FX Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 885 885 885 881 882 885 885 
AIC 675.19 675.98 673.57 668.79 672.39 668.82 667.66 
Table 6.6 Effects of Educational Program Usage on Reclassification. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard 
errors in parentheses 
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 Because it is through these social programs that many affirmative action policies 
are implemented, model 7 interacts program usage with skin tone to test for 
heterogeneity in the effects of usage on reclassification. If “fraud” were indeed the cause 
of reclassification, then finding that lighter-skinned respondents are most likely to 
reclassify would provide suggestive evidence for this hypothesis. Model 7 estimates a 
positive and marginally significant interaction between program usage and darker skin 
tone. Figure 6.7 plots the average marginal effect of using at least 1 program according 
to respondent skin tone. The model estimates no discernible effect among light-skinned 
respondents, but substantively and statistically significant effects among medium and 
dark-skinned respondents. Program usage increases the probability of reclassification 
by 9 percentage points for medium-toned respondents and 15 percentage points for dark-
skinned respondents. Thus usage of the social programs that include affirmative action 
does appear to increase the probability of reclassification. But it is among candidates 
for “whitening” that these policies appear to have this affect, rather than among the 
allegedly opportunistic or “fraudulent.” 
 
Figure 6.7 Average Marginal Effect of Education Program Usage on Reclassification by 
Respondent Skin Tone 
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Political Identity and Political Engagement 
 Clear from these analyses is the robust relationship between political identity 
and racial identification and reclassification. But what are the broader consequences of 
these racialized political identities? In this final section, I aim to show that these recent 
patterns of racial identification indicate not only a growing political meaning that 
individuals are attributing to their racial identities, but also how these newly formed 
political identities, in turn, shape forms of political participation and engagement. Not 
only are the racially and politically conscious more like to confront and challenge racial 
hierarchies by claiming and articulating black identities. But they are significantly more 
likely to take participate in and take an interest in politics, seek to remain politically 
informed, and hold themselves in positive regard as democratic citizens. In sum, the 
development of racialized political identities has not only altered racial identifications 
in Brazil; it has enhanced the very exercise of citizenship. 
 
Civic Participation 
 To first examine the consequences for political engagement, I examine the 
relationship between political identity and popular forms of civic participation in Brazil. 
Civic participation is a fruitful avenue to consider the broader political consequences of 
political identity formation because Brazil has long boasted a vibrant civil society with 
formal and informal venues where marginal citizens might actively exercise voice, 
articulate grievances, and pursue or search for representation outside of the formal 
channels of electoral politics. Indeed, Brazil’s electoral arena is notoriously difficult to 
navigate, even for seasoned and well-informed voters; the party system is fragmented, 
historically volatile, and clientelistic (Mainwaring 1999); partisanship is notoriously 
weak (D. Samuels 2006), voting is compulsory and enforced, and electoral institutions 
are said to promote personalism and charismatic campaigns, rather than clear or 
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sustained forms of programmatic representation (Ames, Baker, and Rennó 2008); 
political parties are largely seen as vehicles for self-interested elites, and by and large 
disarticulate social differences that might otherwise underpin programmatic or 
constituency-based representation in electoral politics (Hagopian 1996). 
 Civic participation in Brazil thus constitutes a real and meaningful alternative to 
electoral forms of political participation. Social movements, in particular, have played 
important roles in processes of democratization (Alvarez 1990; Keck 1992) and 
constitution-writing (Garay 2016), and actively confronted durable inequalities in the 
distribution of land, for example (Wolford 2010). Race-based activism, moreover, 
appears to be on the rise (Caldwell 2007; Paschel 2016; Perry 2013; Smith 2016). Thus 
civic participation offers great potential insight for thinking about the ways in which 
political identity “matters” for politics. What I aim to show in these analyses is that 
individuals with greater levels of political identity are also more likely to exercise their 
civic and political citizenship rights by pursuing new forms of representation and new 
venues in which to voice grievances and pursue interests.   
 To conduct these analyses, I am relying on survey items that asked respondents 
whether they participated in the following activities in the year prior to the survey: social 
movements, in general; the black movement, in particular; unions; NGOs; 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Social Movement 1,000 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Union 1,000 0.14 0.35 0 1 
NGO 999 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Neighborhood Assn. 1,000 0.10 0.29 0 1 
Religious Assn. 999 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Black Movement 1,000 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Women 1,000 0.03 0.16 0 1 
PTA 1,000 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Political party 1,000 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Seniors Assn. 1,000 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Table 6.7 Summary Statistics of Civic Participation 
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neighborhood associations; religious organizations; women’s groups and associations; 
parent-teacher associations; political parties; and senior citizens’ groups. Respondents 
responding affirmatively were coded 1, and otherwise 0. Table 6.7 presents summary 
rates of participation in each of these civic activities. Overall, rates of participation are 
low. Religious groups are a clear exception, with a rate of participation at 25 percent. 
Parent-teacher associations are also high at 22 percent. Unions and neighborhood 
associations make up the next most common forms, and participation in women’s 
groups is the least common form of civic participation. Similarly, only 4 percent of 
respondents reported having contact with the black movement.  
 To begin, I analyze individuals’ propensities to participate in each individual 
activity using logistic regression. Table 6.8 presents estimates from these individual 
models, which adjust for education, skin tone, and standard controls. Point estimates for 
the effect of political identity on all forms of civic participation are positive, though not 
all are statistically significant. Political identity has a discernible positive association 
with participation in social movements, NGOs, neighborhood associations, religious 
organizations, and the black movement. Perhaps unsurprisingly, political identity has 
little to no effect on participation in parent-teacher associations and senior citizens’ 
groups, nor unions, which are perhaps influenced more by one’s age, parental status, or 
occupation. Political identity is not significantly associated with participation in 
women’s groups, though this estimate is imprecise given the low rates of participation 
overall. 
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Social 
movements Unions NGO 
Neighbor- 
hood assn. 
Religious 
org. 
Black 
Movement 
Women’s 
Assn. PTA 
Political 
Party 
Senior Cit. 
Assn. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Political 0.78* 0.27 0.89* 0.44* 0.61* 1.15* 0.64 0.08 0.42 0.05 
Identity (0.25) (0.18) (0.27) (0.22) (0.15) (0.33) (0.39) (0.16) (0.34) (0.31) 
           
Education 0.20 0.19+ 0.62* 0.02 -0.01 0.24 0.36+ 0.10 0.20 0.32+ 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12) (0.08) (0.18) (0.22) (0.09) (0.18) (0.16) 
           
Skin tone -0.22 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.28* 0.45 -0.28 0.02 0.27 0.07 
 (0.24) (0.17) (0.26) (0.20) (0.14) (0.32) (0.36) (0.14) (0.31) (0.27) 
           
Income 0.31* 0.19+ 0.30* 0.15 -0.13 0.36* -0.05 -0.16 0.46* -0.05 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.30) (0.12) (0.16) (0.21) 
           
Age -0.20+ 0.11+ 0.14 -0.00 0.06 -0.12 0.19 0.19* 0.21+ 0.71* 
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.14) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12) 
           
Female -0.52+ -0.47* -0.82* -0.37 -0.18 -0.51 0.99* 0.48* -0.32 0.38 
 (0.28) (0.20) (0.30) (0.24) (0.16) (0.37) (0.49) (0.17) (0.37) (0.34) 
           
Recife -0.44 -0.48* -0.79* 0.12 -0.26 -0.08 -0.06 -0.18 0.85* 0.23 
 (0.30) (0.21) (0.32) (0.25) (0.17) (0.39) (0.45) (0.18) (0.44) (0.36) 
           
Constant -4.35* -3.37* -7.44* -3.57* -2.49* -8.42* -7.82* -3.00* -7.23* -7.93* 
 (1.01) (0.72) (1.14) (0.85) (0.59) (1.43) (1.65) (0.62) (1.45) (1.32) 
Hair type FX Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 879 898 878 898 897 879 879 898 898 898 
AIC 436.30 738.89 395.72 576.42 1002.85 283.03 235.83 935.83 288.85 333.29 
Table 6.8 Effects of Political Identity on Participation in Civic Associations. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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 Figure 8 plots the average marginal effect of a one-unit change in political 
identity on the probability of participating in each of these civic groups. Political identity 
is most strongly associated with religious associations, increasing the likelihood of 
participation by 11 percentage points. This may seem surprising, but according to John 
Burdick (1998a), religious groups are important sites for black mobilization and anti-
racism in Brazil. Additionally, one-unit increases in political identity increase 
participation in social movements overall, in the black movement, in NGOs, and in 
neighborhood associations by roughly 5 percentage points. Of course, not all of these  
Figure 6.8 Average Marginal Effect of Political Identity on Forms of Civic Participation (Models 
1-10 in Table 6.8). Figure displays 90 percent confidence intervals. 
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estimates are statistically different from zero, but low rates of participation overall and 
dichotomous variables render estimation inefficient. 
 To compensate for this statistical inefficiency, I also estimate models of 
summary measures of civic participation: whether individuals participated in at least 
one social movement, union, the black movement, or women’s group; at least one of 
any civic group; at least one group excluding religion; and the total number of civic 
associations, as well as a count measure excluding religion. Summary statistics for these 
measures are presented in Table 6.9. Roughly 20 percent of the sample reported contact 
with at least 1 social movement; nearly half takes part in at least one civic group; and 
on average respondents have at least one association with a civic group. 
 Table 6.10 presents estimates from these models. Models 1 through 3 are 
estimated with logistic regression and Models 4 and 5 are estimated as negative 
binomial models. These models estimate positive and significant correlations between 
political identity and civic participation overall. Political identity is associated with 
greater social movement participation in particular, as well as civic participation in 
general, even excluding religious associations. Models 4 and 5 also estimate positive 
effects of political identity on the number of associations. That is, individuals with 
higher levels of political identity are more likely to participate in not only one group, 
they are more likely to develop a greater number of civic associations. 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Movement Part. 1,000 0.206 0.405 0 1 
Civic Part. 1,000 0.503 0.500 0 1 
Civic Part. (excl. relig.) 1,000 0.403 0.491 0 1 
Num. Civic Assns. 1,000 0.978 1.393 0 10 
Numb. Civic Assns. (excl relig.) 1,000 0.730 1.212 0 9 
Table 6.9 Summary Statistics of Civic Participation Variables 
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 Figure 9 puts these estimates in substantive terms, plotting predicted 
probabilities of these summary measures by the level of political identity. The top-left 
panel shows the probability of participating in at least one civic activity. Moving from 
the lowest to highest level of political identity increases the probability of participating 
in at least one civic activity by 43 percentage points, from 29 percent to 72 percent. This 
effect remains strong even when excluding religious associations (top-right): the same 
increase in political identity increases the estimated probability by 30 percentage points, 
from 27 to 57 percent. The bottom-left panel shows a significant effect specifically on 
 
Soc. Mvmt. 
Assn. 
(At least 1) 
Civic Part. 
(At least 1) 
Civic Part. 
(Excl. 
Relig.) 
Numb. Civic 
Associations 
Numb. Civic 
Associations 
(Excl. 
Relig.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Political  0.47* 0.47* 0.33* 0.36* 0.32* 
Identity (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.10) 
      
Education 0.17+ 0.10 0.16* 0.12* 0.17* 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
      
Skin Tone 0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) 
      
Income 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.09 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) 
      
Age 0.05 0.15* 0.15* 0.10* 0.11* 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
      
Female -0.43* -0.20 -0.18 -0.10 -0.08 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.11) 
      
Recife -0.47* -0.34* -0.30* -0.17+ -0.16 
 (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.12) 
      
Constant -3.17* -2.13* -2.46* -1.78* -2.31* 
 (0.62) (0.51) (0.52) (0.34) (0.39) 
      
ln(alpha)    -0.22+ 0.06 
    (0.13) (0.14) 
Hair type FX Y Y Y Y Y 
N 898 898 898 898 898 
AIC 924.00 1227.75 1209.40 2473.58 2129.37 
Table 6.10 Effects of Political Identity on Summary Measures of Civic Participation. + p < .1, * p 
< .05. Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1-3 are logit; models 4 and 5 are negative binomial 
models. 
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social movement participation as well: moving from the lowest to the highest level of 
political identity increases the probability of participation by 30 percentage points, from 
10 to 40 percent. Political identity also significantly increases the number of civic 
associations, moving from less than 1 to 2 civic associations.  
 
  
Figure 6.9 Estimated Probabilities of Civic Participation by Level of Political Identity. Bars show 
predicted probabilities of each form of participation (models 1-3). The line shows the estimated number 
of civic associations at each level of political identity (model 4). 
 194 
 
Political Interest 
 Individuals with higher levels of political identity also demonstrate greater 
levels of political engagement through their interest in politics. In other words, these 
individuals may not only hold certain political beliefs or worldviews, but they may take 
additional measures to pay attention to political events and consume media to remain 
politically informed. To test this, I analyze the correlation between political identity and 
self-reported consumption of political media. Individuals were asked how often they 
pay attention to political news either on TV, the radio, newspapers, or on the internet. 
Respondents reported whether they did so 1) never, 2) rarely, 3) a few times per month, 
4) a few times per week, 5) daily, or 6) multiple times per day. I use a summary measure 
of media consumption, taken as the average of the responses to these four forms of 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Political 0.18+  0.24* 0.32* 0.42* 
Identity (0.10)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
      
Education  0.12* 0.16* 0.15* 0.21* 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
      
Skin tone    -0.16+ -0.25* 
    (0.09) (0.10) 
      
Income     0.07 
     (0.08) 
      
Age     0.15* 
     (0.04) 
      
Female     -0.50* 
     (0.12) 
      
Recife     -0.24+ 
     (0.13) 
      
Constant 3.41* 3.63* 2.82* 2.88* 2.15* 
 (0.30) (0.15) (0.36) (0.36) (0.43) 
Hair type FX N N N N Y 
N 974 990 974 974 891 
AIC 3912.28 3977.56 3905.31 3903.65 3536.49 
Table 6.11 Adjusted Relationship between Political Identity and Political Interest. + p < .1, 
* p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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media, as a proxy for political interest. 
 Table 6.11 displays OLS estimates from models of political interest. The 
bivariate analysis in Model 1 estimates a marginally significant and positive correlation 
between political identity and political interest. Model 2 estimates a positive and 
significant correlation between education and interest. The bivariate regression in 
Model 3 includes both variables and estimates a positive and significant effect of 
political identity. This relationship is estimated to be stronger in Model 4 once a control 
for skin tone is added. In this model, darker skin tone is negatively correlated with 
political interest (p < .1). Model 5 shows the correlation between political identity and 
interest is robust to the full set of controls. This model estimates that the effect of 
political identity is twice as large as that of education. Notably, respondents with darker 
skin tone and female respondents report significantly lower levels of political interest. 
Indeed, the coefficient estimated for female respondents is the largest in magnitude in 
this model.  
Nonetheless, there is a consistent and robust correlation between political 
identity and political interest. Figure 6.10 displays the predicted probabilities of political 
Figure 6.10 Predictions of Frequency of Political News Consumption (Political Interest) by 
Political Identity. Figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Estimates computed from Model 5. 
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news consumption by level of political identity. The positive relationship is apparent. 
In substantive terms, moving from the lowest to the highest level of political identity 
increases one’s location on the 6-point political interest scale 1.67 points, from 
consuming political news a few times per month (3.13) to consuming it almost daily 
(4.8). 
 
Political Efficacy 
 Finally, I consider the relationship between political identity and political 
efficacy, that is, the individual’s evaluation of her own political competence or 
effectiveness. Scholars distinguish between internal and external efficacy: internal 
efficacy refers to the individual’s evaluation of their own competence to form and 
defend political views and opinions; external efficacy refers to the individual’s 
evaluation of their impact on the decisions of the government and of the extent to which 
they are heard by political elites. Internal and external political efficacy, then, can be 
thought of as important consequences of both identity politicization and social policy, 
if indeed these factors lead individuals to have greater confidence to engage in politics, 
and to have greater faith in the responsiveness of the political system to their views.  
 As I detail in Chapter 4, one surprising finding during my fieldwork was the 
complexity of emotions surrounding the development of racial consciousness and 
political views that these individuals expressed. While individuals often sought to 
Internal Efficacy 
I have a good understanding of the country’s most important political issues. 
My opinions are valid, or at least as valid as others’ opinions. 
My political opinions are well informed. 
When I talk with someone who has opinions different from mine, I feel capable of 
defending my opinions. 
External Efficacy 
People like me don’t have an impact on the decisions of the government. 
The people who govern the country aren’t interested in what people like me think. 
Table 6.12 Survey Measures of Political Efficacy 
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challenge the stigma attached to blackness, they also reported the negative feelings that 
discussing past experiences with racism would drudge up. Moreover, they often 
expressed a pessimism regarding Brazil’s political system – certainly not exclusive to 
the racially conscious – but one that appeared deepened by the political worldview that 
folks like them suffered from power asymmetries. 
 To test these insights, I construct measures of internal and external political 
efficacy, drawing on a battery of survey questions designed to probe individuals’ 
attitudes toward their political competence and their influence on the government’s 
decisions. Table 6.12 displays these questions. Internal efficacy questions were adapted 
from a battery of social psychological questions designed to probe self-esteem. External 
efficacy questions are the same employed on the American National Election Survey. 
Respondents were read each of these statements and asked to state the extent to which 
they agreed each statement applied to them using a 5-point Likert scale. Summary 
measures were constructed using simple averages, producing continuous measures 
between 1 and 5 of both internal and external efficacy. I analyze these summary 
measures with OLS. 
 I first turn to analysis of internal efficacy, models of which are presented in 
Table 6.13. Models 1 and 2 present univariate regressions of political identity and 
education on individuals’ self-evaluations of their internal efficacy. Both variables are 
positively and significantly correlated. Model 3 includes a control for skin tone. Both 
effects are robust, though the substantive effect of political identity more than doubles. 
Darker skin tone, too, is negatively associated with internal efficacy. Model 4 includes 
all control variables and estimates positive and significant effects of both education and 
political identity. The model estimates a substantively small, but significant, average 
effect of political identity on respondents’ internal political efficacy. These findings thus 
corroborate the insight that education and political identity are associated with greater 
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levels of confidence in one’s own political opinions and competency. 
 Table 6.14 presents models of external political efficacy. The univariate 
regression in Model 1 estimates a significant negative association between political 
identity and external efficacy. Model 2 estimates no effect of education. Model 3 
includes the control for skin tone, which has little effect on the size or significance of 
the association with political identity. Unlike with internal efficacy, this model estimates 
no association between skin tone and external efficacy. Model 4 includes the full set of 
controls. The association with political identity, then, is robust and negative. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Political 0.10*  0.22* 0.25* 
Identity (0.04)  (0.05) (0.05) 
     
Education  0.13* 0.14* 0.14* 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
     
Skin Tone   -0.12* -0.13* 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
     
Income    0.13* 
    (0.03) 
     
Age    0.05* 
    (0.02) 
     
Female    -0.21* 
    (0.05) 
     
Recife    -0.01 
    (0.05) 
     
Constant 2.92* 2.88* 2.42* 2.15* 
 (0.13) (0.06) (0.15) (0.18) 
Hair type FX N N N Y 
N 973 989 973 891 
AIC 2263.21 2282.61 2214.27 2007.20 
Table 6.13 Effects of Political Identity on Internal Political Efficacy. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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 Figure 6.11 plots predicted probabilities of respondents’ average evaluations of 
internal and external political efficacy by their level of political identity. Moving from 
the lowest to the highest level of political identity increases internal efficacy by roughly 
1 point on the Likert scale, from 2.7 to 3.7 on average. In substantive terms, this is 
equivalent to changing from a slightly negative evaluation to a near-positive evaluation 
of one’s own political competence. The same substantive change in political identity, 
by contrast, decreases average external political efficacy by an estimated .58 points on 
the Likert scale, from 2.69 to 2.11. In substantive terms, this is equivalent to moving 
from a slightly negative to a decidedly negative evaluation of one’s impact on the 
government’s decisions and the ability to be heard by political elites.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Political -0.12*  -0.13* -0.14* 
Identity (0.05)  (0.05) (0.06) 
     
Education  0.00 -0.00 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     
Skin Tone   0.03 0.03 
   (0.04) (0.05) 
     
Income    -0.08+ 
    (0.04) 
     
Age    -0.02 
    (0.02) 
     
Female    -0.04 
    (0.06) 
     
Recife    0.03 
    (0.07) 
     
Constant 2.74* 2.39* 2.74* 2.86* 
 (0.15) (0.07) (0.18) (0.22) 
Hair Type FX N N N Y 
N 982 999 982 898 
AIC 2577.76 2640.65 2581.12 2386.75 
Table 6.14 Effects of Political Identity on External Political Efficacy. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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The analysis of individuals’ self-evaluations of their internal and external 
political efficacy bears out the expectations of the qualitative research, and paints a 
simultaneously optimistic and pessimistic picture of the effects of political identity on 
the nature of citizenship for these individuals. While confronting and challenging racial 
hierarchies appears associated with a greater tendency to hold one’s own political 
competency in higher regard, it also brings about a skepticism regarding citizens’ 
abilities to impact the decision-making and representativeness of the government. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has utilized original survey data to generate unique measures of 
racialized political identity and test its relationship to patterns of racial identification, 
reclassification, and various forms of civic and political engagement. The data paint a 
clear picture: not only does political identity lead individuals to challenge racial 
hierarchies and the practice of whitening by choosing blackness, individuals with 
greater levels of political identity are significantly more likely to engage in civic forms 
of participation; to participate in social movements; they are more interested in and are 
Figure 6.11 Linear Predictions of Internal (Left) and External (Right) Political Efficacy by Level 
of Political Identity. Values of the y-axis correspond to average values on the 5-point Likert scale, 
where 1 indicates strong disagreement, 3 indicates indifference, and 5 indicates strong agreement. 
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more informed about politics; and they have greater levels of internal self-efficacy, that 
is, they are more confident in their skills and competencies as citizens.  
Yet just as these politically conscious individuals are taking greater strides to 
engage in politics and exercise their citizenship rights, they are becoming increasingly 
pessimistic about their ability to influence politics and to be heard by the very leaders 
they elect into office. These data thus paint a complex picture of racial identity and 
political engagement in contemporary Brazil. On the one hand, Brazilians are being 
increasingly empowered to confront and challenge social hierarchies, embrace 
stigmatized social categories, and pursue interests and representation in a variety of 
political venues. Yet these same citizens—the politically conscious—hold pessimistic 
views about their ability to effect change and have their voices heard through the formal 
channels of political representation. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
“Census bureaus,” writes Melissa Nobles (2000, 2), “are typically overlooked as 
participants in the creation and perpetuation of race.” Race, however, is not always nor 
uniformly perpetuated as it was initially created. As this dissertation has shown in detail, 
racial classifications and identities are not only subjectively (and often politically) 
understood, but subject to reevaluation and transformation over time. Brazil’s official 
classification scheme has long come under fire from black movement activists and their 
allies, who see the intermediate racial category as the institutionalization of the myth of 
racial democracy. In their view, this  scheme undermines efforts at race-based political 
mobilization (Hanchard 1994; Marx 1998; Nobles 2000, 2004). Yet even while official 
ethnoracial classification has remained unchanged in recent decades, Brazilians have 
demonstrated marked shifts in their racial identifications that suggest they do not simply 
comply with the “political realities” or “ways of thinking and seeing” imposed by the 
state (Nobles 2004, 66). Indeed, if recent patterns of reclassification in Brazil suggest 
anything about the census, it is that an individual’s self-classification in an official 
census category can itself become an act of political resistance. 
 The recent and growing tendency for Brazilians to reclassify toward blackness 
highlights the powerful role social citizenship institutions can play in shaping political 
worldviews. In fact, the era of social inclusion casts Brazil in new racial light: no longer 
can Brazil be reduced to a puzzling case of extreme socioeconomic and racial disparity 
paired with the absence of politicized racial identities. This recent era of Brazilian 
politics – in which the state’s posture shifted towards racial recognition and inclusive 
citizenship – brings into stark relief the complex, if unintentional, ways that the 
accessibility of social citizenship rights and benefits operate to imbue certain identities 
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with political meaning. To be sure, state institutions do not shape worldviews in a simple 
and straightforward manner, nor do they affect all individuals uniformly. Instead, 
institutions of social citizenship endow citizens with tools, capacities, and experiences, 
which inform the identities and interests citizens articulate in political arenas.  
 In this concluding chapter, I offer reflections on the theoretical and normative 
implications of the novel theoretical account developed and tested in this dissertation. 
In particular, I pay close attention to the implications that this recent and phenomenal 
case of identity change suggests for political science theorizing on identity 
politicization, suggesting that current theories too often overlook the implications of 
constructivism and the importance of citizenship in exchange for theoretical parsimony. 
Additionally, I offer reflections on what these patterns tell us about the state of Brazilian 
racial politics and its implications for the comparative study of race. Finally, I conclude 
by reflecting on what these patterns tell us about the interplay of race, inequality, and 
citizenship in one of the world’s most starkly unequal democracies. 
 
Implications for Theories of Identity Politicization 
 The findings of this study carry implications most directly for debates on how, 
when, and why identities become politicized. In particular, the argument developed and 
tested in this dissertation marks a departure from dominant explanations of identity 
politicization in the literature. These highly rationalist accounts have coalesced around 
the strategic calculations of political elites and, to a lesser extent, voters, who seek to 
maximize their material payoffs (Chandra 2004; Huber 2017; Posner 2005). This view 
strips identities of their affect (Posner 2005, 6) and conceives of them as nothing more 
than a situational means to a material end. Such theoretical and conceptual assumptions 
may apply in some contexts, but this analysis has provided little support for the idea that 
top-down mobilization or utility-based electoral calculations play central roles in the 
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processes of identity politicization; not to mention that the empirical patterns motivating 
this study seriously complicate the presumptions of stable demographic structures upon 
which the strategic calculations of voters and elites are supposedly based. 
This ought to raise questions about the theoretical assumptions often made in 
“constructivist” theories of ethnic and identity politics. Indeed, in a recent work 
theorizing the politicization of ethnic versus class differences, John Huber writes: 
“[e]thnic and class identities are particularly useful in electoral politics in large part 
because they often define group boundaries that parties can exploit in efforts to win 
votes. When a party makes a commitment to a particular class – say the nonrich – and 
this party wins, a rich voter cannot easily change his or her ‘class identity’ to obtain 
policy benefits from the government” (Huber 2017, 4). Not only does this theoretical 
framework assume that ethnic and class identities are mutually exclusive substitutes 
rather than potentially intertwined and interactive, but this passage renders explicit what 
is often an implicit assumption of so-called constructivist theories of identity politics—
that these highly rationalist accounts, which often reduce identities to heuristic devices 
in service of theoretical parsimony, make presumptions about the stability and 
immutability of demographic structures and social boundaries that contradict the 
fundamentals of constructivism itself. It bears reminding that, not only class, but even 
racial identities—commonly, if too presumptively, viewed as less fluid—can prove 
unstable in ways that would complicate, or substantially alter, demographically based 
calculations. But this dilemma also highlights how thin constructivism – lip service 
commonly paid to the socially constructed and situational nature of social boundaries 
and identities – can obscure essentializing assumptions embedded within so-called 
constructivist theorizing. This study, at the very least, ought renew attention to 
constructivist due diligence in identity politics scholarship. But more importantly, the 
fact that the current dominant theories are so ill-equipped to even contend with the kind 
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of identity change analyzed in this study brings into focus how the prevailing rationalist 
approach to study of ethnic and identity politicization relies on unrealistic 
simplifications that assume away the very empirical implications of constructivism 
itself: that identities and social boundaries are subjective, mutable, and reconstructed 
over time (Barth 1969). 
A second point of departure revolves around the role of the state and political 
elites in the processes of identity politicization. In this account there is little role for the 
rent-seeking politician who politicizes identities for his own gain, but this is not to 
ignore the role of political elites altogether or overlook the incentives elites require to 
find political will. Much to the contrary, political elites, the institutions that they create 
and reform, and electoral incentives have been central to the institutional reforms and 
unfolding processes that have shaped the formation of political consciousness and 
content of racial identities. Suddenly finding themselves in competition for the votes of 
the poor, elites in newly redemocratized Brazil had strong electoral incentives to create 
and expand social policies that would benefits the masses (Garay 2016; Hunter and Brill 
2016). Additionally, elites were responding to incentives to build modern and developed 
states in conformity with international norms for what such a state should look like 
(Loveman 2014). By the end of the twentieth century, western states, transnational 
social movements, and international and non-governmental organizations increasingly 
espoused rhetoric that favored racial recognition and efforts at combating inequality 
(Paschel 2016), just as international norms and rhetoric began to favor democratic 
institutions (Levitsky and Way 2010). Thus political elites, continuing to respond to 
domestic and international political incentives, sought to revisit its racial posture and 
social policies in their efforts to “develop” and “modernize.” These incentives generated 
the political will politicians needed to reform citizenship institutions in ways that would 
reshape the everyday experiences of the country’s mass of citizens living in a state of 
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socioeconomic precarity on the margins of society. Such sweeping and universalizing 
reforms unleashed unprecedented waves of upward mobility for these marginal citizens, 
the very mobility that would lead them to rethink their understandings of race and to 
cross previously recognized racial boundaries. Political and state elites, then, play 
central—if indirect and inadvertent—roles in the processes of identity politicization. 
But rather than the product of crude rent-seeking behavior, these patterns of 
reclassification and political identity formation are best understood as a kind of policy 
feedback effect wherein “new policies create a new politics” (Schattschneider 1935, 
288). 
 Finally, the centrality of social policy reforms and the accessibility of citizenship 
benefits in explaining this political identity formation shines new light on the processes 
of the identity-to-politics link (Lee 2008). In particular, these findings further highlight 
that the translation of social categories into political identities is not structurally 
preordained (Gaventa 1982; Hanchard 1994; Roberts 2002; Yashar 2005). Indeed, for 
decades Brazil served as a case-in-point: if social structure, or the alignment of racial 
and class hierarchies, alone could explain identity politicization, then as one of the 
world’s most unequal and racially stratified countries Brazil ought to have seen the 
politicization of racial (and/or class) identities long ago. What this analysis has made 
clear is that racialized structural inequalities are often an important component of the 
grievances that ground and legitimate the racialized political worldviews of reclassifiers 
and the racially conscious; but coming to such an understanding/interpretation of 
Brazilian society as racially stratified in such a way has been made possible through the 
mechanisms of exposure and efficacy unfurled by expanded access to education. 
Importantly, the case highlights that such racialized/structural interpretations of one’s 
surroundings cannot be assumed ex ante; individuals must arrive to such conclusions. 
Processes of consciousness-building have been crucial even in the canonical U.S. case 
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as well (McAdam 1982), where today racialized political identities among black 
Americans are often taken for-granted require little explanation. Thus the findings of 
this analysis go to show that there are no foregone conclusions in the politicization of 
social categories or identities, no matter how clear this may seem from the point of view 
of the analyst. What mattered in particular in this case was not only a political worldview 
that made sense of one’s relative social position in racial terms, but also access to the 
benefits of social citizenship. Central, then, was the interaction between social structure 
and citizenship institutions in shaping the processes of political identity formation. 
 
Reflections on Racial Politics in Brazil and Beyond 
 Perhaps the greatest contribution this study has made to the interdisciplinary 
study of racial identity and politics in Brazil is the finding that upward mobility does 
not lead inevitably to whitening. This study is not the first to notice a shift in these 
patterns (Marteleto 2012; Miranda 2015; L. F. Schwartzman 2007; S. Soares 2008), but 
it is the first to systematically analyze reclassification toward blackness in particular 
and provide a theoretical and historically situated account of such change. To be sure, 
there is no dearth of scholarship criticizing affirmative action policies and bemoaning 
the potential “race-making” consequences of such policies, which critics claim will 
divide Brazil into black and white and creating the racialized politics that many 
Brazilians believe they escaped (e.g., Fry and Maggie 2004). But there is no indication 
that affirmative action policies themselves or the broader reforms of educational 
expansion have led, or will lead, to undesirable political outcomes. In fact, these 
processes have been underway for quite some time, and Brazil has not been riven with 
inter-racial conflict. I would argue instead that these findings paint an optimistic picture 
for the future of racial politics in the country, not least for the black movement, which 
continues to struggle tirelessly towards its goals of racial equality, as well as for Brazil’s 
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(formerly) marginal citizens who suffer from perpetual inequality and discrimination. 
Greater access to improved education is leading and empowering citizens to assume and 
articulate political identities that coincide with the inequality, stigma, and 
discrimination they have faced for so long and that operate through the informal 
mechanisms of institutional racism. One can only hope that these effects are not limited 
to the domain of stigmatized racial categories. Nonetheless, educational expansion and 
political identity formation may empower individuals to confront stigma and 
discrimination, thereby leading them to interrupt—rather than participate in—the 
reproduction of social hierarchies, and demand further policies and action on the part of 
the state to redress these social ills. 
 Of course, that my analyses suggest a different relationship between 
education/upward mobility and the direction of reclassification raises questions of how 
or if these findings square with previous studies. These differences likely stem from the 
fact that different class sectors gained access to (different levels of) education and 
experienced upward mobility at different periods of time. While Getúlio Vargas is 
widely credited with the creation of a national education plan, his social policies were 
aimed at educating and controlling labor; and while the military regime was focused on 
expanding primary schooling as a measure of economic success, by the 1980s this still 
remained out of reach for large swaths of the population and access to secondary and 
university education was even more restricted. Because of the ambiguity of racial 
identification and persistence of reclassification itself, it is difficult (if not impossible) 
to know for certain the “race” of who exactly had access to education, when they had it, 
and whether they were plausible candidates for reclassification toward either whiteness 
or blackness. Yet if recent survey instruments developed by Edward Telles (2014) 
provide any indication, income is—and likely was—a  strong correlate of skin tone,44 
                                                 
44 Plenty has been written on the social construction of race (Barth 1969; Brubaker, Loveman, and 
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and evidence suggest that lower classes had dismal access to formal education of any 
kind prior to the 1990s. 
It thus stands to reason that unprecedented access to social citizenship for the 
lower classes has also meant, indirectly or not, that new generations of citizens are not 
only better educated, but also look different, from the well-educated in previous 
generations. Findings in my analysis in Chapter 7 show that lighter-skinned individuals 
are unlikely candidates for reclassification toward blackness. And recent studies 
conducted with Telles’ (2014) color palette show that the relationship between “race” 
and socioeconomic variables can look different once less subjective racial measures are 
included as controls in statistical analyses (Telles and Paschel 2014; Telles, Flores, and 
Urrea-Giraldo 2015). The lack of any such measure, until recently, is a real limitation 
of studies from decades past (Degler 1971; N. do V. Silva 1994; Wagley 1952). We can 
thus only infer patterns of identification and reclassification using self and ascribed 
classifications. Regardless, among the findings from more recent studies is that 
controlling for physical attributes alters the relationship between status variables and 
both whiteness and blackness, depending on where one falls on the color spectrum. 
Whitening effects of status appear limited to those on the lighter end of the color 
spectrum, and this is predicted by wealth, not education; by contrast, status appears to 
have a darkening effect for those in the middle to darker end of the spectrum, and is 
predicted by education, not wealth (Telles and Paschel 2014). The ultimate take-away, 
then, is that racial identifications and the political consciousness they generate are 
informed in part by certain physical attributes that allow for credible claims to 
blackness, but they are also ultimately shaped by an individual’s lived experiences, 
which are both racialized and classed. 
                                                 
Stamatov 2004; Loveman 1999a; Omi and Winant 1994). Yet while “race” may not be real in that the 
categories its boundaries demarcate are not natural, commonsense understandings of racial difference in 
Brazil are largely rooted in physical attributes (Telles 2004). 
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 An important caveat is in order regarding the question of whether or not racial 
identities are “politically relevant” in the Brazilian case. On the one hand, evidence 
suggests that now more than ever one might expect race to matter for understanding 
how individuals come to identify and pursue interests and representation in the political 
arena, as well as which political arenas they determine are most responsive to their 
interests and concerns. This is established in part in Chapter 7, which explores the 
consequences of racialized political identities for understanding various forms of 
political engagement and efficacy. Yet central to this analysis is the idea that individuals 
within racial categories vary in the extent to which racial considerations shape their 
behaviors. In other words, we still ought to avoid groupist (Brubaker 2004) inclinations 
that might lead us to over-predict the extent to which self-identified members of any 
racial category cohere in any political sense.  
Nonetheless, what is also clear is that there is an identifiable racial consciousness 
shaping political behavior and engagement. Racially conscious citizens are not only 
more engaged in civic associations and social movements, outside of the formal 
electoral channels of political representation, but they are also more interested in politics 
in general and possess a greater sense of their political competence. Despite all this, 
however, they are also significantly more pessimistic about the responsiveness of the 
government to the concerns of folks like them. The potential implications of these 
findings are varied, and the surface has only been scratched in these analyses. Questions 
thus remain regarding what kinds of behaviors and forms of engagement are most 
impacted by the formation of the racial identities, and in what kinds of (in)formal 
institutions or political arenas individuals choose to articulate these newly formed 
political identities. 
  Finally, a word is in order regarding the generalizability and comparability of 
Brazil as a case of racial politics. This question has generated no shortage of scholarly 
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debate and criticism (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999; J. D. French 2000; Hanchard 1994; 
Loveman 1999b; Marx 1998; Paschel 2016; Seigel 2005). Rather than wade into these 
debates, this study has focused on Brazil in part because it has offered a fascinating case 
of identity change itself worthy of study, but also because the particularities of the 
Brazil’s racial boundaries and ambiguity provide specific conditions that allow for 
systematic empirical analysis of this sort. By this I mean that the fluidity of racial 
boundaries and the uncontroversial nature of reclassification—what is sometimes seen 
as an abhorrent act of “passing” in other contexts—has meant not only that 
reclassification itself happens on a much larger scale than in places like the United States 
and South Africa, but also that ordinary census data can be leveraged in ways that allow 
researchers to study these patterns systematically and, as in this study, as indications of 
political identity formation. In this view, this analysis has focused on the Brazilian case 
not because it is necessarily like any other, but because it was capable of generating new 
insights into the processes of political identity formation. 
 Having done so, this study also points to other findings that the experiences of 
upward mobility can deepen political consciousness for individuals in stigmatized racial 
categories and lead them to pursue voice. This is not unique to the Brazilian case, and 
is in fact in line with seminal analyses of racial consciousness in the United States, 
which associate the middle-class status of African Americans with a deepened sense of 
racial consciousness (Dawson 1995; Hochschild 1995; Tate 1994). In this sense, these 
findings bring Brazil closer to the United States in terms of its racial politics, despite 
the myriad differences in racial subjectivity and political struggles in the two countries. 
To be sure, Brazil remains a far cry from American-style politics, in which the racial 
cleavage appears to permeate countless facets of the country’s politics. But such similar 
findings regarding the racialized class experiences of Brazilians and Americans and the 
relationship to consciousness raise questions about the extent to which Brazil may 
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continue to serve as a convenient point of contrast in comparative studies of ethnoracial 
politics. For while Brazilian society remains heterogeneous in terms of the formation of 
racialized political identities, what is certain is that the country’s recent attempts to 
modernize, develop, and include have led Brazil’s racial politics into a profound state 
of flux in which competing understandings of what it means to “be black” having only 
added to the complexity of Brazil’s racial subjectivity. Thus the “why not” question that 
for so long has characterized scholarly views of Brazil’s (absent) racial politics may be 
more appropriately recast as questions of for whom race constitutes a political identity 
and with what consequences. At the very least, scholars can no longer take for-granted 
Brazil’s exceptional status as the perennial paradox in the comparative study of racial 
politics. 
 
Voice and Citizenship 
 Decades ago, Guillermo O’Donnell (1993) bemoaned the state of citizenship in 
Latin America. As the third wave of democratization swept the region, it was impossible 
to overlook the restoration of civil and political rights as institutional pillars of 
democracy. Yet even while Latin American states formally enshrined these rights in 
their constitutions, the question of whether they would carry real-world consequences 
generated skepticism. Rampant poverty, inequality and discrimination; little or no 
access to justice; pervasive informality/illegality; and the inability of the state to 
guarantee freedom from police and other violence all raised (and continue to raise) 
questions about whether Latin American democracies could address the most pressing 
issues shaping the everyday lives of their so-called citizens. In O’Donnell’s (1993, 
1361) words, “a state that is unable to enforce its legality supports a democracy of low-
intensity citizenship.” 
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 Racialized stigma and discrimination have been central components of the social 
and political forces that coexist with democratic institutions and that have weakened 
citizenship. By disempowering citizens, lowering their internal efficacy, and 
diminishing their levels of political engagement, stigma and discrimination undermine 
citizens’ capacities to exercise their rights to demand and strive for greater fairness and 
equality. It is not difficult to understand why: individuals have myriad incentives to 
comply with racial (and other) social hierarchies in exchange for social, economic, and 
psychological payoffs. But in return, individuals must endure and cope with the hefty 
costs that come with internalizing these hierarchies. Remarkable, then, is that 
individuals have been able to overcome these nefarious social forces and are 
increasingly attempting to interrupt this vicious cycle by choosing not to comply with 
social hierarchies. That is, rather than exiting the stigmatized category, individuals are 
increasingly exercising voice and contesting these hierarchies. In so doing, these citizens 
are not only challenging racial commonsense and racism in their everyday lives, but 
also engaging in politics in new ways to attempt to interrupt the social forces that for so 
long have prevented them from enjoying their full democratic citizenship. 
 That educational expansion could empower citizens to pursue voice and exercise 
citizenship rights suggests we consider a reformulation of the sequence of the expansion 
of citizenship rights envisioned by T.H. Marshall (1950), in which it is through the 
exercise of civic and political citizenship that citizens gain social rights. Clearly, 
Marshall’s focus on de jure citizenship did not anticipate the dilemmas of low-intensity 
citizenship in Latin America, which originate in the state’s inability to guarantee these 
rights for all of its citizens. On paper, Marshall’s sequence holds some water: it is only 
after the expansion of the franchise that elites began to respond to the interests and 
desires of the masses and expand access to social citizenship (Garay 2016). But that 
social and political forces within democracy could so weaken citizenship to a state of 
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low-intensity raises additional questions about the evolution of de facto citizenship 
rights. From this view, recent advances in social policies and protection in Latin 
America suggest an inversion of Marshall’s sequence (Hunter and Brill 2016). I would 
further submit that patterns of racial reclassification, political identity formation, and 
the resulting political engagement suggest that it may not only be the case that the social 
precedes the civic and political, but that it can be precisely through access to the benefits 
of social citizenship that individuals might come to exercise their civic and political 
rights “on terms of equality with others” (Marshall 1950, 10-11). 
 “How can the weaker and the poorer,” then, “be empowered in terms consistent 
with democratic legality and, thus, gain their full, democratic and liberal, citizenship?” 
(O’Donnell 1993, 1361). Part of the answer, this research suggests, lies in the creation 
of universal and expansionary social policy—policies that target and seek to redress 
those very social forces responsible for weakened citizenship in the first place. Insofar 
as social policy expansion has empowered citizens to assume and articulate political 
identities that coincide with the discrimination and disadvantage they face in society, 
and insofar as they pursue interests and representation on these bases in diverse political 
arenas, then this recent era of social inclusion and racial recognition may well constitute 
what O’Donnell deemed “the social conditions necessary for the exercise of citizenship” 
(1993, 1361). 
Only time will tell if Latin America’s democracies can consolidate the gains 
made in this remarkable era of inclusion and recognition and move closer to fulfilling 
the promises of democratic citizenship for all its citizens. But if recent political 
developments in Brazil are any indication, then one cannot expect that progress will 
march on unimpeded. No doubt, the growing tendency for formerly marginalized 
citizens to articulate stigmatized identities in civic arenas of political participation 
inspires optimism. But just as social policies designed to reduce inequalities have 
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deepened political engagement, so also have they introduced a politics of backlash 
(McAdam and Kloos 2014), in which many who sit atop the social and political order 
have challenged and resisted the progress made since redemocratization. Of course, 
there is no single cause of the turmoil that has upended Brazil’s national politics, from 
the crisis of representation evident in the 2013 protests, to the massive bribery scheme 
revealed in 2014, to the impeachment of Brazil’s first female president in 2016. It was 
a perfect storm, then, of opposition and disillusionment that paved the way for the 
election of a right-wing populist leader in 2018 – a leader openly hostile to not only the 
state’s racially inclusive posture and rights for Afro-descendants, but also for women, 
LGBT minorities, and the indigenous – raising fears that the remarkable progress that 
earned Brazil global attention as a rising political and economic star might be 
dismantled. In light of this, it is difficult to ignore the role that this great and rapid social 
progress has likely played in motivating the public sentiments that have fueled this 
turmoil, at least in part. 
 To be sure, it is far from clear where Brazil’s political crisis ends or what effect 
the election of a president so hostile to racial inclusion will ultimately have on the 
country’s racial politics. What is clear, however, is that insofar as this study ought to 
inspire optimism, it must be a cautionary optimism; for the inclusive and expansionary 
social policies responsible for the reshaping of racial identities and empowering of 
citizens may also have planted the seeds of a political backlash that threatens the future 
of that very progress. As Brazil’s values and institutions continue to be tested, one can 
only hope that the beneficiaries of this remarkable era of social inclusion will resist in 
return and defend the rights and benefits finally and duly allocated to them in Brazil’s 
new era of racialized democracy. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO CHAPTER TWO 
 
Census Enumeration Practices and Classification Schemes 
In the Brazilian context, where racial boundaries are fluid and there are no rigid 
rules that govern racial group membership, questions of which classification schemes 
the census bureau employs and how “race” is measured could affect estimates of group 
size. Several studies have shown that individuals’ racial identifications are sensitive to 
the classification scheme employed, namely whether official census categories (black, 
white, brown) or more colloquial labels (e.g., moreno, negro) are used (Bailey, 
Loveman, and Muniz 2013; Bailey and Telles 2006; Loveman, Muniz, and Bailey 
2012). Others have further noted the inconsistency between respondents’ self-
classifications and the categories assigned to respondents by enumerators (N. do V. 
Silva 1994; E. E. Telles 2004; E. E. Telles and Lim 1998). One potential explanation, 
then, is that these shifts in population estimates reflect changes in classification schemes 
or enumeration practices in the census. 
 
Year 
White/ 
Branca 
Black/ 
Preta 
Brown/ 
Parda 
Yellow/ 
Amarela 
Indigenous/ 
Indígena 
Mixed/ 
Mestiça Cabocla 
1872 Y Y Y N N N Y 
1890 Y Y N N N Y Y 
1900 - - - - - - - 
1920 - - - - - - - 
1940 Y Y N* Y N N N 
1950 Y Y Y Y N N N 
1960 Y Y Y Y N N N 
1970 - - - - - - - 
1980 Y Y Y Y N N N 
1991 Y Y Y Y Y N N 
2000 Y Y Y Y Y N N 
2010 Y Y Y Y Y** N N 
Table A1 Census Classification Schemes, 1872-2010. Source: Características étnico-raciais da 
população: um estudo das categorias de classificação de cor ou raça : 2008 / IBGE, Coordenação de 
População de Indicadores Sociais (IBGE 2011). *Responses of “other” re-coded as “pardo”. **Census 
includes indigenous subgroup and language spoken in addition to this color category. Y = Yes, N = No. 
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 Table A1 presents the racial classification schemes employed by the Brazilian 
census bureau since the first census in 1872. While there are notable differences in these 
schemes over the course of the twentieth century, over the period relevant to the patterns 
under examination (1991 to 2010) the scheme has remained unchanged (IBGE 2011; 
Paixão 2009). Moreover, between 1950 and 2010, the only change in this scheme has 
been the inclusion of the indigenous category, which comprises 0.4 percent of the total 
population. Additionally, concerns regarding the reliability of census data as a reflection 
of self-identification can be allayed by the fact that the census bureau reports a 
commitment to individuals’ self-declarations as the mode of measuring race in the 
population (IBGE 2003, 2016). Census classification schemes and enumeration 
practices have remained constant and therefore cannot explain such short-term shifts in 
patterns of racial identification. 
 
Demographic Trends 
Differences in demographic trends are a second potential explanation for these 
patterns since intergroup differences in migration, mortality, or fertility could easily 
produce structural change. To be sure, Brazil owes the vast majority of its population to 
the forced migration of Africans in the slave trade, to Portuguese colonization, and to 
the state’s twentieth century efforts to encourage European immigration with the goal 
of whitening the predominantly Afro-descendant population. (Levy 1974; Skidmore 
1974). In particular, Thomas Skidmore points out in his prominent study of immigration 
policy in Brazil that the Estado Novo constitution of 1937 included nationality-based 
immigration quotas to restrict immigration to white Europeans. Getulio Vargas vocally 
espoused this policy. Shortly before his ouster in 1945, Vargas issued a decree in which 
he stipulated that immigration policy conform with “the necessity to preserve and 
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develop, in the ethnic composition of the population, the more desirable characteristics 
of its European ancestry,” quoted in (Skidmore 1974, 199). 
 
Census Nationality Population Percentage 
1991 
Native Brazilians 146,048,028 99.48% 
Naturalized Brazilians 161,151 0.11% 
Foreign Resident 606,624 0.41% 
Total 146,815,803 100% 
    
2000 
Native Brazilians 169,189,026 99.60% 
Naturalized Brazilians 173,763 0.10% 
Foreign Resident 510,067 0.30% 
Total 169,872,856 100% 
    
2010 
Native Brazilians 190,163,229 99.69% 
Naturalized Brazilians 161,250 0.08% 
Foreign Resident 431,319 0.23% 
Total 190,755,799 100% 
Table A2  International Immigration to Brazil, 1991-2010. Source: Census, IBGE 
Yet international immigration is no longer of major consequence. According to 
census data from 1991 to 2010 (Table A2), native-born Brazilians have comprised more 
than 99 percent of Brazil’s resident population. Moreover, the minute population of 
foreign residents has been decreasing over time, foreclosing international migration as 
a potential explanatory factor (Andrews 2004; Levy 1974). 
 
  2000   2010 
Age Total White Black Brown Ratio   Total White Black Brown Ratio 
0 - 4 4.85 3.63 3.10 3.26 0.89  3.40 2.89 1.93 3.26 1.08 
5 - 9 0.32 0.27 0.32 0.26 0.98  0.28 0.25 0.22 0.26 1.02 
10 - 14 0.36 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.96  0.33 0.29 0.31 0.33 1.11 
15 - 19  1.07 0.87 1.32 1.02 1.21  1.12 0.85 1.11 1.24 1.44 
20 - 29  1.74 1.38 2.14 1.66 1.25  1.65 1.24 1.60 1.91 1.50 
30 - 39  2.44 1.96 3.30 2.15 1.19  2.09 1.68 2.38 2.25 1.35 
40 - 49  4.45 3.75 5.82 3.59 1.06  3.76 3.29 4.36 3.74 1.17 
50 - 59 8.82 7.90 9.93 6.40 0.89  7.69 7.30 8.76 6.94 1.00 
60 - 69  18.76 17.67 18.93 12.43 0.77   15.89 15.80 16.54 13.69 0.90 
Table A3 Mortality Rates in 2000 and 2010, by Race and Age. Measured as deaths per 1,000. Source: 
Ministerio de Saude, DataSUS. The ratio is computed as mortalities of negros (blacks and browns) 
relative to whites. 
 
 Mortality and fertility statistics also provide little explanation for the observed 
patterns. Statistics from the Ministry of Health show that, depending on age, the 
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mortality rate of Afro-descendants is similar to or greatly exceeds that of whites (Table 
A3). Moreover, in comparison to the year 2000, mortality rates of Afro-Brazilians 
appear to have increased relative to whites’. 
As for fertility, it is true that Afro-Brazilians have more children on average than 
white Brazilians, but the intergroup fertility ratio has been steadily declining since the 
early 1990s. Whereas in 1992 the average number of children of Afro-descendent 
women was 23 percent higher than that of white women, by 2002 this figure was 17 
percent, and by 2012 it was 15 percent. In other words, relative to white Brazilians, 
Afro-Brazilian fertility rates are slowing through time, not increasing (Figure A1). 
While demography undoubtedly plays some role in the changing composition of the 
population, both mortality and fertility trends do not provide compelling explanations 
for such drastic and short-term change. Only fertility statistics offer prima facie 
evidence in favor of a demographic explanation, but the longitudinal pattern belies 
demography as a logical explanation. 
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Figure A1 Fertility Rates of Women Aged 15-44, 1992-2014. Source: PNAD, IBGE. 
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Cohort Component Analysis 
While intergroup differences in demographic trends offer little prima facie 
evidence for the observed longitudinal patterns, demography must play some role in 
shaping the racial composition of the population. Figure 2.2 in the main text displays a 
simple cohort analysis to emphasize the Brazilians are in fact reclassifying and to 
produce crude estimates of rates of reclassification. Another technique commonly 
employed by demographers45 is cohort component analysis, which uses demographic 
trends at t-1 to make projections about the size of demographic groups at time t, 
assuming little or no change in demographic patterns.  
 
 2000  2010 (aged 10+) Difference due to  
Category Enumerated  Projected Enumerated Reclassification % Difference 
White 92.0  88.1 77.8 -10.3 -12 
Brown 65.8  62.6 68.8 6.2 10 
Black 10.6  9.9 13.0 3.1   31 
Table A4 Estimates of Inter-Census Racial Reclassification, 2000-10. Source: Miranda (2015). 
 
Table A4 presents estimates from this more rigorous demographic analysis, as 
reported in Miranda (2015). These estimates confirm the pattern that is readily 
observable in the aggregate statistics presented in Figure 1 of the main text, as well as 
in the simple cohort analysis in Figure 2: between 2000 and 2010 Brazilians 
demonstrated a tendency to move away from whiteness and toward blackness. These 
trends mark a departure from findings of cohort component analyses of racial 
reclassification conducted using earlier census rounds (Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade 
2004; Wood 1991; Wood and Carvalho 1994). Ultimately, then, these patterns cannot 
be dismissed as artifacts of either enumeration practices or demographic trends. 
  
                                                 
45 For examples of cohort component analyses employed for the purpose of estimating racial 
reclassification, see Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade (2004), Wood and Carvalho (1994), Loveman and 
Muniz (2007), and Lovell and Wood (1998). 
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APPENDIX B 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO CHAPTER THREE 
 
Policy Reform/Creation Year Description 
Federal Constitution 1988 Codified education as a basic social right for all 
citizens. 
Municipal spending 1990s Federal program to supplement municipal spending on 
primary and secondary education 
Municipal transfer of cash 1990s Changed how federal funds were sent to localities for 
education spending 
Lei de Diretrizes Básicas 
(LDB) 
1996 Reformed the national educational plan 
Fundo de manutenção e 
desenvolvimento do Ensino 
fundamental e de valorização 
do Magistério (FUNDEF) 
1996 ▪ Created federal and state spending floors 
▪ Altered local incentives by allocating funds to 
localities based on student enrollments 
▪ Earmarked federal and state resources for teachers’ 
salaries, teacher training, and  
▪ Incentivized administration by municipalities (by 
deducting funds for schools administered by states) to 
circumvent political bargaining between state and 
local governments   
Exame nacional do ensino 
médio (ENEM) 
1998, 
2009 
Initially created to assess the quality of high school 
education in Brazil (1998). Later reformed into a 
centralized university entrance exam (2009). 
Fundo de financiamento ao 
estudante ao ensinso superior 
(FIES) 
1999 Federal financial aid program for students to attend 
private universities 
Fiscal Responsibility Law 2000 Imposed a host of requirements for transparency, 
monitoring, and reporting for subnational governments 
in Brazil, including spending by FUNDEF/FUNDEB 
Afro-history Law 2003 Mandated teaching of African and Afro-Brazilian 
history and culture in schools 
Programa universidade para 
todos (ProUni) 
2004 Federal program to awarded full and partial 
scholarships for students to attend private universities 
Bolsa Família 2004 Included children’s educational attendance as a 
condition for receiving cash payments 
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Sistema nacional de avaliação 
da Educação Superior 
(SINAES) 
2004 Created a system for the assessment of the quality of 
public universities. 
Fundo de Manutenção e 
Desenvolvimento da 
Educação Básica (FUNDEB) 
2006 ▪ Provides federal top-up for under-resourced localities  
▪ Expanded coverage to high school 
▪ Mandated nationwide spending floors 
Programa de apoio de 
reestruturação e expansão das 
universidades federais 
(REUNI) 
2007 Expanded the number of federal university campuses 
and the number of slots offered at existing federal 
universities.  
Sistema de seleção unificada 
(SISU) 
2010 System operating jointly with the Enem to facilitate 
application and admission to multiple public 
universities 
Programa nacional de 
assistência estudantil 
(PNAES) 
2010 Program to improve retention of university students; 
Minimize effects of inequalities on completion rates; 
reduce dropout rates;  
Federal Affirmative Action 
Law 
2012 Reserved slots in free public universities for low-
income, public school, and ethnoracially disadvantaged 
students 
Table B1 National Education Policy and Program Reforms, 1988-2012 
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APPENDIX C 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Reflections on Methods Sequencing and Generating the Political Identity 
Hypothesis 
 The data and analyses presented in this dissertation reflect a multi-stage research 
design in which initial hypotheses derived from the literature were preliminarily tested 
using both observational qualitative methods (participant observation and interviews) 
and rigorous quantitative methods (regression and difference-in-difference analysis of 
municipal-level census data). With little support found for these hypotheses, I embarked 
on hypothesis-generating qualitative field research. The main goal of this fieldwork was 
to identify reclassifiers who were willing to participate in relatively open-ended 
interviews, with the intention of allowing these discussions to generate new ideas and 
insights, and to allow individuals to provide their own reflections on the processes of 
reclassification and consciousness formation. After preliminary field trips to establish 
institutional affiliations and secure grant funding, I began field research in São Paulo in 
July 2016. According to apparent subnational variation in patterns of reclassification, 
São Paulo was a strong positive case, and would likely serve as a useful starting point 
for identifying and exploring the phenomenon of interest. In Seawright and Gerring’s 
(2008) terms, São Paulo is an “extreme value on Y.” 
In São Paulo, I began by embedding myself in sites where I thought I would be 
most likely to find reclassifiers: black movement spaces and events; local NGOs and 
other civil society organizations; political campaigns and events of local politicians 
campaigning on “the racial question; and university associations. My goal was to collect 
data through participant observation, aiming to understand the discourse and rhetoric 
employed toward race, and to meet individuals who might reveal themselves to be 
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reclassifiers and who, through personal contact with me, might agree to be interviewed 
about this process. After identifying initial interviewees, I allowed additional interview 
subjects to “snowball” and continued to interview subjects until I felt I had reached 
saturation (Morse 2000).  
 Regarding the specific goals of the qualitative research, I used participant 
observation and open-ended, in-depth interviews with reclassifiers and non-reclassifiers 
to inductively generate new ideas and hypotheses about the causes of these apparent 
patterns of reclassification (Lynch 2013). These data were invaluable for illustrating 
causal pathways and giving me a sense of what these processes looked like “on the 
ground.” Before beginning this fieldwork, I hypothesized that racial consciousness was 
an important part of the observed patterns, but my initial hypothesis that racial and class 
cleavage structures were the cause of such consciousness proved to hold little water. As 
a result, the overly structural hypothesis fell away, but it remained clear to me that 
consciousness was an important part of this story.  
It was in São Paulo, my first prolonged research site, where the centrality of 
education as a driving forced in these patterns had come to the fore. Yet while this 
crystallized for me in São Paulo after completing a number of illuminating interviews, 
this was not something that came through explicitly or brightly in every single 
conversation. In fact, if ever I asked reclassifiers in my interviews what factor they 
would point to as the determinants of their racial identity change, almost none 
mentioned “education” by name. Instead, they often pointed to their personal 
experiences that were direct or indirect consequences of acquiring greater education 
(what they learned about history, how they got involved in a particular social movement 
or association, or what they experienced at their job). An important part of the 
generation of this hypothesis was allowing the diversity of personal experiences of my 
interview subjects to accumulate before it could become clear to me how exactly 
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education could operate in ways that would alter their understandings of racial 
boundaries and shape their political consciousness. 
Having narrowed in on education as the hypothesized driving force of these 
patterns, I moved to Recife, the capital city of the northeastern state of Pernambuco, in 
February 2017 to continue exploring these ideas in an ostensibly “weak” site for 
reclassification. There, I pursued similar sites for recruiting interview subjects and also 
employed snowball sampling. To gain greater leverage on the effects of greater 
education, I also sought to include lower-educated individuals in my interview sample, 
since these subjects were entirely absent among my São Paulo interviewees. To get 
access to and build relationships with less-educated Brazilians, I specifically set out to 
observe courses on adult literacy with local organizations (which in many ways were 
similar educational sites to those where I made contact with other interview subjects). 
 Once I felt I had a firmer grasp of the argument from my qualitative research, I 
then sought to further specify and refine the hypothesis and mechanisms through 
inductive iteration (Yom 2015), moving repeatedly between the data I was collecting on 
the ground, specific empirical findings in the literature, and testing my hunches using 
systematic quantitative data. After finding that the political identity hypothesis held 
some water, I continued to develop this argument and sought to test it more rigorously, 
to a greater extent, and up against the alternative hypotheses presented in Chapters 2 
and 5. Overall, I employed a multi-method and multi-staged research design in this 
project which enabled me to mine for insights into causal processes and later test these 
insights systematically.  
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Interview Sample 
 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Recife 0.47 0.51 0 1 34 
Age 31.62 14.01 18 70 34 
Female 0.59 0.50 0 1 34 
Per capita household income 1307 1419.72 0 7666.67 34 
Household residents 3.32 1.53 1 7 34 
Residents with income 1.65 0.95 0 4 34 
Household Income 3637.26 4001.69 0 23000 34 
Reclassifier 0.56 0.50 0 1 34 
Education 3.15 1.02 1 4 34 
(1)  < Primary 0.15 0.36 0 1 34 
(3)  High School 0.41 0.50 0 1 34 
(4)  University 0.44 0.50 0 1 34 
Racial ID 2.58 0.61 1 3 33 
(1)  White 0.06 0.24 0 1 33 
(2)  Brown 0.30 0.47 0 1 33 
(3)  Black 0.64 0.49 0 1 33 
Political Identity Index 0.80 0.25 0.14 1 30 
 Question 10 0.94 0.24 0 1 33 
Question 11 0.67 0.48 0 1 33 
Question 12 0.56 0.50 0 1 34 
Question 13 0.82 0.39 0 1 33 
Question 14 0.94 0.24 0 1 34 
Question 15 0.76 0.43 0 1 34 
Question 16 0.81 0.40 0 1 32 
Table B1 Descriptive Statistics of Interview Sample. Means for education, racial ID, 
and the political identity index reflect the means of single categorical or composite 
measures of individual values or items. Numbers in parentheses reflect codings of these 
single variables. Responses to question 12 were measured on a 5-category Likert scale, 
discretized such that responses of uncomfortable or very uncomfortable were coded as 
1. The political identity index is the mean of questions 10 through 16 of the structured 
interview questionnaire. 
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Questionnaire Applied to Interviewees During Structured Portion of Interview 
 
At the start of each interview, interviewees were asked to respond to the following 
questions after being read a consent script and consenting to voluntarily participate in 
the interview. 
 
1. Gender (classified by interviewer)  
a. Man 
b. Woman 
 
2. What year were you born? 
a. ______________ 
b. Confirm present-day age: _________ 
 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
a. None 
b. Primary incomplete 
c. Primary complete 
d. High school incomplete 
e. High school complete 
f. Technical/vocational incomplete 
g. Technical/vocational complete 
h. University incomplete 
i. University complete 
 
4. What is the total income of your household? 
a. ____________ 
 
5. Including yourself, how many people live in your household? 
a. ____________ 
 
6. Including yourself, how many people earn income in your household? 
a. ____________ 
 
7. In terms of your race or color, how do you identify? 
a. ____________ 
 
8. The Brazilian census uses six categories for people to classify themselves 
according to race or color: White, black, brown, yellow, indigenous, or other. 
In which of these categories would you classify yourself?  
a. White 
b. Black 
c. Brown 
d. Yellow 
e. Indigenous 
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f. Other 
g. NA 
 
9. Have you, or another member of your family, always classified your in that 
category, or did you classify yourself in another category in the past?  
a. Always in this category 
b. In another category in the past → which? _______________ 
c. Don’t know 
 
Political Identity Pilot Questions 
 
10. Do you think your color or race is an important part of who you are?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. NA 
 
11. Do you think your color or race affects your ability to get a good job? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. NA 
 
12. In situations where you are the only [census category] person, do you feel…? 
a. Very comfortable 
b. Comfortable 
c. Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 
d. Uncomfortable 
e. Very uncomfortable 
 
13. Do you think that what happens with [RACE] people in general in Brazil 
affects your life? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. NA 
 
14. Do you think that [RACE] people in Brazil should be more conscious of their 
race/color? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. NA 
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15. Would you say your race/color influences your political opinions or 
associations? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. NA 
 
16. Do you think that [RACE] people should organize politically on the basis of 
race/color? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. NA 
 
End of structured component of interview. 
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Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
 
After the structured portion, I transitioned the interview to a semi-structured format 
where I allowed questions and answers to flow in a conversational tone, making sure 
to cover the ground outlined below.  
 
Education 
 
To begin, can you tell me a little bit more about where you were born and grew up, 
and what your education was like growing up? 
 
Do your parents have a similar educational background to yours? 
 
What do/did your parents do for work? 
 
Do you have siblings? Do/did they go to school? 
 
What did your parents incentivize education for you when you were young? 
 
[If they have university education] When did you start to consider going to university?  
 
Did you assume you would go? 
 
Did you feel prepared? 
 
Did you know how to apply?  
 
How many times did you apply? 
 
How did you choose your course of study? 
 
Did you use any social program during the admissions process (Enem, Prouni, 
Fies, quotas, etc) 
 
[If university] When you compare yourself to your peers in high school, would you 
say that most went to university?  
 
[If no] Why do you think you made it there and they didn’t? 
 
How would you describe the quality of your education growing up? 
 
Were your schools public or private? 
 
Growing up what did you learn about slavery? 
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Did you learn about “racial democracy” (or the myth of the three races)?  
 
[If yes] What did you learn exactly? 
 
[If yes] What do you think of this today? 
 
Racial Identity/Race general 
 
[Referring back to questionnaire] Would you say that your race/color is an important 
part of who you are in Brazilian society? Por example, there are other ways you could 
describe yourself, like with class, religion, occupation, etc.  
 
[Referring back to open-ended race question] When I asked you openly how you 
identify racially, you used the word [open-ended ID]. Why did you choose that word, 
and not [negro, preto/pardo/branco, moreno]? 
  
 Did you always use that word? [If no] When did you start and why? 
 
Did you think a lot about race, generally, when you were growing up? 
 
Did your parents talk about race or racism at home? 
 
Can you remember the first time you were asked to classify yourself racially? Or was 
this second nature to you?  
 
Do your parents consider you the same race/color that you consider yourself?  
 
[If no] Why not? 
 
[If no] Do they know that you disagree? What do they think about how you 
identify? 
 
How would you classify your parents? And how would they classify themselves? 
Generally speaking, would you say that you suffer from racism in Brazil? 
 
[If yes] Is this more diffuse, or are there specific instances that you think of as 
examples of racism?  
  
[If no] Is there another kind of prejudice that you have experienced? [If 
needed, suggest class or region] 
 
Reclassification [Applies mostly to reclassifiers] 
 
Do you know how you are classified on your birth certificate? 
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Do you who chose that category for you? 
 
When did the way you identify racially change for you? 
  
Was it a particular moment or instant that tipped the scale? Or was it a slower 
process? 
 
Would you consider yourself to be someone who has “racial consciousness”?  
 
What does the word “consciousness” mean to you?  
 
Would you consider other members of your family racially conscious? 
 
[If no] Do you try to speak with them about racial questions/issues? How do 
they respond? 
 
If I asked you to point to a particular cause, or something that provoked/awakened, 
this consciousness, what would you say? 
 
Affirmative Action/Quotas [save for last if interviewee does not bring it up herself] 
 
Do you support affirmative action for negros? Why or why not? 
 
Some people say that affirmative action violates ideas of meritocracy. What do you 
think? 
 
Other say that affirmative action is un-Brazilian, in part because Brazil is a “racial 
democracy” and does have racism, and others because Brazilians are too racially 
mixed to determine who is/not black. What do you think? 
 
[Depending on timing of reclassification] When you were in high school, did you ever 
consider changing how you identified to be able to use a quota for university?  
 
Do you think “fraud” in affirmative action is a problem in Brazil?  
 
 [If yes] How widespread do you think it is? 
 
[If no] So when you see cases in the news, for example of very light-skinned 
students with blond hair using quotas to get into university, what do you think 
about that? 
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APPENDIX D 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
1998 x Primary 0.001 (0.052) -0.033 (0.056) -0.033 (0.056) 
1998 x High School -0.020 (0.064) -0.077 (0.075) -0.081 (0.075) 
1998 x University 0.024 (0.117) -0.010 (0.130) -0.016 (0.130) 
       
2003 x Primary 0.067 (0.051) 0.014 (0.054) 0.015 (0.054) 
2003 x High School 0.154 (0.062)* 0.067 (0.072) 0.062 (0.072) 
2003 x University 0.232 (0.110)* 0.188 (0.122) 0.179 (0.122) 
       
2008 x Primary 0.177 (0.052)* 0.089 (0.055) 0.090 (0.055) 
2008 x High School 0.302 (0.061)* 0.118 (0.070)+ 0.111 (0.070) 
2008 x University 0.527 (0.105)* 0.336 (0.116)* 0.322 (0.116)* 
       
2013 x Primary 0.155 (0.055)* 0.056 (0.058) 0.058 (0.058) 
2013 x High School 0.348 (0.063)* 0.103 (0.072) 0.096 (0.072) 
2013 x University 0.607 (0.106)* 0.343 (0.117)* 0.331 (0.117)* 
       
2015 x Primary 0.203 (0.055)* 0.123 (0.058)* 0.124 (0.058)* 
2015 x High School 0.359 (0.063)* 0.126 (0.072)+ 0.118 (0.072) 
2015 x University 0.686 (0.105)* 0.458 (0.116)* 0.443 (0.116)* 
       
1998 x Income   0.008 (0.009) 0.008 (0.009) 
2003 x Income   0.008 (0.009) 0.009 (0.009) 
2008 x Income   0.012 (0.009) 0.013 (0.009) 
2013 x Income   0.012 (0.009) 0.012 (0.009) 
2015 x Income   0.009 (0.009) 0.010 (0.009) 
       
1998 x Female   0.067 (0.064) 0.068 (0.064) 
2003 x Female   -0.008 (0.060) -0.007 (0.060) 
2008 x Female   0.010 (0.058) 0.010 (0.058) 
2013 x Female   -0.083 (0.059) -0.083 (0.059) 
2015 x Female   -0.040 (0.058) -0.040 (0.058) 
       
1998 x Municip. Native   0.026 (0.044) 0.025 (0.044) 
2003 x Municip. Native   -0.017 (0.043) -0.016 (0.043) 
2008 x Municip. Native   -0.111 (0.042)* -0.110 (0.042)* 
2013 x Municip. Native   -0.041 (0.044) -0.040 (0.044) 
2015 x Municip. Native   -0.038 (0.043) -0.037 (0.043) 
       
1998 x State migrant   -0.025 (0.064) -0.025 (0.064) 
2003 x State migrant   0.010 (0.064) 0.012 (0.064) 
2008 x State migrant   -0.112 (0.070) -0.110 (0.070) 
2013 x State migrant   -0.070 (0.079) -0.068 (0.079) 
2015 x State migrant   -0.189 (0.083)* -0.187 (0.083)* 
       
1998 x Cohort Lag     0.786 (1.665) 
2003 x Cohort Lag     0.425 (1.942) 
2008 x Cohort Lag     1.580 (2.030) 
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2013 x Cohort Lag     0.016 (1.721) 
2015 x Cohort Lag     0.378 (1.580) 
       
1998 0.039 (0.043) -0.014 (0.062) -0.380 (0.780) 
2003 0.155 (0.043)* 0.126 (0.060)* -0.125 (0.943) 
2008 0.250 (0.043)* 0.296 (0.062)* -0.695 (1.066) 
2013 0.299 (0.046)* 0.409 (0.066)* 0.242 (0.909) 
2015 0.369 (0.046)* 0.466 (0.066)* 0.079 (0.833) 
Primary -0.804 (0.038)* -0.506 (0.041)* -0.510 (0.041)* 
High School -1.282 (0.048)* -0.628 (0.056)* -0.627 (0.056)* 
University -2.203 (0.093)* -1.316 (0.102)* -1.309 (0.102)* 
Income   -0.163 (0.007)* -0.163 (0.007)* 
Female   0.123 (0.051)* 0.124 (0.051)* 
Municip. native   0.014 (0.033) 0.012 (0.033) 
State migrant   0.158 (0.046)* 0.154 (0.046)* 
Cohort Lag     1.741 (1.042)+ 
Constant 0.644 (0.032)* 1.202 (0.046)* 0.388 (0.489) 
Interactive State FX N N N 
Observations 140718 137410 137410 
AIC 185758.188 176818.204 176813.411 
Table D1 Pseudo-Panel Estimates of Nonwhite Identification among Cohorts 3 and 4. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05. 
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 (4) 
1998 x Primary -0.033 (0.061) 
1998 x High School -0.106 (0.082) 
1998 x University -0.094 (0.137) 
   
2003 x Primary 0.028 (0.060) 
2003 x High School 0.172 (0.078)* 
2003 x University 0.198 (0.129) 
   
2008 x Primary 0.077 (0.061) 
2008 x High School 0.252 (0.076)* 
2008 x University 0.424 (0.122)* 
   
2013 x Primary 0.048 (0.064) 
2013 x High School 0.271 (0.078)* 
2013 x University 0.422 (0.123)* 
   
2015 x Primary 0.110 (0.064)+ 
2015 x High School 0.301 (0.078)* 
2015 x University 0.527 (0.122)* 
   
1998 x Income 0.017 (0.010)+ 
2003 x Income 0.014 (0.010) 
2008 x Income 0.008 (0.010) 
2013 x Income 0.013 (0.010) 
2015 x Income 0.017 (0.010)+ 
   
1998 x Female 0.122 (0.071)+ 
2003 x Female 0.064 (0.066) 
2008 x Female 0.080 (0.064) 
2013 x Female 0.023 (0.065) 
2015 x Female 0.029 (0.064) 
   
1998 x Municip. Native 0.067 (0.049) 
2003 x Municip. Native 0.040 (0.047) 
2008 x Municip. Native -0.058 (0.047) 
2013 x Municip. Native 0.029 (0.048) 
2015 x Municip. Native 0.014 (0.048) 
   
1998 x State migrant 0.008 (0.071) 
2003 x State migrant 0.006 (0.070) 
2008 x State migrant -0.129 (0.076)+ 
2013 x State migrant 0.021 (0.087) 
2015 x State migrant -0.083 (0.093) 
   
1998 x Cohort Lag 1.361 (1.813) 
2003 x Cohort Lag 0.730 (2.111) 
2008 x Cohort Lag 3.347 (2.194) 
2013 x Cohort Lag 0.247 (1.865) 
2015 x Cohort Lag 2.196 (1.717) 
   
1998 -0.918 (0.878) 
2003 -0.279 (1.043) 
2008 -1.812 (1.167) 
2013 -0.057 (1.002) 
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2015 -1.152 (0.923) 
Primary -0.321 (0.046)* 
High School -0.777 (0.061)* 
University -1.460 (0.107)* 
Income -0.104 (0.007)* 
Female 0.026 (0.056) 
Municip. native -0.091 (0.037)* 
State migrant -0.035 (0.051) 
Cohort Lag 0.806 (1.141) 
Constant 1.003 (0.557)+ 
Interactive State FX Y 
Observations 137410 
AIC 156984.253 
Table D2 Pseudo-Panel Estimates of Nonwhite Identification among Cohorts 3 and 4. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05. 
 
 
 
 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.566 0.592 0.587 0.586 0.628 0.617 
 (0.0136) (0.0155) (0.0116) (0.0114) (0.0132) (0.0139) 
Primary 0.504 0.523 0.529 0.538 0.574 0.575 
 (0.0120) (0.0149) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0128) (0.0132) 
High School 0.414 0.417 0.466 0.480 0.526 0.522 
 (0.0140) (0.0160) (0.0114) (0.0110) (0.0139) (0.0142) 
University 0.287 0.291 0.336 0.377 0.415 0.428 
 (0.0196) (0.0184) (0.0146) (0.0126) (0.0157) (0.0155) 
Table D3 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID. Computed from Model 4. 
 
 
 
 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.0257 0.0206 0.0202 0.0613*** 0.0505*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0190) (0.0195) 
Primary 0.0191 0.0252 0.0340** 0.0699*** 0.0716*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0175) (0.0178) 
High School 0.00329 0.0520*** 0.0664*** 0.112*** 0.108*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0197) (0.0199) 
University 0.00377 0.0486** 0.0899*** 0.128*** 0.140*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0245) (0.0233) (0.0251) (0.0250) 
Table D4 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993. Computed from Model 
4. + p < .1, * p < .05. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 Excl. Top Decile Bottom 5 Deciles Top Decile 
1998 x Primary -0.043 (0.062) -0.090 (0.073) 0.634 (0.591) 
1998 x High School -0.108 (0.085) 0.098 (0.133) 0.385 (0.578) 
1998 x University 0.117 (0.196) 0.205 (0.599) 0.279 (0.586) 
       
2003 x Primary 0.020 (0.060) 0.044 (0.072) 0.242 (0.561) 
2003 x High School 0.146 (0.080)+ 0.298 (0.125)* 0.523 (0.545) 
2003 x University 0.282 (0.184) 0.836 (0.529) 0.458 (0.551) 
       
2008 x Primary 0.066 (0.061) 0.087 (0.074) 0.642 (0.522) 
2008 x High School 0.201 (0.079)* 0.423 (0.121)* 0.857 (0.507)+ 
2008 x University 0.570 (0.172)* 1.075 (0.467)* 0.669 (0.513) 
       
2013 x Primary 0.029 (0.064) 0.074 (0.080) 0.630 (0.492) 
2013 x High School 0.244 (0.081)* 0.475 (0.125)* 0.631 (0.478) 
2013 x University 0.554 (0.173)* 1.108 (0.467)* 0.552 (0.484) 
       
2015 x Primary 0.086 (0.065) 0.028 (0.081) 1.197 (0.497)* 
2015 x High School 0.256 (0.081)* 0.495 (0.125)* 1.320 (0.483)* 
2015 x University 0.573 (0.171)* 0.963 (0.465)* 1.333 (0.488)* 
       
1998 x Income 0.020 (0.011)+ 0.013 (0.025)   
2003 x Income 0.019 (0.011)+ 0.011 (0.024)   
2008 x Income 0.014 (0.010) 0.016 (0.024)   
2013 x Income 0.022 (0.011)* 0.017 (0.026)   
2015 x Income 0.026 (0.011)* 0.046 (0.026)+   
       
1998 x Female 0.107 (0.075) 0.082 (0.098) 0.156 (0.223) 
2003 x Female 0.040 (0.070) 0.043 (0.092) 0.161 (0.208) 
2008 x Female 0.064 (0.068) 0.126 (0.090) 0.113 (0.196) 
2013 x Female 0.012 (0.069) 0.029 (0.093) -0.040 (0.195) 
2015 x Female 0.028 (0.068) 0.034 (0.092) -0.053 (0.191) 
       
1998 x Municip. native 0.063 (0.051) 0.053 (0.069) 0.134 (0.181) 
2003 x Municip. native 0.069 (0.049) 0.089 (0.067) -0.276 (0.171) 
2008 x Municip. native -0.093 (0.049)+ -0.016 (0.068) 0.197 (0.163) 
2013 x Municip. native 0.023 (0.051) 0.010 (0.073) 0.101 (0.164) 
2015 x Municip. native -0.004 (0.051) 0.054 (0.072) 0.143 (0.160) 
       
1998 x State migrant 0.025 (0.076) 0.117 (0.104) -0.059 (0.226) 
2003 x State migrant 0.063 (0.076) 0.231 (0.105)* -0.347 (0.212) 
2008 x State migrant -0.152 (0.083)+ -0.270 (0.117)* 0.127 (0.209) 
2013 x State migrant 0.072 (0.096) 0.052 (0.144) -0.037 (0.232) 
2015 x State migrant -0.077 (0.103) -0.209 (0.153) -0.005 (0.239) 
       
1998 x Cohort Lag 0.585 (1.890) -0.984 (2.558) 10.904 (6.541)+ 
2003 x Cohort Lag 1.921 (2.212) 0.356 (3.018) -9.201 (7.315) 
2008 x Cohort Lag 2.985 (2.319) 3.253 (3.287) 3.922 (7.096) 
2013 x Cohort Lag -0.256 (1.981) -2.637 (2.892) 1.077 (5.917) 
2015 x Cohort Lag 1.280 (1.829) -0.977 (2.664) 6.323 (5.433) 
       
1998 -0.453 (0.917) -0.082 (1.247) -6.511 (3.143)* 
2003 -0.862 (1.092) -0.034 (1.495) 4.307 (3.609) 
2008 -1.624 (1.234) -2.021 (1.755) -2.613 (3.730) 
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2013 0.202 (1.065) 1.327 (1.566) -0.911 (3.104) 
2015 -0.665 (0.987) 0.245 (1.453) -4.281 (2.822) 
Primary -0.325 (0.046)* -0.306 (0.055)* -0.928 (0.409)* 
High School -0.750 (0.064)* -0.887 (0.102)* -1.318 (0.401)* 
University -1.387 (0.157)* -1.591 (0.447)* -1.827 (0.407)* 
Income -0.092 (0.008)* -0.066 (0.019)*   
Female 0.035 (0.060) 0.079 (0.078) 0.024 (0.172) 
Municip. native -0.092 (0.038)* -0.112 (0.052)* -0.060 (0.136) 
State migrant -0.021 (0.054) -0.053 (0.074) -0.142 (0.161) 
Cohort Lag 0.862 (1.188) 1.811 (1.623) -0.108 (4.200) 
Constant 0.865 (0.581) 0.374 (0.799) 1.205 (2.020) 
Interactive State FX Y Y Y 
Observations 120468 61464 16942 
AIC 139551.998 70295.603 17285.052 
Table D5 Pseudo-Panel Estimates of Nonwhite Identification among Cohorts 3 and 4 and by 
Income Group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05. 
 
 
 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.590 0.607 0.617 0.611 0.655 0.649 
 (0.0138) (0.0159) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0138) (0.0146) 
Primary 0.526 0.535 0.557 0.560 0.597 0.603 
 (0.0125) (0.0155) (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0138) (0.0143) 
High School 0.441 0.435 0.496 0.500 0.553 0.551 
 (0.0153) (0.0171) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0153) (0.0158) 
University 0.318 0.354 0.393 0.445 0.484 0.484 
 (0.0298) (0.0257) (0.0203) (0.0163) (0.0193) (0.0189) 
Table D6 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Excluding Top Decile) 
 
 
 
 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.0172 0.0272 0.0217 0.0650*** 0.0594*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0180) (0.0183) (0.0195) (0.0201) 
Primary 0.00862 0.0309* 0.0338** 0.0707*** 0.0768*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0163) (0.0168) (0.0186) (0.0190) 
High School -0.00541 0.0552*** 0.0595*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0217) (0.0220) 
University 0.0359 0.0756** 0.127*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0361) (0.0340) (0.0355) (0.0353) 
Table D7 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Excluding Top 
Decile) 
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 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.682 0.680 0.690 0.689 0.716 0.709 
 (0.00825) (0.00754) (0.00497) (0.00463) (0.00657) (0.00720) 
Primary 0.627 0.614 0.632 0.648 0.660 0.662 
 (0.00812) (0.00704) (0.00410) (0.00452) (0.00727) (0.00780) 
High School 0.499 0.538 0.570 0.603 0.620 0.612 
 (0.0158) (0.0131) (0.00836) (0.00739) (0.00966) (0.0102) 
University 0.375 0.362 0.469 0.535 0.548 0.553 
 (0.0583) (0.0512) (0.0405) (0.0221) (0.0203) (0.0182) 
Table D8 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Bottom 5 Deciles) 
 
 
 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary -0.00173 0.00821 0.00747 0.0341*** 0.0277** 
 (0.0112) (0.00963) (0.00946) (0.0105) (0.0109) 
Primary -0.0137 0.00508 0.0201** 0.0330*** 0.0347*** 
 (0.0107) (0.00910) (0.00929) (0.0109) (0.0113) 
High School 0.0388* 0.0712*** 0.104*** 0.121*** 0.113*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0179) (0.0174) (0.0185) (0.0188) 
University -0.0136 0.0941 0.159** 0.173*** 0.178*** 
 (0.0776) (0.0710) (0.0624) (0.0618) (0.0611) 
Table D9 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Bottom 5 Deciles) 
 
 
 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.433 0.450 0.446 0.418 0.466 0.350 
 (0.0502) (0.0476) (0.0405) (0.0350) (0.0289) (0.0293) 
Primary 0.305 0.325 0.369 0.384 0.413 0.396 
 (0.0237) (0.0217) (0.0145) (0.0123) (0.0144) (0.0148) 
High School 0.247 0.244 0.303 0.327 0.333 0.328 
 (0.0205) (0.0169) (0.00954) (0.00768) (0.0109) (0.0111) 
University 0.167 0.157 0.211 0.216 0.232 0.245 
 (0.0180) (0.0142) (0.00879) (0.00609) (0.00863) (0.00924) 
Table D10 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Top Decile) 
 
 
 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.0174 0.0132 -0.0145 0.0336 -0.0829 
 (0.0692) (0.0645) (0.0612) (0.0579) (0.0581) 
Primary 0.0206 0.0644** 0.0790*** 0.109*** 0.0911*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0277) (0.0267) (0.0277) (0.0279) 
High School -0.00320 0.0560** 0.0800*** 0.0862*** 0.0815*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0226) (0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0233) 
University -0.00908 0.0444** 0.0498*** 0.0652*** 0.0784*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0200) (0.0190) (0.0199) (0.0202) 
Table D11 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Top Decile) 
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 (1) 
 Full Sample 
1998 x Primary -0.007 (0.039) 
1998 x High School 0.009 (0.053) 
1998 x University -0.043 (0.084) 
   
2003 x Primary 0.018 (0.037) 
2003 x High School 0.181 (0.049)* 
2003 x University 0.123 (0.078) 
   
2008 x Primary 0.096 (0.037)* 
2008 x High School 0.327 (0.049)* 
2008 x University 0.382 (0.075)* 
   
2013 x Primary 0.019 (0.039) 
2013 x High School 0.250 (0.050)* 
2013 x University 0.315 (0.075)* 
   
2015 x Primary 0.094 (0.039)* 
2015 x High School 0.293 (0.049)* 
2015 x University 0.412 (0.074)* 
   
1998 x Income -0.004 (0.007) 
2003 x Income 0.004 (0.006) 
2008 x Income 0.003 (0.006) 
2013 x Income 0.016 (0.006)* 
2015 x Income 0.015 (0.006)* 
   
1998 x Female 0.038 (0.042) 
2003 x Female 0.049 (0.040) 
2008 x Female 0.041 (0.038) 
2013 x Female 0.000 (0.039) 
2015 x Female 0.034 (0.038) 
   
1998 x Municip. native 0.050 (0.032) 
2003 x Municip. native 0.049 (0.031) 
2008 x Municip. native -0.020 (0.030) 
2013 x Municip. native 0.036 (0.031) 
2015 x Municip. native 0.024 (0.031) 
   
1998 x State migrant 0.023 (0.048) 
2003 x State migrant 0.028 (0.046) 
2008 x State migrant -0.090 (0.048)+ 
2013 x State migrant 0.050 (0.053) 
2015 x State migrant -0.020 (0.055) 
   
1998 x Cohort Lag -0.323 (0.599) 
2003 x Cohort Lag 0.687 (0.564) 
2008 x Cohort Lag 1.288 (0.557)* 
2013 x Cohort Lag 2.151 (0.630)* 
2015 x Cohort Lag 3.123 (0.588)* 
   
1998 0.149 (0.321) 
2003 -0.074 (0.305) 
2008 -0.596 (0.309)+ 
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2013 -1.118 (0.353)* 
2015 -1.529 (0.333)* 
Primary -0.319 (0.029)* 
High School -0.822 (0.040)* 
University -1.477 (0.065)* 
Income -0.092 (0.005)* 
Female 0.044 (0.034) 
Municip. native -0.100 (0.024)* 
State migrant -0.082 (0.035)* 
Cohort Lag 1.373 (0.437)* 
Constant 0.553 (0.234)* 
Interactive State FX Y 
Observations 363,968 
AIC 414725.317 
Table D12 Pseudo-Panel Estimates of Nonwhite Identification among All Cohorts, Full Sample. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05. 
 
 
 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.574 0.577 0.596 0.596 0.623 0.608 
 (0.00697) (0.00631) (0.00455) (0.00406) (0.00498) (0.00522) 
Primary 0.512 0.513 0.536 0.551 0.564 0.564 
 (0.00584) (0.00505) (0.00312) (0.00294) (0.00447) (0.00470) 
High School 0.413 0.416 0.468 0.495 0.508 0.502 
 (0.00774) (0.00640) (0.00407) (0.00384) (0.00540) (0.00558) 
University 0.291 0.284 0.327 0.373 0.386 0.393 
 (0.0113) (0.00920) (0.00721) (0.00603) (0.00686) (0.00676) 
Table D13 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Full Sample) 
 
 
 
 
 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.00333 0.0216*** 0.0220*** 0.0491*** 0.0336*** 
 (0.00941) (0.00833) (0.00807) (0.00857) (0.00871) 
Primary 0.00102 0.0243*** 0.0393*** 0.0517*** 0.0515*** 
 (0.00772) (0.00662) (0.00654) (0.00736) (0.00749) 
High School 0.00291 0.0547*** 0.0825*** 0.0949*** 0.0889*** 
 (0.0100) (0.00875) (0.00864) (0.00944) (0.00954) 
University -0.00720 0.0361*** 0.0819*** 0.0951*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0134) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0131) 
Table D14 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Full Sample) 
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 (2) (3) (4) 
 Excl. Top Decile Bottom 5 Deciles Top Decile 
1998 x Primary -0.014 (0.039) -0.048 (0.048) 0.046 (0.333) 
1998 x High School 0.023 (0.055) 0.217 (0.092)* -0.085 (0.325) 
1998 x University 0.139 (0.121) -0.013 (0.378) -0.136 (0.328) 
       
2003 x Primary 0.010 (0.037) -0.008 (0.046) 0.291 (0.324) 
2003 x High School 0.189 (0.052)* 0.318 (0.084)* 0.270 (0.317) 
2003 x University 0.249 (0.113)* 0.446 (0.340) 0.259 (0.320) 
       
2008 x Primary 0.084 (0.038)* 0.074 (0.047) 0.520 (0.306)+ 
2008 x High School 0.314 (0.051)* 0.483 (0.081)* 0.569 (0.298)+ 
2008 x University 0.556 (0.106)* 0.757 (0.303)* 0.480 (0.301) 
       
2013 x Primary 0.004 (0.040) -0.004 (0.050) 0.432 (0.287) 
2013 x High School 0.247 (0.052)* 0.423 (0.083)* 0.367 (0.279) 
2013 x University 0.455 (0.105)* 0.679 (0.299)* 0.351 (0.281) 
       
2015 x Primary 0.075 (0.040)+ 0.036 (0.051) 0.939 (0.294)* 
2015 x High School 0.278 (0.052)* 0.412 (0.082)* 0.930 (0.286)* 
2015 x University 0.449 (0.104)* 0.727 (0.296)* 1.013 (0.288)* 
       
1998 x Income -0.001 (0.007) -0.004 (0.016)   
2003 x Income 0.008 (0.007) -0.001 (0.016)   
2008 x Income 0.010 (0.007) 0.017 (0.016)   
2013 x Income 0.024 (0.007)* 0.032 (0.016)*   
2015 x Income 0.023 (0.007)* 0.039 (0.016)*   
       
1998 x Female 0.054 (0.045) 0.045 (0.061) -0.159 (0.138) 
2003 x Female 0.040 (0.042) 0.009 (0.057) 0.057 (0.126) 
2008 x Female 0.034 (0.040) 0.064 (0.055) 0.044 (0.119) 
2013 x Female 0.001 (0.041) 0.012 (0.056) -0.066 (0.119) 
2015 x Female 0.033 (0.041) 0.036 (0.056) -0.025 (0.118) 
       
1998 x Municip. native 0.052 (0.034) 0.052 (0.046) 0.034 (0.115) 
2003 x Municip. native 0.054 (0.032)+ 0.072 (0.044)+ 0.013 (0.105) 
2008 x Municip. native -0.038 (0.031) 0.003 (0.044) 0.121 (0.101) 
2013 x Municip. native 0.031 (0.033) 0.044 (0.046) 0.091 (0.101) 
2015 x Municip. native 0.017 (0.032) 0.070 (0.046) 0.097 (0.100) 
       
1998 x State migrant 0.034 (0.051) 0.098 (0.070) -0.024 (0.146) 
2003 x State migrant 0.068 (0.049) 0.146 (0.068)* -0.239 (0.136)+ 
2008 x State migrant -0.081 (0.052) -0.153 (0.072)* -0.037 (0.133) 
2013 x State migrant 0.116 (0.059)+ 0.124 (0.084) -0.096 (0.139) 
2015 x State migrant 0.025 (0.061) 0.053 (0.087) -0.155 (0.147) 
       
1998 x Cohort Lag -0.429 (0.616) -0.742 (0.834) 1.736 (2.574) 
2003 x Cohort Lag 0.289 (0.585) -0.128 (0.797) 5.457 (2.283)* 
2008 x Cohort Lag 1.078 (0.583)+ 0.738 (0.809) 3.404 (2.188) 
2013 x Cohort Lag 1.795 (0.665)* 0.412 (0.947) 4.891 (2.305)* 
2015 x Cohort Lag 2.790 (0.618)* 1.466 (0.876)+ 6.124 (2.225)* 
       
1998 0.229 (0.332) 0.387 (0.465) -1.270 (1.302) 
2003 0.102 (0.317) 0.428 (0.438) -2.515 (1.176)* 
2008 -0.502 (0.323) -0.397 (0.452) -1.950 (1.144)+ 
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2013 -0.966 (0.373)* -0.266 (0.535) -2.548 (1.219)* 
2015 -1.364 (0.352)* -0.687 (0.504) -3.719 (1.172)* 
Primary -0.321 (0.029)* -0.288 (0.036)* -0.695 (0.242)* 
High School -0.809 (0.042)* -0.915 (0.070)* -1.046 (0.237)* 
University -1.410 (0.095)* -1.506 (0.285)* -1.623 (0.239)* 
Income -0.081 (0.005)* -0.067 (0.013)*   
Female 0.045 (0.035) 0.104 (0.048)* 0.061 (0.106) 
Municip. native -0.096 (0.025)* -0.095 (0.035)* -0.112 (0.086) 
State migrant -0.077 (0.037)* -0.114 (0.051)* -0.123 (0.105) 
Cohort Lag 1.439 (0.449)* 1.500 (0.609)* -0.350 (1.950) 
Constant 0.441 (0.242)+ 0.251 (0.333) 0.838 (0.982) 
Interactive State FX Y Y Y 
Observations 317,595 160,967 46,373 
AIC 367159.037 183383.226 46868.049 
Table D15 Pseudo-Panel Estimates of Nonwhite Identification among All Cohorts and by Income 
Group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05. 
 
 
 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.597 0.601 0.618 0.620 0.648 0.634 
 (0.00696) (0.00628) (0.00448) (0.00399) (0.00506) (0.00536) 
Primary 0.535 0.535 0.556 0.573 0.585 0.586 
 (0.00603) (0.00519) (0.00317) (0.00307) (0.00481) (0.00507) 
High School 0.437 0.443 0.493 0.519 0.534 0.528 
 (0.00859) (0.00704) (0.00452) (0.00431) (0.00605) (0.00626) 
University 0.321 0.347 0.382 0.444 0.452 0.438 
 (0.0175) (0.0144) (0.0116) (0.00882) (0.00932) (0.00879) 
Table D16 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Excluding Top Decile) 
 
 
 
 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.00377 0.0203** 0.0231*** 0.0504*** 0.0366*** 
 (0.00938) (0.00828) (0.00803) (0.00861) (0.00879) 
Primary -3.12e-06 0.0214*** 0.0382*** 0.0504*** 0.0511*** 
 (0.00795) (0.00681) (0.00676) (0.00771) (0.00788) 
High School 0.00606 0.0557*** 0.0821*** 0.0973*** 0.0905*** 
 (0.0111) (0.00971) (0.00961) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
University 0.0262 0.0608*** 0.123*** 0.130*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0210) (0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0196) 
Table D17 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Excluding Top 
Decile) 
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 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.682 0.680 0.690 0.689 0.716 0.709 
 (0.00825) (0.00754) (0.00497) (0.00463) (0.00657) (0.00720) 
Primary 0.627 0.614 0.632 0.648 0.660 0.662 
 (0.00812) (0.00704) (0.00410) (0.00452) (0.00727) (0.00780) 
High School 0.499 0.538 0.570 0.603 0.620 0.612 
 (0.0158) (0.0131) (0.00836) (0.00739) (0.00966) (0.0102) 
University 0.375 0.362 0.469 0.535 0.548 0.553 
 (0.0583) (0.0512) (0.0405) (0.0221) (0.0203) (0.0182) 
Table D18 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Bottom 5 Deciles) 
 
 
 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary -0.00173 0.00821 0.00747 0.0341*** 0.0277** 
 (0.0112) (0.00963) (0.00946) (0.0105) (0.0109) 
Primary -0.0137 0.00508 0.0201** 0.0330*** 0.0347*** 
 (0.0107) (0.00910) (0.00929) (0.0109) (0.0113) 
High School 0.0388* 0.0712*** 0.104*** 0.121*** 0.113*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0179) (0.0174) (0.0185) (0.0188) 
University -0.0136 0.0941 0.159** 0.173*** 0.178*** 
 (0.0776) (0.0710) (0.0624) (0.0618) (0.0611) 
Table D19 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Bottom 5 Deciles) 
 
 
 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.433 0.450 0.446 0.418 0.466 0.350 
 (0.0502) (0.0476) (0.0405) (0.0350) (0.0289) (0.0293) 
Primary 0.305 0.325 0.369 0.384 0.413 0.396 
 (0.0237) (0.0217) (0.0145) (0.0123) (0.0144) (0.0148) 
High School 0.247 0.244 0.303 0.327 0.333 0.328 
 (0.0205) (0.0169) (0.00954) (0.00768) (0.0109) (0.0111) 
University 0.167 0.157 0.211 0.216 0.232 0.245 
 (0.0180) (0.0142) (0.00879) (0.00609) (0.00863) (0.00924) 
Table D20 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID  
 
 
 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
< Primary 0.0174 0.0132 -0.0145 0.0336 -0.0829 
 (0.0692) (0.0645) (0.0612) (0.0579) (0.0581) 
Primary 0.0206 0.0644** 0.0790*** 0.109*** 0.0911*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0277) (0.0267) (0.0277) (0.0279) 
High School -0.00320 0.0560** 0.0800*** 0.0862*** 0.0815*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0226) (0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0233) 
University -0.00908 0.0444** 0.0498*** 0.0652*** 0.0784*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0200) (0.0190) (0.0199) (0.0202) 
Table D21 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 
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 Brown ID vs. White ID Black ID vs. White ID 
1998 x Primary -0.048 (0.063) 0.007 (0.114) 
1998 x High School -0.114 (0.087) 0.013 (0.184) 
1998 x University 0.099 (0.205) 0.349 (0.539) 
     
2003 x Primary -0.002 (0.061) 0.174 (0.110) 
2003 x High School 0.093 (0.083) 0.561 (0.169)* 
2003 x University 0.201 (0.193) 0.882 (0.502)+ 
     
2008 x Primary 0.052 (0.062) 0.175 (0.108) 
2008 x High School 0.134 (0.081)+ 0.663 (0.163)* 
2008 x University 0.525 (0.180)* 0.985 (0.483)* 
     
2013 x Primary 0.027 (0.066) 0.088 (0.110) 
2013 x High School 0.193 (0.084)* 0.628 (0.164)* 
2013 x University 0.518 (0.181)* 0.927 (0.481)+ 
     
2015 x Primary 0.079 (0.066) 0.167 (0.109) 
2015 x High School 0.189 (0.084)* 0.698 (0.162)* 
2015 x University 0.504 (0.180)* 1.073 (0.478)* 
     
1998 x Income Decile 0.018 (0.011) 0.035 (0.022) 
2003 x Income Decile 0.014 (0.011) 0.044 (0.020)* 
2008 x Income Decile 0.010 (0.011) 0.038 (0.020)+ 
2013 x Income Decile 0.017 (0.011) 0.047 (0.020)* 
2015 x Income Decile 0.026 (0.011)* 0.034 (0.020)+ 
     
1998 x Female 0.097 (0.076) 0.104 (0.136) 
2003 x Female 0.040 (0.071) -0.020 (0.126) 
2008 x Female 0.075 (0.069) -0.060 (0.122) 
2013 x Female 0.028 (0.070) -0.141 (0.122) 
2015 x Female 0.032 (0.070) -0.092 (0.121) 
     
1998 x Municip. native 0.054 (0.053) 0.077 (0.101) 
2003 x Municip. native 0.079 (0.051) -0.033 (0.095) 
2008 x Municip. native -0.078 (0.051) -0.224 (0.093)* 
2013 x Municip. native 0.027 (0.053) -0.071 (0.094) 
2015 x Municip. native 0.026 (0.053) -0.200 (0.093)* 
     
1998 x State migrant 0.025 (0.076) 0.091 (0.168) 
2003 x State migrant 0.056 (0.076) 0.186 (0.161) 
2008 x State migrant -0.140 (0.083)+ -0.108 (0.169) 
2013 x State migrant 0.059 (0.096) 0.272 (0.178) 
2015 x State migrant -0.064 (0.101) 0.003 (0.186) 
     
1998 x Cohort Lag 0.117 (1.957) 3.537 (3.697) 
2003 x Cohort Lag 2.036 (2.295) 1.697 (4.122) 
2008 x Cohort Lag 2.422 (2.407) 5.886 (4.084) 
2013 x Cohort Lag 0.033 (2.057) -0.934 (3.488) 
2015 x Cohort Lag 2.070 (1.899) -1.200 (3.223) 
     
1998 -0.215 (0.949) -1.898 (1.865) 
2003 -0.869 (1.135) -0.987 (2.082) 
2008 -1.412 (1.282) -2.215 (2.185) 
2013 -0.029 (1.109) 1.440 (1.882) 
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2015 -1.251 (1.026) 1.943 (1.738) 
Primary -0.309 (0.047)* -0.440 (0.087)* 
High School -0.707 (0.066)* -1.105 (0.145)* 
University -1.338 (0.164)* -1.816 (0.465)* 
Income Decile -0.090 (0.008)* -0.106 (0.017)* 
Female -0.000 (0.060) 0.271 (0.111)* 
Municip. native -0.119 (0.040)* 0.096 (0.078) 
State migrant 0.006 (0.053) -0.287 (0.125)* 
Cohort Lag 1.026 (1.225) -0.278 (2.448) 
Constant 0.705 (0.601) -1.373 (1.255) 
Interactive State FX Y Y 
Table D22 Multinomial Logit Pseudo-Panel Estimates (Excluding Top Income Decile). + p < .1, * p 
< .05. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 120,468, AIC = 195143.493. 
 
 
  1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
White ID 
< Primary 0.410 0.392 0.383 0.388 0.345 0.350 
 (0.0137) (0.0160) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0139) (0.0146) 
Primary 0.474 0.465 0.443 0.440 0.403 0.397 
 (0.0125) (0.0155) (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0138) (0.0144) 
High School 0.559 0.565 0.504 0.500 0.446 0.447 
 (0.0154) (0.0172) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0155) (0.0159) 
University 0.682 0.647 0.607 0.555 0.516 0.514 
 (0.0303) (0.0259) (0.0206) (0.0167) (0.0194) (0.0192) 
        
Brown 
ID 
< Primary 0.521 0.512 0.532 0.514 0.521 0.500 
 (0.0142) (0.0170) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0151) (0.0155) 
Primary 0.472 0.457 0.479 0.471 0.482 0.469 
 (0.0126) (0.0157) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0143) (0.0146) 
High School 0.406 0.383 0.426 0.412 0.438 0.415 
 (0.0152) (0.0167) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0154) (0.0153) 
University 0.296 0.311 0.333 0.376 0.391 0.367 
 (0.0300) (0.0252) (0.0203) (0.0164) (0.0189) (0.0180) 
        
Black ID 
< Primary 0.0695 0.0960 0.0850 0.0980 0.134 0.150 
 (0.00850) (0.0131) (0.00771) (0.00633) (0.0116) (0.0128) 
Primary 0.0543 0.0776 0.0784 0.0888 0.115 0.134 
 (0.00625) (0.0104) (0.00644) (0.00531) (0.00996) (0.0114) 
High School 0.0349 0.0520 0.0702 0.0882 0.116 0.137 
 (0.00556) (0.00821) (0.00658) (0.00595) (0.0108) (0.0123) 
University 0.0226 0.0429 0.0609 0.0694 0.0929 0.119 
 (0.0103) (0.0120) (0.0108) (0.00798) (0.0118) (0.0135) 
Table D23 Predicted Probabilities of White, Brown, and Black ID 
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  1998 2003 2008 2013 2015 
White ID 
< Primary -0.0182 -0.0266 -0.0215 -0.0649*** -0.0600*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0178) (0.0182) (0.0195) (0.0200) 
Primary -0.00909 -0.0310* -0.0342** -0.0707*** -0.0774*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0163) (0.0168) (0.0186) (0.0190) 
High School 0.00574 -0.0553*** -0.0594*** -0.113*** -0.112*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0218) (0.0221) 
University -0.0353 -0.0753** -0.127*** -0.166*** -0.167*** 
 (0.0398) (0.0366) (0.0346) (0.0360) (0.0359) 
       
Brown ID 
< Primary -0.00819 0.0111 -0.00695 0.000596 -0.0201 
 (0.0221) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0207) (0.0210) 
Primary -0.0143 0.00686 -0.000307 0.00996 -0.00251 
 (0.0201) (0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0190) (0.0193) 
High School -0.0229 0.0199 0.00611 0.0320 0.00942 
 (0.0226) (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0217) (0.0216) 
University 0.0150 0.0370 0.0804** 0.0960*** 0.0715** 
 (0.0391) (0.0362) (0.0342) (0.0354) (0.0350) 
       
Black ID 
< Primary 0.0264* 0.0155 0.0285*** 0.0643*** 0.0801*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0115) (0.0106) (0.0144) (0.0154) 
Primary 0.0234* 0.0241*** 0.0345*** 0.0608*** 0.0799*** 
 (0.0121) (0.00897) (0.00820) (0.0118) (0.0130) 
High School 0.0171* 0.0353*** 0.0533*** 0.0808*** 0.102*** 
 (0.00992) (0.00862) (0.00814) (0.0121) (0.0135) 
University 0.0203 0.0383** 0.0468*** 0.0703*** 0.0959*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0149) (0.0130) (0.0157) (0.0170) 
Table D24 Change in Predicted Probability of Racial ID Relative to 1993 
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Priming Experiment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 White ID White ID Brown ID Brown ID Black ID Black ID 
Recognition x  -0.034 -0.135 0.057 0.083 -0.023 0.052 
Primary (0.123) (0.104) (0.132) (0.137) (0.110) (0.094) 
       
Recognition x -0.004 -0.168 0.037 0.090 -0.033 0.077 
High School (0.125) (0.106) (0.134) (0.139) (0.112) (0.096) 
       
Recognition x  0.071 -0.083 -0.061 0.034 -0.010 0.049 
University (0.118) (0.101) (0.127) (0.132) (0.106) (0.091) 
       
Quotas x  -0.025 -0.123 0.194 0.266 -0.168 -0.142 
Primary (0.123) (0.103) (0.132) (0.135)+ (0.110) (0.093) 
       
Quotas x 0.029 -0.100 0.178 0.280 -0.207 -0.180 
High School (0.121) (0.102) (0.130) (0.134)* (0.109)+ (0.092)+ 
       
Quotas x  0.040 -0.019 -0.045 0.073 0.005 -0.054 
University (0.120) (0.101) (0.129) (0.133) (0.108) (0.091) 
       
Both x  0.144 -0.138 0.197 0.296 -0.340 -0.158 
Primary (0.125) (0.106) (0.134) (0.139)* (0.112)* (0.095)+ 
       
Both x  0.058 -0.106 0.245 0.311 -0.303 -0.205 
High School (0.124) (0.106) (0.133)+ (0.139)* (0.112)* (0.096)* 
       
Both x 0.033 -0.037 0.104 0.183 -0.137 -0.146 
University (0.123) (0.105) (0.133) (0.138) (0.111) (0.095) 
       
Recognition 0.008 0.100 0.009 -0.025 -0.017 -0.075 
 (0.088) (0.075) (0.095) (0.099) (0.079) (0.068) 
       
Quotas -0.012 0.035 -0.054 -0.124 0.066 0.089 
 (0.087) (0.073) (0.093) (0.096) (0.078) (0.066) 
       
Both -0.072 0.069 -0.130 -0.207 0.203 0.138 
 (0.090) (0.077) (0.097) (0.102)* (0.081)* (0.070)* 
       
Primary -0.056 0.015 0.015 -0.026 0.041 0.011 
 (0.086) (0.074) (0.093) (0.097) (0.078) (0.066) 
       
High School -0.102 -0.065 0.053 0.007 0.049 0.058 
 (0.086) (0.073) (0.092) (0.097) (0.077) (0.066) 
       
University 0.040 -0.021 0.035 0.001 -0.075 0.021 
 (0.082) (0.073) (0.088) (0.096) (0.073) (0.066) 
       
Income  0.037  -0.049  0.012 
  (0.017)*  (0.022)*  (0.015) 
       
Age  0.026  -0.011  -0.015 
  (0.009)*  (0.012)  (0.008)+ 
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Female  0.028  -0.054  0.027 
  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.024) 
       
Recife  -0.025  0.025  0.000 
  (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.025) 
       
Skin tone  -0.326  0.035  0.291 
  (0.022)*  (0.028)  (0.019)* 
       
Constant 0.339 0.865 0.419 0.442 0.242 -0.307 
 (0.059)* (0.077)* (0.063)* (0.101)* (0.053)* (0.070)* 
Hair type FX N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 942 864 942 864 942 864 
R2 0.023 0.381 0.027 0.072 0.029 0.375 
Table D25 Testing for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Level of Education. + p < .1, * p < .05. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 White ID White ID Brown ID Brown ID Black ID Black ID 
Recognition x  0.110 0.141 -0.055 -0.087 -0.055 -0.055 
Medium (0.076) (0.079)+ (0.094) (0.099) (0.067) (0.070) 
       
Recognition x  0.068 0.065 -0.137 -0.138 0.069 0.073 
Dark (0.092) (0.094) (0.113) (0.118) (0.081) (0.083) 
       
Quotas x  -0.002 0.007 0.044 0.038 -0.041 -0.045 
Medium  (0.076) (0.079) (0.094) (0.099) (0.067) (0.069) 
       
Quotas x  0.031 0.038 -0.058 -0.092 0.028 0.054 
Dark (0.093) (0.095) (0.115) (0.119) (0.082) (0.084) 
        
Both x  0.027 0.023 0.036 0.019 -0.063 -0.041 
Medium (0.078) (0.080) (0.096) (0.100) (0.068) (0.070) 
       
Both x  0.060 0.065 -0.031 -0.068 -0.029 0.003 
Dark (0.093) (0.096) (0.115) (0.120) (0.082) (0.085) 
       
Recognition -0.045 -0.057 0.046 0.064 -0.000 -0.007 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.066) (0.069) (0.047) (0.049) 
        
Quotas -0.031 -0.031 0.011 0.022 0.019 0.009 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.066) (0.069) (0.047) (0.048) 
       
Both -0.037 -0.017 -0.010 -0.012 0.047 0.029 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.068) (0.071) (0.048) (0.050) 
       
Medium -0.566 -0.514 0.381 0.381 0.185 0.133 
 (0.055)* (0.059)* (0.068)* (0.074)* (0.048)* (0.052)* 
       
Dark -0.681 -0.630 -0.018 0.012 0.698 0.619 
 (0.063)* (0.069)* (0.078) (0.086) (0.055)* (0.061)* 
       
Income  0.039  -0.046  0.007 
  (0.016)*  (0.021)*  (0.014) 
       
Age  0.024  -0.005  -0.019 
  (0.009)*  (0.011)  (0.008)* 
       
Female  0.009  -0.024  0.014 
  (0.026)  (0.032)  (0.023) 
       
Recife  -0.001  -0.025  0.026 
  (0.027)  (0.034)  (0.024) 
       
educ2  -0.023  0.025  -0.002 
  (0.013)+  (0.016)  (0.011) 
       
Constant 0.681 0.642 0.309 0.294 0.011 0.064 
 (0.038)* (0.070)* (0.047)* (0.087)* (0.034) (0.061) 
Observations 942 864 942 864 942 864 
R2 0.371 0.401 0.169 0.189 0.399 0.427 
Table D26 Testing for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Skin Tone. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard 
errors in parentheses 
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List Experiment 
 
  Item Counts  
Row  0 1 2 3 4 Sum 
1 Treatment 0.600 0.312 0.059 0.019 0.011 1.000 
2 Treatment “at least” 1.000 0.400 0.088 0.030 0.011  
3 Control 0.581 0.316 0.082 0.021 0.000 1.000 
4 Control “at least” 1.000 0.419 0.103 0.021 0.000  
5 2-4 Joint 0.000 -0.019 -0.015 0.008 0.011 -0.014 
6 2-4 Conditional 0.000 -0.061 -0.250 0.450 n/a  
 Row 5 p-value  0.55 0.89 0.16 0.82 n/a  
Table D27 Evaluating Design Effects Assumption. Row 5 values for counts 1 and 2 are negative, 
suggesting a possible design effect. However difference-in-proportion tests do not reveal significant 
differences (p-values of 0.89 and 0.16, respectively). 
 
 
 Treatment (Ti=1)  Control (Ti =0) 
Response (Yi) Est. S.E.  Est. S.E. 
3 0.0101 0.0045  0.0120  0.0080 
2 0.0062 0.0099  0.0781  0.0157 
1 -0.0216 0.0187  0.3308 0.0254 
0 -0.0177 0.0312  0.6020  0.0220 
Table D28 Blair and Imai’s Statistical Test for Design Effects. Bonferroni-corrected p-value = 
0.43. 
 
 
 
 Full Sample  “At Least 1” 
 Mean N  Mean N 
Control 0.543 (0.033) 475  1.296 (0.040) 199 
Treatment 0.528 (0.035) 475  1.321 (0.032) 190 
Difference -0.014 (0.049) -  0.02 (0.063) - 
T-Statistic -0.48 -  0.01 - 
Table D29 Mean reported list items by treatment group. “At Least 1” reports means and difference 
among respondents claiming to have completed at least 1 activity listed. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
At Least 
1 
At Least 
1 
At Least 
1 
Treatment -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
       
Education  0.00 0.00  -0.04 -0.04 
  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) 
       
Age  -0.31* -0.30*  -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) 
       
Female  -0.39* -0.40*  -0.09 -0.10 
  (0.10) (0.10)  (0.10) (0.10) 
       
Income  0.18* 0.15*  0.03 0.03 
  (0.04) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) 
       
Brown ID  0.15 0.12  0.05 0.05 
  (0.12) (0.12)  (0.12) (0.12) 
       
Black ID  -0.01 0.02  0.03 0.07 
  (0.18) (0.18)  (0.18) (0.18) 
       
Skin tone  -0.10 -0.06  -0.01 0.01 
  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.09) (0.09) 
       
Recife   -0.37*   -0.05 
   (0.10)   (0.10) 
       
Constant -0.61* 0.66* 0.66* 0.26* 0.41+ 0.42+ 
 (0.06) (0.25) (0.25) (0.06) (0.25) (0.25) 
       
ln(alpha) -2.11* -15.18 -15.32 -51.23 -26.30 -26.30 
 (0.77) (642.85) (490.02)    
Hair type FX N N Y N N Y 
N 950 857 857 389 354 354 
Table D30 Negative Binomial Models of List Item Counts. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < .1, * 
p < .05 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment x   -0.12  -0.06  
Primary  (0.14)  (0.14)  
      
Treatment x   -0.07  0.05  
High School  (0.14)  (0.15)  
      
Treatment x   -0.19  0.01  
University  (0.14)  (0.14)  
      
Treatment x    -0.03  -0.09 
Medium   (0.11)  (0.11) 
      
Treatment x    -0.03  -0.13 
Dark   (0.14)  (0.14) 
      
Treatment -0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) 
      
Primary  0.31  0.09 0.05 
  (0.10)*  (0.10) (0.07) 
      
High School  0.23  -0.03 -0.00 
  (0.10)*  (0.11) (0.08) 
      
University  0.36  0.00 0.00 
  (0.10)*  (0.11) (0.08) 
      
Medium   0.00 -0.05 -0.00 
   (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) 
      
Dark   -0.09 -0.06 0.01 
   (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) 
      
Recife    -0.20 -0.20 
    (0.05)* (0.05)* 
      
Age    -0.14 -0.14 
    (0.02)* (0.02)* 
      
Female    -0.21 -0.21 
    (0.05)* (0.05)* 
      
Income    0.10 0.10 
    (0.03)* (0.03)* 
      
Brown    0.08 0.08 
    (0.07) (0.07) 
      
Black    0.03 0.02 
    (0.10) (0.10) 
      
Constant 0.54 0.31 0.56 1.17 1.14 
 (0.03)* (0.07)* (0.05)* (0.13)* (0.12)* 
Observations 950 950 950 857 857 
R2 0.000 0.020 0.003 0.150 0.150 
Table D31 Regression-Adjusted Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on the Full 
Sample. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
 254 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment x   -0.19  -0.20  
Primary  (0.21)  (0.22)  
      
Treatment x   -0.02  0.03  
High School  (0.21)  (0.23)  
      
Treatment x   -0.17  -0.12  
University  (0.20)  (0.22)  
      
Treatment x    -0.27  -0.35 
Medium   (0.14)+  (0.15)* 
      
Treatment x    0.07  -0.03 
Dark   (0.18)  (0.20) 
      
Treatment 0.02 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.20 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.10) (0.18) (0.10)+ 
      
Primary  0.18  0.12 0.02 
  (0.15)  (0.16) (0.11) 
      
High School  0.04  -0.05 -0.03 
  (0.15)  (0.16) (0.12) 
      
University  0.05  -0.08 -0.13 
  (0.14)  (0.16) (0.12) 
      
Medium   0.13 -0.03 0.14 
   (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) 
      
Dark   -0.04 0.05 0.05 
   (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) 
      
Recife    -0.06 -0.06 
    (0.08) (0.08) 
      
Age    -0.02 -0.02 
    (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Female    -0.14 -0.14 
    (0.07)+ (0.07)+ 
      
Income    0.05 0.04 
    (0.04) (0.04) 
      
Brown    0.06 0.08 
    (0.10) (0.10) 
      
Black    0.06 0.10 
    (0.14) (0.13) 
      
Constant 1.30 1.22 1.25 1.38 1.35 
 (0.04)* (0.12)* (0.07)* (0.20)* (0.18)* 
Observations 389 389 389 354 354 
R2 0.000 0.010 0.014 0.047 0.059 
Table D32 Regression-Adjusted Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects among “At Least 
1” Respondents. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Full model results from Imai and Blair’s multivariate list analysis 
 
 
 
 Least Squares Estimator  Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
 Linear  Nonlinear  Constrained  Unconstrained 
Variables OR 95% CI  OR 95% CI  OR 95% CI  OR 95% CI  OR 95% CI 
Sensitive Item                             
Age 1.00 (0.99, 1.00)   0.92 (0.79, 1.07)   0.93* (0.88, 0.98)   1.02 (0.99, 1.06)       
Female 1.04 (0.87, 1.25)   4.29 (0.04, 455.7)   2.56 (0.58, 11.2)   0.49 (0.15, 1.56)       
Education 0.99 (0.91, 1.07)   0.29 (0.03, 2.80)   0.48* (0.24, 0.97)   1.25 (0.76, 2.07)       
Skin tone 0.96 (0.85, 1.09)   0.08 (0.00, 15.48)   0.41+ (0.15, 1.16)   1.44 (0.73, 2.85)       
               
Control Item          h0(y;x,psi0)  h1(y;x,psi1) 
Age 0.99* (0.98, 0.99)  0.97* (0.96, 0.98)  0.97* (0.96, 0.98)  0.96* (0.95, 0.97)  0.90* (0.83, 0.97) 
Female 0.77* (0.68, 0.88)  0.55* (0.40, 0.74)  0.51* (0.40, 0.64)  0.60* (0.47, 0.76)  0.60 (0.10, 3.46) 
Education 1.03 (0.97, 1.10)  1.1 (0.95, 1.28)  1.15* (1.03, 1.28)  1.05 (0.94, 1.18)  0.80 (0.39, 1.63) 
Skin tone 0.97 (0.90, 1.05)  0.94 (0.76, 1.15)  0.94 (0.81, 1.10)  0.84* (0.71, 0.99)  0.52 (0.20, 1.38) 
Table D33 Multivariate Item Count Models of Racial ID Manipulation 
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Is there a 
state AA 
Law? 
Is the AA 
law race-
targeted? 
Year the law 
was passed 
Year the law 
was 
implemented 
Is there a 
Uni. Decree 
for AA? 
Is the decree 
race-
targeted? 
Year the 
decree was 
passed 
Year the 
decree was 
implemented 
code state aalaw1 aalaw2 aalaw3 aalaw4 decree1 decree2 decree3 decree4 
12 Acre  no no   no    
27 Alagoas  yes no 2004 2005 yes yes 2003 2004 
16 Amapá  yes yes 2008 2009 no    
13 Amazonas  yes no 2004 2005 no    
29 Bahia  yes no 2014 2015 yes yes 2004 2005 
23 Ceará  yes yes 2017 2018 yes yes 2014 2015 
53 Distrito Federal  no no   yes yes 2004 2005 
32 Espírito Santo  no no   yes no 2007 2008 
52 Goiás  yes yes 2004 2005 yes yes 2008 2009 
21 Maranhão  yes yes 2010 2011 yes yes 2006 2007 
50 Mato Grosso  no no   yes yes 2004 2005 
51 Mato Grosso do Sul  yes yes 2003 2004 no    
31 Minas Gerais  yes yes 2004 2005 yes yes 2008 2009 
15 Pará  no no   yes yes 2005 2006 
25 Paraíba  no no   yes no 2009 2010 
41 Paraná  yes no   yes yes 2005 2006 
26 Pernambuco  no no   no    
22 Piauí  no no   yes no 2008 2009 
33 Rio de Janeiro  yes yes 2001 2002 no    
24 Rio Grande do Norte  yes no 2002 2003 yes yes 2005 2006 
43 Rio Grande do Sul  yes yes 2014 2015 yes yes 2007 2008 
11 Rondônia  no no   no    
14 Roraima  no no   yes no 2012 2013 
42 Santa Catarina  no no   yes yes 2007 2008 
35 São Paulo  no no   yes yes 2004 2005 
28 Sergipe  no no   yes yes 2008 2009 
17 Tocantins  no no   no    
Table D34 State-Level Affirmative Action Laws and University Decrees 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Random FX Fixed FX Random FX Fixed FX 
Post-AA x -0.054* -0.054*   
Exam (0.003) (0.003)   
     
Post-AA x   0.030* 0.030* 
University   (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Post-AA 0.012*  0.012*  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  
     
Exam 0.217* 0.217*   
 (0.003) (0.003)   
     
University   0.039* 0.039* 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Constant 0.463* 0.472* 0.463* 0.472* 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
N 273,150 273,150 273,150 273,150 
Table D35 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Affirmative Action on Racial Identification 
(Conservative Coding). + p < .1, * p < .05. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates 
are computed relative to the baseline probability of nonwhite identification in high school. Post-AA is 
the treatment variable, capturing whether individuals enrolled in university after the implementation 
of affirmative action policies. Exam and University indicate the time when racial identification was 
measured. The dependent variable in these models is coded as white (0) if the respondent identified as 
white at any point during high school, any registration for the university exam, or at any point in 
university. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(A) 
High School 
(B) 
Exam 
(C) 
University 
 
(B) – (A) 
 
(C) – (A) 
Post-AA 
0.475 
(0.002) 
0.637 
(0.001) 
0.544 
(0.002) 0.163 (0.002) 0.069 (0.001) 
Pre-AA 
0.462 
(0.003) 
0.679 
(0.003) 
0.502 
(0.003) 0.217 (0.003) 0.039 (0.002) 
Difference 
0.012 
(0.003) 
-0.042 
(0.003) 
0.041 
(0.003) 
DiD = -0.054 
(0.004) 
DiD = 0.030 
(0.004) 
Table D36 Predicted Probabilites, Marginal Effects, and Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
Computed from Models 1 and 3 of Table D35 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Random FX Fixed FX Random FX Fixed FX 
Post-AA x -0.054* -0.054*   
Exam (0.003) (0.003)   
     
Post-AA x   0.034* 0.034* 
University   (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Post-AA 0.012*  0.012*  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  
     
Exam 0.217* 0.217*   
 (0.003) (0.003)   
     
University   0.004 0.004 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Constant 0.463* 0.472* 0.463* 0.472* 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
N 273,150 273,150 273,150 273,150 
Table D37 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Affirmative Action on Racial Identification 
(Liberal Coding). + p < .1, * p < .05. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are 
computed relative to the baseline probability of nonwhite identification in high school. Post-AA is the 
treatment variable, capturing whether individuals enrolled in university after the implementation of 
affirmative action policies. Exam and University indicate the time when racial identification was 
measured. The dependent variable in these models is coded as nonwhite (1) if the respondent identified 
as nonwhite at any point during high school, any registration for the university exam, or at any point in 
university. 
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APPENDIX E 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO CHAPTER SIX 
 
Survey Sample and Information 
This original survey was designed to compare Brazilians of varied skin tones 
within levels of education, and therefore stratified the sample by levels of education 
(less than primary, completed primary, completed high school, and some university or 
higher). Because nonwhite Brazilians are underrepresented in secondary and higher 
education, we oversampled darker skinned Brazilians in higher education groups, 
producing a sample that is, on average, slightly darker than the overall Brazilian 
population according to the 2010 census. Comparisons with the census data nonetheless 
show the sample is broadly representative of the national population in its racial 
composition, with whites undersampled and blacks oversampled.   
 
 
  White Nonwhite   Brown Black  
Brazil 47.7 50.8   43.0 7.8 
       
Regions 
(IBGE) 
Northeast 29.1 69.3   59.5 9.9 
Southeast 55.0 43.7   35.6 8.1 
             
States 
(IBGE) 
Pernambuco 36.2 62.2   55.5 6.7 
São Paulo 63.7 34.8   29.1 5.7 
             
Capital Cities 
(IBGE) 
Recife/PE 37.2 61.5   52.8 8.8 
São Paulo/SP 58.6 39.4   32.8 6.6        
Stratified 
 Random  
Sample 
Full Sample 39.6 59.6 
 
40.3 19.3 
Recife/PE 26.6 72.6  48.8 23.8 
São Paulo/SP 52.6 46.6 
 
31.8 14.8 
Table E1 Racial Representativeness of Stratified Random Survey Sample compared to 2010 
Census (IBGE). Nonwhite is the sum of black and brown identifiers. IBGE data comes from Table 
1379, which can be consulted at sidra.ibge.gov.br. 
This survey was conducted in two major cities in Brazil: São Paulo, the capital 
city of the state of São Paulo, which is located in Brazil’s southeastern region; and 
Recife, the capital city of the state of Pernambuco, located in the northeastern region. 
These two cities were selected for several reasons. First, because this survey employs 
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skin tone measurement techniques to mirror those used in the Project on Ethnicity and 
Race in Latin America (PERLA), in-person interviews are required for the application 
of the questionnaire in order for interviewers to observe skin tone as well as their 
evaluations of the respondents’ racial classifications. In-person interviews made the 
costs of nationally representative random sample prohibitive, and I thus selected two 
cities in regions of Brazil widely considered to capture subnational variation in historical 
conditions, socioeconomics, demographics etc. São Paulo is Brazil’s largest city and is, 
in a general sense, representative of the southeast region. Recife is the ninth largest city 
in Brazil, and is generally representative of the northeast.  
Second, these cities also mirror the qualitative fieldwork carried out and 
elaborated in Appendix B. Under the cost constraints of implementing a survey with in-
person interviews, survey questions were intended to test hypotheses generated from 
fieldwork without potentially introducing other unforeseen factors in other locations 
that might affect results.  
And third, many studies of race relations and politics in Brazil are carried out in 
Salvador (Bahia), which is seen as a site of black activism and culture. However 
Salvador underwent a process of re-africanization in an effort to attract greater tourism 
in the 1980s and 1990s, introducing a particular element into that city’s racial dynamics. 
Recife, by contrast, maintains a similar historical and sociodemographic profile to 
Salvador, but did not experience such cultural activism in recent decades. The selection 
of Recife/PE moreover allows us to expand beyond Salvador/BA in the study of racial 
politics in the Brazilian northeast. 
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Racial Identification Question Wording 
 This survey was designed to analyze racial identifications in a multidimensional 
way. This entailed measuring physical attributes commonly understood to inform (if not 
determine) one’s racial identification, like skin tone and hair texture, as well as 
capturing racial identity and identifications in multiple formats. In conformity with 
emerging standards in the study of race and ethnicity in Latin America (E. E. Telles 
2014), this survey asks the interviewers to collect information about the respondents, 
including the respondents’ rough positions on an 11-point color palette and a description 
of the respondent’s hair. Additionally, interviewers are asked to racially classify the 
respondents using the official census categories. Interviewers were instructed to collect 
this information using their own judgment and without informing respondents that such 
information was being collected. In the sequence of the questionnaire, these ascriptive 
measures were collected before any other racial information or attitudes were collected 
to avoid any influence from the respondents on the interpretations of the interviewers. 
 In addition to ascriptive measures, respondents were also prompted to provide 
several forms of racial self-declaration. First, respondents are asked to self-identify in 
racial terms in an open-ended format. For comparison to the interviewers’ 
classifications, respondents were then asked to self-classify using the official census 
categories. The close-ended census question reads: “The IBGE – the institute that does 
the census – classifies people in the categories white, black, brown, yellow, and 
indigenous. Which of these categories best describes how you identify?”46 The analyses 
presented in Chapter 6 make use of these three racial identification/classification 
questions to analyze patterns of identification and whitening/darkening, as well as the 
specific language choices individuals make when the identify. Including measures of 
                                                 
18046 In Portuguese, this reads: “O IBGE – instituto que faz o censo – classifica as pessoas nas 
categorias branca, preta, parda, amarela e indígena. Entre estas categorias, qual melhor descreve como 
você se identifica?” 
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physical attributes in these analyses as controls helps to separate racial identification 
from factors that may constrain individuals’ choice sets, and allow for more precise 
estimation of how socioeconomic factors shape patterns of identification and 
reclassification.  
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Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Education 2.56 1.10 1 4 1000 
Skin tone 1.79 0.74 1 3 1000 
Hair type 3.51 2.04 1 6 1000 
Income 0.81 0.83 0 9.5 912 
Age 4.04 1.56 1.8 8.4 1000 
Female 0.52 0.50 0 1 1000 
Political Identity 3.02 0.59 1 4.9 982 
City 0.50 0.50 0 1 1000 
Ideology -0.02 1.00 -2 2 775 
Civil Servant Exam 0.21 0.41 0 1 1000 
Vestibular 0.19 0.40 0 1 999 
Enem 0.25 0.43 0 1 1000 
Fies 0.05 0.21 0 1 996 
ProUni 0.05 0.21 0 1 997 
> 1 Program 0.43 0.50 0 1 1000 
Table E2 Summary Statistics of Independent Variables. Age is measured in decades. Income 
measures total household income per capita. Political identity is a composite variables computed as the 
mean of 5-category Likert responses to a battery of racial consciousness questions. 
 
 
  
Est. Delta-method Unadjusted 
Education Comparisons difference Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
Primary vs. < Primary 0.04 0.02 .0000393    .0897947 
High School vs. < Primary 0.09 0.04 .0025826    .1690800 
University vs. < Primary 0.12 0.06 .0068797    .2386561 
High School vs. Primary 0.04 0.02 .0025329    .0792957 
University vs. Primary 0.08 0.04 .0067914    .1489103 
University vs. High School 0.04 0.02 .0042248    .0696484 
Table E3 Comparing Marginal Effect of Political Identity across Levels of Education. Computed 
from Model 6 in Table 6.3. 
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 White ID vs. Brown ID  Black ID vs. Brown ID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education 0.05 -0.18* -0.20* -0.21* 0.86+ -0.22*  -0.16* 0.04 0.10 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.49) (0.10)  (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.62) (0.12) 
              
Skin tone  -2.40* -2.25* -2.10* -2.13* -0.53   2.14* 1.99* 1.87* 1.87* 1.48 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (1.07)   (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (1.25) 
              
Political Identity   -0.48* -0.42* 0.58 0.34    0.92* 0.80* 0.79 0.49 
   (0.17) (0.19) (0.48) (0.55)    (0.20) (0.21) (0.52) (0.90) 
              
Income    0.26* 0.25+ 0.27*     0.23 0.23 0.23 
    (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)     (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
              
Age    0.19* 0.18* 0.19*     -0.15+ -0.15+ -0.15+ 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)     (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
              
Female    0.12 0.13 0.13     0.19 0.19 0.19 
    (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)     (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
              
Recife    0.04 -0.00 0.03     0.23 0.22 0.23 
    (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)     (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
              
Political Identity x      -0.37*       0.01  
Education     (0.17)       (0.18)  
              
Political Identity x      -0.54       0.12 
Skin tone      (0.37)       (0.38) 
              
Constant -0.52* 3.56* 4.77* 3.65* 0.82 1.48  -0.32 -5.62* -8.42* -7.74* -7.67* -6.75* 
 (0.20) (0.38) (0.63) (0.76) (1.46) (1.64)  (0.21) (0.52) (0.86) (0.95) (1.84) (2.96) 
Hair type FX N N N Y Y Y  N N N Y Y Y 
N 942 942 925 851 851 851  942 942 925 851 851 851 
AIC 1989.94 1412.26 1363.10 1239.61 1238.64 1241.30  1989.94 1412.26 1363.10 1239.61 1238.64 1241.30 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < .1, * p < .05 
Table E4 Full Multinomial Logit Estimates for Section 3.2 Estimating Self-Identification as White, Black or Brown. 
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 Comparison 
Estimated 
Difference SE 95% CI 
Black ID 
Primary vs. < Primary 0.007 0.017 -0.026 0.040 
High School vs. < Primary 0.011 0.034 -0.055 0.077 
University vs. < Primary 0.014 0.050 -0.085 0.113 
High School vs. Primary 0.004 0.017 -0.029 0.037 
University vs. Primary 0.007 0.034 -0.059 0.073 
University vs. High School 0.003 0.017 -0.030 0.036 
 
     
Brown ID 
Primary vs. < Primary 0.039 0.025 -0.010 0.089 
High School vs. < Primary 0.078 0.050 -0.021 0.176 
University vs. < Primary 0.114 0.074 -0.031 0.258 
High School vs. Primary 0.038 0.025 -0.011 0.087 
University vs. Primary 0.074 0.049 -0.021 0.170 
University vs. High School 0.036 0.024 -0.011 0.083 
 
     
White ID 
Primary vs. < Primary -0.046 0.023 -0.091 -0.002 
High School vs. < Primary -0.089 0.043 -0.172 -0.005 
University vs. < Primary -0.128 0.060 -0.245 -0.011 
High School vs. Primary -0.043 0.020 -0.082 -0.004 
University vs. Primary -0.082 0.037 -0.154 -0.009 
University vs. High School -0.039 0.017 -0.073 -0.005 
Table E5 Pairwise Tests Marginal Effects of Political Identity on Pr(Racial ID) across Education Levels 
(Figure 6.3) 
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Coding Response Frequency 
White or euphemism 
Branca/o 261 
Caucaziano 2 
Clara 1 
Loiro 1 
Normal branca 1 
 Subtotal 266 obs. 
   
Mixed or euphemism 
Morena/a 83 
Parda/o 286 
Moreno clara/o 7 
Moreno pardo 1 
Morena clara e brasileira 1 
Normal parda 1 
Parda morena 1 
Pardo café com leite 1 
Mais ou menos parda 1 
Brasileiro pardo 1 
 Subtotal 383 obs. 
   
Black, negro or preto 
Negra/o 140 
Preta/o 58 
Negro pretão 1 
Normal negra 1 
 Subtotal 200 obs. 
   
Excluded 
Missing values 78 
Normal 54 
Amarela 11 
Brasileiro 4 
Indígena 1 
Mulata 1 
Pálida 1 
Afrodescendente 1 
 Subtotal 151 obs. 
 Total 1,000 obs. 
Table E6 Tabulation and Coding of Open-Ended Racial ID Responses 
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 White ID (or euphemism) vs. Brown ID (or euphemism)  Black ID (negro or preto) vs. Brown ID (or euphemism) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Political -0.91*  -0.40* -0.33 0.48  1.33*  0.87* 0.82* 0.65 
Identity (0.16)  (0.18) (0.20) (0.51)  (0.18)  (0.21) (0.22) (0.54) 
            
Education  0.13+ -0.07 -0.04 0.83   -0.05 0.24* 0.07 -0.15 
  (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.53)   (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.63) 
            
Skin tone   -2.25* -1.94* -1.96*    1.98* 1.73* 1.73* 
   (0.20) (0.21) (0.22)    (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) 
            
Income    0.30* 0.29+     0.54* 0.54* 
    (0.15) (0.15)     (0.21) (0.21) 
            
Age    0.23* 0.23*     -0.08 -0.08 
    (0.07) (0.08)     (0.08) (0.08) 
            
Female    -0.04 -0.02     0.44+ 0.43+ 
    (0.21) (0.21)     (0.25) (0.25) 
            
Recife    -0.22 -0.25     0.09 0.09 
    (0.22) (0.22)     (0.25) (0.25) 
            
Political Identity x     -0.30+      0.06 
Education     (0.18)      (0.19) 
            
Constant 2.27* -0.72* 4.23* 2.80* 0.51  -4.95* -0.53* -8.46* -8.48* -7.89* 
 (0.45) (0.21) (0.66) (0.80) (1.57)  (0.60) (0.22) (0.89) (1.01) (1.93) 
Hair type FX N N N Y Y  N N N Y Y 
N 835 849 835 772 772  835 849 835 772 772 
AIC 1632.46 1808.16 1243.20 1139.71 1140.61  1632.46 1808.16 1243.20 1139.71 1140.61 
Table E7 Multinomial Logit Estimates of Open-Ended Racial Identifications. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < .1, * p < .05 
  
 268 
 Lighter ID vs. Match  Darker ID vs. Match 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pol. Iden. 0.31  -0.68*  -0.67*  -0.00  0.75*  0.62* 
 (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.24)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.19) 
            
Education  -0.43* -0.38* -0.12 -0.16   0.11 0.04 0.01 0.03 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)   (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
            
Skin Tone   1.56* 1.54* 1.74*    -1.53* -1.64* -1.85* 
   (0.21) (0.24) (0.26)    (0.17) (0.20) (0.21) 
            
Income    -0.42+ -0.55*     -0.34* -0.30* 
    (0.24) (0.27)     (0.14) (0.14) 
            
Age    0.19* 0.19*     -0.20* -0.20* 
    (0.09) (0.09)     (0.07) (0.07) 
            
Female    -0.60* -0.61*     -0.28 -0.28 
    (0.26) (0.27)     (0.19) (0.19) 
            
Recife    -0.25 -0.23     0.06 -0.01 
    (0.27) (0.27)     (0.20) (0.21) 
            
Constant -2.87* -0.95* -2.39* -4.67* -2.90*  -1.19* -1.50* -1.18* 2.09* 0.56 
 (0.60) (0.25) (0.76) (0.74) (0.95)  (0.42) (0.22) (0.56) (0.51) (0.71) 
Hair type FX N N N Y Y  N N N Y Y 
N 921 938 921 862 849  921 938 921 862 849 
AIC 1500.94 1505.25 1293.51 1217.14 1183.07  1500.94 1505.25 1293.51 1217.14 1183.07 
Table E8 Multinomial Logit Estimates of Classification Mismatch. 
+ p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses 
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